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 This project argues for a new definition of community that is not grounded in the 
shared identity or shared history of its members.  Postcolonial, and more specifically, 
Caribbean literary theory, emphasizes three major types of community: nation, diaspora 
and “folk community,” despite the fact that these types reinforce the exclusion of specific 
“others” based on socioeconomic, racial, and gendered differences.  These notions of 
community also rely on static notions of history and identity that Caribbean cultural 
theorists (Stuart Hall, Edouard Glissant, and Wilson Harris), South Asian subaltern 
studies historians (Dipesh Chakrabarty and Partha Chatterjee) and feminist theorists 
(Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Carol Boyce-Davies, Anne McClintock and Donna 
Haraway) incisively critique.  Through the incorporation of these theorists in my 
examination of Maryse Condé’s I, Tituba, Black Witch of Salem, Zee Edgell’s Beka 
Lamb, Erna Brodber’s Louisiana, and Caryl Phillips’ The Atlantic Sound I derive a 
definition of community in Caribbean literature as praxis, rather than a static entity or 
body of individuals.  Reading community as praxis allows for the inclusion of the 
aforementioned excluded “others,” a re-visioning of historical realities, and the 
consequent increased possibility of effective struggle against multiple forms of 
oppression.  It also points us toward alternative forms of community that work within and 
against concepts of nation, diaspora, and “the folk” to complicate, oppose, and in some 
cases, transcend our understanding of how these forms operate.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: COMMUNITY AS PRAXIS IN CARRIBEAN LITERATURE 
 
 
The past, to which we were subjected, which has not yet emerged as history for 
us, is, however, obsessively present.  The duty of the writer is to explore this 
obsession, to show its relevance in a continuous fashion to the immediate present. 
(Glissant 63-64)  
 
 
In “The Quarrel with History,” Edouard Glissant delineates connecting the past to 
the present as an essential task for Caribbean writers.  For slaves of the Middl  Passage 
and their descendants, history is characterized by rupture; it “came together in the context 
of shock, contraction, painful negation, and explosive forces” (62).  Glissant deems “this 
dislocation of the continuum, and the inability of the collective consciousness to absorb it 
all . . . a nonhistory” (62).  The Caribbean writer, he suggests, must continually strive to 
transform this nonhistory into a viable history, because only that will lead “to the 
identification of a painful notion of time and its full projection forward into the future” 
(64).  In his argument, Glissant specifically locates the possibilities of the futur  in a 
revelation of “a painful notion of time.”  This concept encompasses not only the past as a 
painful temporality characterized by trauma for dispersed African peoples, but also the 
notion of linear, progressive time emphasized by European imperialists to justify the 
colonization of peoples ostensibly not as “advanced” as the Europeans (from the 
European standpoint, of course), and consequently unable to meet the Western
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requirements of modernity.  In short, Glissant claims that Caribbean subject will claim 
their futures as their own only if they reclaim classification of time and the past.   
I begin this chapter with Glissant’s theorization of history and time because the  
concepts are absolutely integral to reconceptualizing community. Glissant’s c ll for the 
reclamation of time and the past partially inspires my argument, but instead of positing a 
dichotomous relationship between history and nonhistory, or between seamless, linear 
time and ruptured time, I strive to recognize and acknowledge the existence of multiple 
temporalities and histories and how they affect our conception of communities. 
Caribbean literary scholars have not yet articulated a concept of community that 
transcends both Glissant’s “painful notion of time” and the multiplicity and movement of 
Caribbean identities.  Nation, diaspora and images of the “folk” still permeate our heory 
as the dominant modes of community in Caribbean literary texts, but these forms have 
proved limited and indeed, as some of the works I explore reveal, destructive to the 
psychological and material well-being of Caribbean subjects.  We need a theory of 
community that accounts for multiple temporalities and recognizes the flux and fluidity 
of identities if community is to be an effective source of sustenance or resistance from 
multiple forms of oppression.  As Audre Lorde so eloquently states, “without community 
there is no liberation, only the most vulnerable and temporary armistice between an 
individual and her oppression” (qtd Weiss and Friedman 4).  My study works toward an 
open theory of community, in that it turns away from exclusivist, identitarian ideologies 
that characterize many models of community in the Caribbean.  I argue that Caribbean 
community must be conceived as praxis rather than a body of individuals or a group 
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defined by specific, shared characteristics.  I further theorize Caribben communities, like 
identities, as continually in flux, and consequently open to the influence of other subject, 
ideas, histories, and, of course,  possible futures.     
Broadly speaking, we often think of community as a collectivity either 
accidentally or intentionally formed on the basis of shared values, interests, ance try, 
histories, identities, culture, or geographical location (Britton 3; Lee 9). In the Caribbean, 
however, historical trauma resulting from the Middle Passage, slavery, colonizati , 
economic underdevelopment and migration disrupts each of these terms.  For example, 
how can community be grounded in the shared history of a people when their past has 
been characterized as “nonhistory”?  What does shared identity mean in a region suffused 
with cultural heterogeneity, which theorists like Glissant and Antonio Benitez-Rojo 
highlight as the perfect ground for theorizing multiple, fluid, complex postmodern 
identities?  And what role can “shared geographical location” play for a community of 
Caribbean subjects who live in the Caribbean region, but who are also dispersed 
throughout the globe?  Clearly, the peculiar social, historical, and economic conditions 
that characterize the region suggest the need for an original theory of community 
unconstrained by these limitations. 
 In a study such as this, the term Caribbean holds the power to impose limitations 
on the choice of literary texts I explore.  Norman Girvan points out that Anglophone 
Caribbean subjects tend to refer only to other Anglophone islands when they refer to the 
Caribbean, and that the same is true for Hispanophone subjects (par. 1).  Indeed, although
some recent scholarship of Caribbean literature has attempted to bring the literatures of 
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Hispanophone, Anglophone, Francophone and other linguistic groups within the region 
into productive relation with one another, there remains a powerful division between 
these categories.  Moreover, the consideration of texts produced throughout the Afro-
Caribbean diaspora in the U.S., Canada, Great Britain and elsewhere only serves to 
complicate the matter of identification of a Caribbean literature pe  se. For example, 
Caryl Phillips, the author of The Atlantic Sound is most commonly known as a black 
British writer; my exploration of his work as Caribbean diverges from this common 
identification of his work.  My own definition of the Caribbean links with Girvan’s 
explanation of it as “a socio-historical category . . . a cultural zone characterised by the 
legacy of slavery and the plantation system. It embraces the islands and parts of the 
adjoining mainland—and may be extended to include the Caribbean Diaspora overseas” 
(par. 1).  In keeping with the rest of my efforts to resist exclusionary practices and locate 
communities in alternative spaces/times, I employ a definition of Caribben lit rature as 
that literature which explores in-depth the social, political, economic and personal issues 
that result from relations to this cultural zone, whether the subjects of those relations be 
in South America, Southwest Louisiana, Ghana, Puritan Salem, or elsewhere.    
Caribbean literary and cultural theorists tend to theorize community as a 
secondary concern in their discussions of identity, culture, history, subjectivity, literary 
form, nation, and diaspora.  For example, cultural theorist Stuart Hall argues that 
Caribbean identities should be conceived as positionings and repositionings infused with 
the presence of America (Présence Americaine), Africa (Présence Africaine), and Europe 
(Présence Européenne) (133).  His body of work takes identity and culture as its central 
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focus, rather than community.  Yet, his theorization of identity illuminates how to 
imagine alternative forms of community and helps us to move toward the specific 
elaboration of a viable diasporic community.  
While Hall prioritizes identity, Édouard Glissant and Wilson Harris theorize the 
productive possibilities of cross-cultural relationship, a possibly productive building 
block for the establishment of Caribbean communities constructed through difference 
rather than sameness. Glissant and Harris view literature as the primary s te through 
which cross-cultural relationships can be realized. Like Glissant and Harris, Kamau 
Brathwaite also takes Caribbean literature as his central concern, but he argues fo  an 
original West Indian literary form that will deal with “a specific, clear y-defined folk-
type community [and] will try to express the essence of this community through its form” 
(107).  Clearly, he deems the folk-community essential to the creation of a Caribbean 
literary aesthetic, but form remains his central analytical focus, not the characteristics or 
nature of the “folk-community.”      
 In addition to questions of identity, culture, history and literary form, explorations 
of nation and diaspora abound in Caribbean theory.  Indeed, these tropes comprise the 
most prominent models of community for scholars in the field. Yet, these theorists do not 
take community in and of itself as their main concern; instead, they seek to argue for the 
ways in which community or communities participate (or should participate) in these wo 
dominant frameworks.  For example, in The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon argues 
for the creation of a truly postcolonial nation model that fully integrates the rural 
masses—socially, economically, and politically.  His call for the centralization of the 
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peasantry’s power attempts to reverse the colonial and bourgeois nationalist order, and he 
claims that without such a reversal, the new nation becomes doomed to failure.  He does 
not actually contest the nation as a positive and productive mode of community; he 
simply articulates an alternative class-based power structure within the framework of the 
nation that will eventually lead to a form of transnationalism.    
Finally, in the face of the many failures of the Caribbean nation-state in the post-
independence period, theorists turned to diaspora as a propitious ground for an imagined 
international community.  Again, however, the focus in these studies veers away from 
community toward notions of identity and subjectivity.  In Black Women, Writing and 
Identity, Carol Boyce-Davies asserts that black women’s writing should be theorized 
through the concept of “migratory subjectivities,” rather than nationalist or Pan-
Africanist paradigms.  In The Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy points out that notions of 
modernity theorized by European theorists and philosophers—such as Hegel and Marx—
and the rise of the nation-state have influenced the modes of resistance (in theorization 
and artistic expression) that African diasporic subjects utilize in their att mpts to reclaim 
identities/histories/citizenship/etc.  Gilroy critiques essentialis  b ack nationalism as well 
as the never-ending pluralism that wholly rejects similarities between th  black 
experience in Africa, the Americas and Europe.  He counters these theories with the 
metaphor of the “ship”—an imagined space that contains both roots and routes—to 
define black identity in the webbed network of the black Atlantic.  His argument 
ostensibly addresses the diasporic community, but turns on the idea of identity rather th n 
community itself.   
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In this project, I have made community—as it is theorized and/or presented in 
Caribbean literature—my central analytical focus. The dominant theoretical dis ourses of 
community do not suffice to address the complexities of Caribbean reality nor do they 
thoroughly engage with the representations of community presented in the literature. For 
instance, community—national, diasporic or otherwise—typically implies a notion of 
identity as static or stable.  As with Fanon’s “rural masses,” community appears as a 
homogeneous, somewhat stable collective in opposition to the bourgeoisie, when in fact, 
cultural, linguistic, and religious differences (to name a few) may disrupt this group’s 
ability to cooperate in the political sphere. This elision of differences also occurs in 
nationalist discourses—as Anne McClintock, Carol Boyce-Davies and several others
have illustrated—that ignore racial and gender differences to posit a homogenized 
masculine national community.  Yet, as Stuart Hall explains, Caribbean identity is “not 
an essence, but a positioning” (132).  Most of the aforementioned Caribbean scholars 
agree with Hall about this particular notion of identity; hence, the ongoing discussion 
about continual processes of hybridity, metissage, creolization, migratory subjectivity, 
roots/routes and so forth.  These scholars provide invaluable insight into the theoretical 
import of this concept of identity.  Yet, theories of community itself in Caribbean 
scholarship still fail to fully incorporate this view.  We need a theory of community that 
will somehow, some way, account for the continual flux of Caribbean identities.   
My theory addresses this limitation by conceiving of community itself as 
grounded in praxis and moments of solidarity, rather than as a stable or static group of 
similar individuals. Praxis indicates “the processes of mediation through whic  theory 
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and practice become deeply interwoven with one another.  It is often traced back to Paulo 
Freire’s concept of liberation as praxis—that is, the cycle of action, reflection, and action 
through which human beings work to transform their worlds” (Lock Swarr & Nagar 6).  
In the texts I analyze, praxis operates both at the textual and the meta-textual levels; that 
is, it is rendered through authorial representations of characters and events in narrative, 
but it is also rendered through the text itself as performing a type of cultural and political 
work that broadens conceptions of community in the material world.  Thus, my analyses 
draw attention to the imagined work in the texts that might help us to transcend the 
limitations of current discourses of community, but also to the ways in which texts 
operate on readers and work as a form of theory.     
In my attempt to move away from identity-based communities, I draw on Stuart 
Hall’s work and the work of feminist theorists like Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Donna 
Haraway.  Mohanty thoroughly critiques essentialist identity politics and the heg monic 
postmodern skepticism that claims identity is “naïve or irrelevant.”  She reclaims identity 
as “a source of knowledge and [a] basis for progressive mobilization” and posits 
solidarity, “in terms of mutuality, accountability and the recognition of common interests 
as the basis for relationships among diverse communities” (6-7).   Similarly, Donna 
Haraway argues for the acceptance of “permanently partial identities and contradictory 
standpoints” in the service of realizing communities based on affinity—“related not by 
blood but by choice” (154-55).  Haraway’s theory attempts to open up a space in which 
to “see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and 
possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point” (154).  This space would be an 
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efficacious site for realizing non-dominating, non-exclusivist, non-hierarchical, and non-
oppressive communities, and it helps me to recognize such positive forms of community 
already extant in the Caribbean literary texts I explore.   
I also draw on Glissant to bolster my attempt to conceive of identities as fluid and 
multiple, without falling into the postmodern trap Mohanty references.  In Glissant’  
Poetics of Relation, he claims Relation identity is “linked not to a creation of the world 
but to the conscious and contradictory experience of contacts among cultures” and that it 
is “produced in the chaotic network of Relation and not in the hidden violence of 
filiation” (144).  Relation constitutes many things: it is akin to a relationship but not 
quite; it is the totalité-monde or total world—an imagined space in which the cultures of 
the world come into contact without generalization or obliteration of any one of them.  
Most importantly, it is the process whereby individuals or cultures interact with each 
other without eliding difference.  The notion of a relationship that works through rather 
than despite difference supports my efforts to construct a theory of how community can 
constitute a productive site of engagement among different subjects and cultures.   
In addition to Mohanty, Haraway and Glissant, I also draw on Houston A. Baker, 
Jr.’s notion of the blues matrix and Homi Bhabha’s theory of culture as an enunciatory 
site to advance my overarching thesis of community as praxis.  Baker reads African 
American culture as “a point of ceaseless input and output, a web of intersecting, 
crisscrossing impulses always in productive transit” (3).  I extend his metaphor to 
encompass Afro-Caribbean culture as well.  If we imagine culture as alw ys in 
productive transit, we must also recognize the continual movement of the community(ies) 
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grounded in that culture.  Similarly, Bhabha’s view of culture centers on its enactments, 
rather than culture as a stable object of study.  In different ways, Bhabha and Baker 
decenter the subject and re-center discourses in their interrogation of culture, and this 
opens up new ways of conceiving not just identity, but also the workings of agency in 
community.  Thus, these theorists help to illuminate the ways in which Caribbean 
subjects’ agency stems directly from the community—positing a radically different 
notion of community than those based on Western individualist paradigms in which the 
individual precedes the community.              
While theorizing Caribbean collectivities necessitates the incorporation of 
alternative identity concepts, reimagining history and temporality holds even more 
significance in my project.  Benedict Anderson’s theory of “homogeneous, empty time” 
aptly shows how central notions of time are in theorizing the ways in which communities 
come together. Glissant labels his “painful notion of time” as such because the concept of 
progressive, linear time constitutes a temporal vision that reinforces the Caribbean past as 
a discontinuum, a traumatic break, that is, as an incomplete or insufficient temporality. 
This ostensible insufficiency, in turn, reinscribes a limited view of the present and 
possible futures to be imagined for Caribbean communities in their various forms.  To 
contest both Anderson’s “homogenous, empty time,” and Glissant’s “painful notion of 
time,” and replace them with a conception that allows for the recognition of alternative 
histories, communities, and futures, I turn to the South Asian subaltern studies scholars 
Dipesh Chakrabarty and Partha Chatterjee for their novel theorizations of history and 
time.   
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Relying primarily on Marx for their theoretical framework, subaltern studies 
scholars critique the dominance of capitalist ideologies and modes of production 
embedded within the nation-state.  They further attempt to historicize the nation and 
nationalisms from a perspective “from below,” which, in their terms, specifically 
signifies the peasant class. Thus, they attempt to write histories from the standpoint of 
laboring subjects. In Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty contests the notion of 
history defined solely through the relentless march of capital, and instead posits 
“subaltern pasts” as those pasts which disrupt the hegemony of capital.  He labels thes  
two temporalities—the history that “lends itself to the reproduction of capitalist 
relationships” and the history that “constantly interrupt[s] the totalizing thrusts” of 
capital—H1 and H2, respectively (64-66).  I lean on Chakrabarty’s idea of H2 because it 
allows me to turn away from the debilitating theoretical limitations of H1—again, that 
“painful notion of time”—in locating and elaborating alternative forms of both natio l 
and non-national community.   
Although Chatterjee does not examine temporal concepts in the way that 
Chakrabarty does, his rendering of nationalism in the colonial and post-independence 
period in India boosts my own contestation of the Western model of national community.  
In The Nation and its Fragments, Chatterjee argues that Indian nationalists failed to 
create a productive national community post-independence because they submitted to 
Western ideologies of sovereign subjectivity, Enlightenment reason, progress, and of 
course, capitalism.  As a result, “autonomous forms of imagination of the community 
were, and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the postcolonial 
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state.”  He further argues that India’s “postcolonial misery” lies “noti  [i s] inability to 
think out new forms of the modern community but in our surrender to the old forms of 
the modern state” (10-11).  Postcolonial misery, painful notions of time, the inevitabl  
march of capital—all of these afflictions retard our imaginations concerning the possible 
forms Caribbean communities can take.  My argument takes up these theorists in the 
effort to locate the possibilities and alternative models for viable and productive 
Caribbean communities that I see Caribbean writers imagining through the literary texts 
they produce. 
Although theory helps me to construct my argument, the works I explore here 
brought me to my conclusions about how Caribbean communities should be imagined.  In 
short, my theory of open community grounded in various practices comes out of the 
representations of community that Maryse Condé, Zee Edgell, Erna Brodber an  Caryl 
Phillips have created.  All of these texts engage with what I have been callingthe 
dominant tropes of community in Caribbean theory—nation, diaspora, and “the folk”—
but they revise and reconstruct these forms in a way that rejects the identitarian 
restrictions embedded within them.  The texts I have chosen to include here are simil r in 
their strident contestations of historical knowledge and historiographical practices, but 
they are also indicative of a wide range of Caribbean, or Afro-Caribbean diasporic 
experiences.   
Condé’s text is set long before America itself had gained independence, and in her 
textual traversal of Africa, Europe, and America (different spaces), and vastly different 
temporalities, she creates a highly fictionalized, minimally historical text that depicts the 
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dispersal of African diasporic subjects during a period when the slave trade thrived.  Her 
text presents both diasporic and folk conceptions of community, both of which she 
problematizes and contests.  Edgell’s novel only incidentally addresses the African 
diaspora; it is most definitively a nationalist text that rejects most aspects of the Western 
nationalist paradigm.  Brodber’s novel explores the African diaspora—geographically 
and subjectively—but specifically through the trope of black nationalism (which the 
other texts barely acknowledge) and Phillips’ historical fictional text, like Condé’s 
traverses multiple temporalities and geographical spaces.  Yet, Phillips’ text is multi-
generic, whereas Condé’s is pure fiction.    Thus, between the texts I examine, we see a 
wide range of traditions and topics; Condé is a Francophone writer, although she takes 
issue with Patrick Chamoiseau’s directives for creating Francophone literature, nd 
Edgell, Brodber, and Phillips are Anglophone writers—although Phillips is often 
identified as a black British writer.  Thus, I intentionally include not only texts that 
disrupt dominant tropes of community in Caribbean theory, but also texts that disturb the 
static notion of Caribbean itself.      
In Chapter 1, “The Sacred Tradition of Solidarity in I, Tituba, Black Witch of 
Salem,” I argue that embedded in Maryse Condé’s representation of the cruelty and 
violence that results from exclusive concepts of  communities (like that of the Puritans in 
Salem) lies a hopeful representation of community as formed through the praxis of 
solidarity. The communities portrayed in the text are somewhat localized—the Puritan 
community in Salem, the slave community in Barbados, etc.—but I read them as 
indicators of the possibilities for a viable transnational model of community grounded i 
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resistance to raced and gendered injustice.   Tituba’s perpetual outsiderness allows her a 
form of freedom whereby she can work in solidarity with those whom she chooses, rath r 
than incorporate into a community conceived as a “body of individuals.”  Typically, her 
solidarity manifests through healing practices, but her ultimate incarnation as a slave 
rebel explodes notions of nation time that relegate women to the margins, outside of 
history.  Her outsiderness also allows her a more open worldview that inclines toward
morality and social justice more easily than the worldviews borne of “insideress” as 
demonstrated in the other characters.  Although the narrative content here repeatedly 
asserts the problems of community, I read Tituba metonymically as the positive model 
for an open community grounded in choice and a subsequent mutual sense of 
responsibility toward others which, in turn, makes her a somewhat moral agent in the 
communities she works with.   
 In Chapter 2, “Flexible Community in Beka Lamb,” I, like several other scholars, 
read the Lamb family as an allegorical figure of the nation.  I depart from these scholars, 
however, in their evaluation of this community; most critical readings focus on the 
failures of the national community depicted in this text because it centers on the complete 
destruction of young womanhood in the face of classist, racist and patriarchal nationalist 
ideologies.  These analyses seem to me to reinforce the very tropes of national 
community (especially shared identity, linear, progressive time, and gendered 
subjectivities) that Edgell works against in her text.  My own positive reading focuses on 
the alternative communal form that Edgell posits to contest the “old forms of the modern 
state.”  Edgell makes collective mourning rituals and inclusivist social and political 
15 
 
praxis the basis for a model of the viable nation that successfully addresses and integrates 
all of its citizens, and recognizes these citizens as agents who can enact change in their 
worlds.  Although the narrative ends in the pre-independence period, I argue that Edgell 
points us toward the way to imagining a national community that transcends the 
limitations inscribed by identity differences, and which contests the dominant Western 
and Caribbean nationalist paradigms.     
In Chapter 3, “The Blues Matrix and Community in Erna Brodber’s Louisiana,” I 
argue that Brodber’s representation of African-derived cultural discourses, identified 
mainly through the practice of voodoo, spiritism, and, of course, the blues, illuminates an 
already extant cultural unity that forms the basis of a possibly productive political unity 
through which diasporic subjects around the globe can contest racial oppression.  
Although Brodber’s narrative focuses on the protagonist’s small spiritual and familial 
communities, each member of these communities represents a constituent body of the 
African diaspora (African-American, Afro-Caribbean, Afro-European) and the 
protagonist, Louisiana, and her husband Reuben represent the unification of this 
community.    
Most of the criticism about this text argues for the realization of Brodber’s spirit 
world as a very real zone of ontological experience. It posits voodoo as a vehicle through 
which alternative ways of knowing and being can be realized.  While I agreewith this 
formulation, my own interest in community requires a turn toward how community 
becomes enacted, and I find Baker’s “blues matrix” and Bhabha’s notion of the 
enunciation of culture a fruitful ground for reading community as the embodiment of a 
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variety of cultural practices. Thus, I argue that Brodber’s representation of community 
occurs through discourses, and that these discourses illuminate a novel form of collective 
agency that is radically different from Westernized notions of community.  I also re-
center the material world in my reading, despite Brodber’s overwhelming emphasis on 
the metaphysical realm, and the consequent spirit-based readings of her work.  Doing so 
helps me to get past the critical focus on alternative epistemologies and uncover the 
nature and viability of her representation of community as opposed to more traditional 
representations of it.    
In Chapter 4, “Walking Into the Face of History”: Historical Difference and
Diasporic Community in The Atlantic Sound,” I argue that the narrative structure of the 
text, with its multiple narrators and its incorporation of subjects from various 
temporalities, escapes the limitations of a linear concept of history, and enacts Glissant’s 
Relation (cross-cultural relationship that works through difference).  In doing so, the 
structure contests Phillips’s apparent cynicism about the possibilities for diaspor c 
community.  Of all the texts that I examine, Phillips’ text performs most of its work at the 
meta-textual rather than the textual level.  As a traveling subject in search of a substantial 
foundation for community, the narrator consistently mocks these possibilities because of 
national, economic and cultural differences between diasporic subjects. His pervaive 
doubt has become the overarching guidepost in the criticism about this text, but I take a 
narratological approach in order to illuminate how Phillips’s text actually points toward 
the ways in which community manifests through writing—through the author’s textual 
striving toward spontaneous, productive moments of Relation. 
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In short, I argue for a definition of community as praxis and each of the texts I 
examine illuminate the different forms such praxis can take.  In I, Tituba, Condé 
theorizes community as the praxis of collective resistance and activism; in Beka Lamb, 
Edgell posits community as the praxis of collective mourning and political work; in 
Louisiana, Brodber imagines community as the praxis of constantly circulating cultural 
discourses; and, in The Atlantic Sound, Phillips conjures community through the praxis of 
his own writing, which occasionally brings him to establish Relation among different 
cultures, histories and subjects in time.    
Although my argument springs directly from my readings of these four texts in 
connection with historians, cultural theorists, and feminist theorists, and although my 
focus may appear to have an Anglophone bias (with the exception of Condé’s text), the 
theory of community as praxis applies to other Caribbean literary works as well.  
Consider, for example, Patrick Chamoiseau’s Texaco. Texaco tells the story of a 
Martinican grassroots community of shantytown dwellers who successfully resist the 
efforts of city officials to raze their unsightly, ragtag homes at the edg  of the city.  
Chamoiseau employs the tactics of linguistic mixing (French and Creole), multiple 
narration, and the representation of a diverse community to reinforce the impression of 
creolité or creoleness that Celia Britton claims dominates most critical accounts of the 
novel (103).  Creolité is about the mixing of cultures and languages in the formation of 
new identities that allow the fullest integration of the self (multiple selve) in Caribbean 
society and throughout the world.  As Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant point out in 
their well-known essay, “In Praise of Creoleness,” creoleness “is expressing a 
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kaleidoscopic totality, that is to say: the nontotalitarian consciousness of a preserved 
diversity” (892).  The emphasis here, once again, is on identity, consciousness, 
subjectivity, rather than on a more productive manifestation of community, even though 
creoleness may provide a sound basis for such a community.1   
Most analyses of Texaco do focus on the positive possibilities of alternative 
modes of collective existence, but they still turn on concepts of identity formation. The 
nature of the grassroots community and how it achieves its continued survival gets taken 
for granted because it is the ultimate end of the narrative. Unlike most scholar, Celia 
Britton focuses on community in her analysis of the text, but argues that Chamoiseu’s 
representation of it fails in terms of its openness and fluidity.  She claims the Texaco 
community is closed and exclusivist in relation to the city and that it is grounded i  an 
origin myth (akin to Glissant’s notion of filiation, where roots are valued and used as the 
justification for totalitarian oppression of others, or Bhabha’s notion of nationalist 
pedagogical time, in which nationalist texts repeatedly reinscribe the naion as a 
community created long ago) (99).  Thus, she reads failure instead of possibility into 
Chamoiseau’s literary depiction: “beneath the superficial multiplicity and heterogeneity 
of the text, there is a ‘secret order’ of unity and coherence” (100).  Perhaps this reading 
results from her implicit stress on identity in community; she claims that creole here has 
become a new form of essentialist identity (99).    
                                                          
1 Notably, Glissant, whose thinking obviously influenc s my work as well as Chamoiseau’s, criticizes 
creoleness and posits creolization as the continual productive process rather than a stable entity: 
“Creolization, one of the ways of forming a complex mix—and not merely a linguistic result—is only 
exemplified by its processes and certainly not by the ‘contents’ on which these operate.  This is where we 
depart from the concept of creoleness” (90).   
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 Applying my own methodology in an analysis of Texaco would of course, entail a 
discussion of creolité and diverse identities, but would go beyond this to emphasize how 
Chamoiseau illuminates a community that works together to protect and help one 
another. I would not deem it sufficient to discuss the ways in which such a diverse group 
comes together because of their poverty, homelessness, and social oppression, but would 
rather focus on how (through their collaborative efforts at guarding each other’s homes, 
warning each other of police invasions, building and rebuilding their shacks and shanties, 
and so on) and why this community ultimately succeeds.  Even the primary narrator’s 
name, Marie-Sophie Laborieux, indicates the significance of work in the reprsentation 
of the community both in/through her writing of multiple histories and through her active 
defiance of the police and city and corporate officials.  Time will not allow a more 
thorough development of a textual analysis here, but suffice it to say that my theory of 
community provides a critical lens that uncovers the success, creativity and possibilitie  
of community presented in literature where other views (such as Britton’s) only see 
failure, dysfunction and lack. 
In closing, I should point out that I recognize reading these texts against the grain 
as I do is a risky business. Yet, I contend that the pervasive influence of limiting tropes 
such as nation and patriarchy still need to be repeatedly contested, problematized, and 
challenged in our theory and through our reading. If we read a literary critique of nation 
as simply that and nothing more, wherein lies our hope for the possibilities that 
alternative forms of the nation might arise—forms that do not oppress those considered 
“outsiders,” like women, people of color, and immigrants?  As Glissant attests, “thought 
20 
 
in reality spaces itself out into the world.  It informs the imaginary of peoples, th ir 
varied poetics, which it then transforms, meaning, in them its risk becomes realized” (4).  
My project argues for a hopeful alternative to theoretical notions of community in 
Caribbean literature in the anticipation that this thought, too, might eventually sp ce itself 
out into the world.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE SACRED TRADITION OF SOLIDARITY IN I, TITUBA, BLACK WITCH  
OF SALEM 
 
 
The model of community presented in Maryse Condé’s I, Tituba, Black Witch of 
Salem repeatedly stresses the protagonist’s differences with and consequent exclusion 
from the communities in which she lives.  The differences Condé draws between Tituba, 
the slaves, the Puritans, and the persecuted Jews contest any notion that Tituba views or 
enacts community as a form of commonality or unity.  From a young age, Tituba’s 
“witchcraft” locates her on an existential plane between the spirit world and the human 
world; consequently, she does not quite fit into either.  One might argue that this in-
between position places her as the link between the two worlds and indicates a unique 
plane of her particular diverse, hybrid identity, but Condé consistently invokes Tituba’s 
separateness from both, thereby complicating such a reading.  Indeed, the “I” in the 
novel’s title not only signifies Tituba’s forceful reclamation of her historical presence, 
but also (and perhaps more significantly) the sense of solitude that results from her 
peculiar connections to the spiritual and material, her life choices, the actions of those 
around her, and the practice of her craft. As Delphine Perret points out, Tituba “the 
‘witch’ is isolated in groups which do not share her knowledge [;] . . . her destiny 
depends more on her desire [and]  . . . her own choices” (652).  I argue that in this 
emphasis on the “I,” Condé intentionally reinscribes Tituba’s singularity—her 
separateness, division and difference from all others—more than her diversity or 
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hybridity, and that this method paradoxically opens up a space for envisioning a novel 
form of unbounded, potentially moral community. Rather than emphasize Tituba’s hybrid 
self in an attempt to show how an individual can belong to multiple communities at once, 
I focus on Tituba’s singularity and outsiderness from the communities with whic s e 
lives and works.  This analytical turn attempts to loosen the ties that bind identity to 
community even as it recognizes the impossibility of the task, because of course, Tit ba’s 
identitarian differences (“witch,” voluntary slave, black, female, rebel) set the very terms 
of her outsiderness.   
It may perhaps seem odd that a novel such as I, Tituba—in which the excluded 
protagonist’s primary concern is to write herself back into history—would warrant 
inclusion in a study of community. Indeed, along with her singularity, the combination of 
first-person narration and the repeated egotistical claims of the narrator—“Tituba must be 
loved!”—testifies to a definitive focus on the individual self in this text (12).  Yet, critics 
generally agree that the intentional destabilization of cultural value systms, identities, 
histories, and political views undergirds much of Condé’s writing, and in keeping with 
their conclusions, I argue that in I, Tituba, this tendency leads her to locate a potential 
model of community in a partially isolated, atomistic protagonist who belongs to no 
community at all.2  In my analysis, I read Tituba metonymically as Condé’s theorization 
of an innovative form of community.  Although Condé’s destabilizing praxis somewhat 
precludes the establishment of a clearly discernible theory of community, it does present 
the possibilities and limitations of one.  As Leah Hewitt observes of Condé’s work: “[her] 
                                                          
2 See Bécel, Hewitt, and Simmons. 
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narratives criticize sexual, political, and racial oppositions [and] keep all terms in play: 
no cliché goes unexamined, no position on either side of an opposition is left to solidify 
into an unquestionable truth. The truths that we find in her works are multiple, partial and 
provisional” (649).  Because of Condé’s resistance to capital “T” “truth,” and the 
mutability of meaning as she presents it, critique of I, Tituba presents a formidable 
challenge.  As I elaborate the ways in which Condé’s Tituba embodies “perpetual 
outsiderness,” “friendship,” “solidarity” and “affinity,” and the ways in which these 
tropes inspire collective resistance as the foundation for community, I find myself not 
only arguing for an oxymoronic “community of outsiders,” but also deploying the very 
concepts of community and identity which I mean to disavow.3  Stuart Hall has declared 
the need for a politics of identity that problematizes the postmodernist model of “infinite 
dispersal,” while at the same time is not “founded on the notion of some absolute, 
integral, self . . . , a politics which accepts the ‘no necessary or essential correspondence’ 
of anything with anything” (118).  In my turn to outsiderness as the potential site for such 
a politics, I attempt to address this need and consider its implications for a theory of 
community.   
Outsiderness, as opposed to commonality or unity, allows Tituba to live 
consciously in multiplicity and flux, to choose her associations as she sees fit, and to act 
accordingly.  As presented in the narrative, outsiderness is a vexed term.  It undoubtedly 
                                                          
3 In centering my analysis on Tituba’s division from the communities in the text, I tend to generalize these 
collectives, as in “the slave community,” “the Puritan community,” etc. Of course, internal differences 
abound within these groups, but an in-depth discussion of them is beyond the scope of this chapter since I 
argue that Tituba stands as a metonym for the model of community Condé proffers in this text.  Suffice t to 
say that I do not imagine these groups as unified monoliths, but rather invoke their sameness as the “other” 
of Tituba as a site for the re-imagination of community.   
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contributes to the ostracization, abuse, violation and cruelty that Tituba suffers at the 
hands of the Puritans, the Barbados plantation owners, and Christopher, the leader of the 
maroons.  Yet, at the same time, Tituba continually invokes the position as one that 
allows her to voluntarily act in solidarity with various others at different points in time, 
and more specifically, to treat her persecutors more humanely than they do her. The 
distinction between these behaviors directly relates to the position from which one acts.  
As the outsider to various communities, Tituba experiences suffering but clings to a sense 
of independent agency in her repeated assertion that she will not “become like them” 
(29).  Insiders, on the other hand, cannot easily withstand the pressures to cooperate with 
those in the communities to which they “belong,” which explains why, for instance, 
Betsey Parris and her mother—erstwhile friends of Tituba—turn against her and accuse 
her of witchcraft.  The Puritans of Salem village—historically and in Condé’s text— ach 
us nothing if not the destructive effects of a bounded, exclusionary community grounded 
in a rigidly enforced unity.  Condé demonstrates how, in contradistinction to the Puritans, 
the refusal to immerse herself into any community allows Tituba to 1) act in friendship 
and solidarity through her affinity with others—even when those others work from within 
specific, bounded communities, 2) intentionally reject the violence and depravity enac ed 
by certain others in those communities, and 3) fight against various forms of tyrannical 
and destructive power. Perhaps, Condé seems to suggest, the conscious decision to resist 
enclosure, sameness and unity might lead to the creation of a collectivity of perpetual 
outsiders better equipped to fight together against various forms of oppression and ensure 
the survival and potential healing of the oppressed.  Conde’s text illuminates a 
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community that transcends racial and gendered difference, and simultaneously brings 
together African, Caribbean and American subjects.        
My conceptions of affinity, solidarity and friendship draw on the feminist theory 
of Donna J. Haraway, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, and Marilyn Friedman, respectively.  
Haraway argues that “with the hard-won recognition of their social and historical 
constitution, gender, race, and class cannot provide the basis for belief in ‘essential’ 
unity” (155).  Since there is nothing essential in these characteristics that bind individuals 
to one another, and since identities are always partial, groups (especially women) must 
recognize and strategically implement alternative structures of coalition in order to 
collectively resist domination and oppression. In Haraway’s view, such alternativ s re 
created through a coalitional politics grounded not in identity, but in affinity, i.e. throug  
the collective action of those who are “related not by blood but by choice” (155).  Her 
emphasis on choice simultaneously highlights women’s agency and contests totalizing 
discourses about ostensibly “natural” collectivities that ignore the multitude of 
differences that exist within any group.  Mohanty’s consideration of solidarity similarly 
emphasizes women’s choices; as she explains, “rather than assuming an enforced 
commonality of oppression, the practice of solidarity foregrounds communities of people 
who have chosen to work and fight together” (7).  Both Haraway and Mohanty stress 
collective political action, but Mohanty defines solidarity “in terms of mutuality [and] 
accountability” (7), whereas Haraway focuses more on the individual’s struggle to “s e 
from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities 
unimaginable from the other vantage point” (154).  While affinity and solidarity hold 
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explicitly political connotations, Friedman’s concept of friendship focuses more on 
women’s choices in the domestic, partially apolitical sphere.  Through her reprsentation 
of Tituba, Condé utilizes, problematizes and plays with these models of feminist 
community to create an innovative form of her own.       
Although I am not only concerned with feminist community in I, Tituba, I find 
these notions helpful because they stress relationships and the voluntary actions of those 
who choose to collaborate, rather than the supposed cohesion of a group based on their 
shared oppression.  Condé’s Tituba remains ever aware of her differences from the 
groups with which she lives (the Puritans, the slaves, the Jewish community, and the 
maroons), but a strong affinity exists between them, and this feeling inspires her to help 
them survive and struggle in any way she can.  The concept of affinity, in particular, 
deemphasizes identity as the foundation for communities and highlights shared goals 
instead, which helps us to move toward a theory of community that incorporates a 
multiplicity of differences more effectively.  If outsiderness allows one t  act with some 
degree of independence, affinity allows one to work with others toward particular shared 
objectives. Of course, circumstances limit Tituba’s choices, but they do not completely 
preclude her acting upon her own desires, needs, and interests within these limitations.  
Thus, Condé presents a complex portrait of a socially constituted self asserting ome 
agency within a network of oppressive forces, both for her own benefit and the benefit of 
others.   
Unlike most historical seventeenth-century Africans in Barbados (and, most 
likely, the historical Tituba), Condé’s Tituba lives on the edge of a plantation alone nd 
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“free” for a good part of her life.4 She is an orphan; at the age of seven, her mother Abena 
is hanged for trying to kill Darnell—the plantation owner who attempts to rape her—and 
her beloved adoptive father Yao commits suicide by swallowing his own tongue. When 
Darnell runs young Tituba off the plantation, she is saved, she claims, by that “almost 
sacred tradition of solidarity among slaves” (8).  Thus, in the narrator’s own wrds, 
solidarity forms the ground of her very survival, even as it forms the break that initilly 
severs her from the slave community.  The slaves do not take her in themselves, nor do 
they bring her to another plantation; instead, they give her to Mama Yaya—a healer 
woman who lives alone in the woods.  This action positions Tituba as an outsider and at 
the same time, grants her a young life of relative freedom she might never have known 
otherwise.  Thus, Condé highlights how solidarity itself creates a form of freedom for the 
individual that would be unattainable through other modes of community that require 
inclusion or incorporation.   
The model of solidarity presented here directly contests immersion or 
incorporation into a community. Moreover, this “sacred tradition”—the foundational act 
of solidarity that saves Tituba’s life—not only protects her from the violence and 
oppression from which the slaves suffer, but it also reinforces the line between slavery
and freedom that divides them.  The slaves effectively ensure Tituba’s safety by allowing 
her to live on the margins of the plantation; thus, solidarity here not only allows, but 
creates a difference that ultimately reinforces the positive ends of solidarity.  When the 
                                                          
4 In her historical account of the slave woman Tituba’s life and influence in the Salem witch trials, Elaine 
Breslaw argues that “Tituba was just a child, somewhere between nine and fourteen years old, in 1676.  
While still a child she was in all likelihood sold in Barbados as a slave and subsequently brought to 
Massachusetts by Samuel Parris” (12).   
28 
 
slaves give Tituba to Yaya, they do so out of a desire to ensure her safety—a luxury none 
of them seem to enjoy.  Subsequently, when Tituba becomes an adult, she uses her 
powers to heal and comfort the sick and dying.  In both instances, solidarity acts to ensure 
safety and healing that (perhaps not immediately) mutually benefit both parties, but do 
not require the suppression of differences among them.  Moreover, as a “free” woman, 
Tituba voluntarily chooses association with the slaves, demonstrating how acts of 
solidarity exert more pull on one’s choices than do the ostensibly natural loyalties 
embedded in what Friedman labels “communities of origin.”           
Ironically, when Tituba becomes an adult and consciously decides to become a 
slave by marrying John Indian, she remains unincorporated in the slave community 
because the decision only serves to buttress her difference from the other slaves. Condé 
repeatedly reminds us that Tituba consciously chose her chains and this astonishing fact 
creates an even sharper, more unforgettable division between them: 
 
The slaves who flocked off the ships in droves . . . were far freer than I was.  For 
the slaves had not chosen their chains.  They had not walked of their own accord 
toward a raging, awe-inspiring sea to give themselves up to the slave dealers and 
bend their backs to the branding iron.  That is exactly what I had done.  (25)   
 
 
Paradoxically, Tituba’s partial autonomy leads her to enslavement and a life none of the 
slaves would actually choose.  The choice illuminates an insurmountable difference that 
separates her from those who were physically forced into bondage.  In constructing a 
“free” woman who chooses slavery, Condé makes Tituba into a perpetual outsider, yet 
this “outsiderness” is borne of her affinity for slaves in general, and John India i  
particular.  In a time when race played a significant role in determining one’s fre dom or 
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enslavement, Tituba does not automatically belong to the class of slaves whose only ways 
out of slavery’s miseries are rebellion, escape and survival in hostile conditions, or death.   
Although Mama Yaya tells Tituba that there’s no way to escape “the white man’s world,” 
Condé clearly places responsibility for re-entry into that world in her hands: Tituba 
struggles with herself for seven days and in the end, confesses that she “was beaten” and 
moves in with John Indian (19-20). By painting her protagonist’s choice in this way, 
Condé here illustrates the complexity of the relationship between freedom and agency.  
Although Tituba appears to live and act independently after Yaya’s death, Condé shows 
that the community of slaves still conditions this freedom and independence.  Agency, 
she suggests, does not simply equate with freedom; the agency of one who stands outside 
of all communities remains inextricably linked to those who stand “inside.”         
 Despite the deep rift that separates Tituba from the slaves, Condé still represents 
her as identifying with this particular group throughout the text. Condé’s description 
explicitly shows how Tituba’s own suffering typically inspires her acknowledgement of 
theirs.  When she is in jail awaiting trial, she imagines escape and a return to Barbados: 
 
I am back on the island I thought I had lost! . . . But the men and women are 
suffering.  They are in torment.  A slave has just been hung from the top of a 
flame tree.  The blossom and the blood have merged into one.  I have forgotten 
that our bondage is not over.  They are sending us up in the air like fireworks.  
Look at the confetti made with our blood! (102 my emphasis) 
 
 
The sheer inconsistency of Tituba’s narrative voice here illuminates her simultaneous 
exteriority and affinity to the slave community.  Her initial use of the third-person 
referents “the men and women” and “they” gives way to the first-person “our” and “us.”  
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This does not, however, signify her inclusion in that community of slaves, for the salient 
line in this passage, “I have forgotten,” contests such a reading.  Those who remain in the 
bondage to which she refers can never forget the sine qua non of their daily living 
conditions.  Instead, Tituba’s imagined relation to the violence inflicted on the slaves 
establishes the type of identification that Stuart Hall defines as arbitrary closure:  “the self 
is always, in a sense, a fiction, just as the kinds of ‘closures’ which are required to create 
‘communities of identification’—nation, ethnic group, families, sexualities, etc.—are 
arbitrary closures; and the forms of political action, whether movements, or parties, o  
classes, those too, are temporary, partial, arbitrary” (117). As the language she assigns to 
Tituba demonstrates, Condé recognizes these closures as fleeting, but in general, she 
shows how members of such communities of identification do not or cannot recognize 
their identities or their communities as temporary or arbitrary. For chara ters as diverse 
as Mama Yaya, Yao, Samuel Parris, and Benjamin Cohen d’Azevedo, the “us versus 
them” dichotomy that motivates their senses of community permeates all of their lived 
relations and their consequent world views. No space exists in these views for the 
recognition of possible transcendence, disruption, or contestation of the dividing lines 
between different racial, class, and ethnic groups.  For Tituba, however, division from the 
communities with which she interacts not only allows, but also forces her continual 
awareness of community as arbitrary and partial.  Thus, she is able to identify 
simultaneously with the slaves across difference, recognize the destructive capabilities of 
white men and women like Samuel Parris and Susanna Endicott, and still refuse 
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entrenchment within the “us versus them” dichotomy.  Through Tituba, Condé draws out 
the productive effects of lived awareness of arbitrary, partial community.     
 As Condé presents it, a moral aspect is embedded within this subjective location.  
When Tituba wants to take revenge against Susanna Endicott for all the humiliation she 
makes Tituba endure, Mama Yaya advises against it: “Use your powers to serve you  
own people and heal them. . . . if she does die. . . you will have perverted your heart into 
the bargain.  You will have become like them, knowing only how to kill and destroy” 
(29-30).  This injunction reveals two common assumptions that undergird conceptions of 
race-based communities of identification: 1) that African ancestry necessarily signifies 
slaves as one’s “people,” and 2) that white men and women, collectively and 
individually, only perpetrate death and destruction.  In Mama Yaya, Condé demonstrates 
how this view not only differentiates between white and black on the basis of race, but 
also how it translates into a form of moral equivalence wherein black men and women, 
by virtue of their suffering, are believed morally superior to white men and women. Of 
course, this worldview seems reasonable within the text, especially since Mama Yaya’s 
“man” and her two sons had been tortured to death for instigating a slave revolt (8).  In 
her experience and in the experiences of many slaves—fictional and real—white men and 
women appear devoid of any moral values.  At first glance, Tituba appears to subscribe 
to, and perhaps even enact, this dialectical view.  Her actions seem inspired by th  desire 
to maintain this sense of moral superiority over characters like Samuel Parris and 
Rebecca Nurse by refraining from perpetrating revenge against them.  However, Condé’s 
portrait of Salem village and Tituba’s actions throughout the text actually demonstrate a 
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more complex, unstable and ambiguous politics of identification at work wherein neither 
group definitively inhabits a morally superior position.  In this, she destabilizes the 
binaristic conception of historical race relations as black victimization/white hegemonic 
power, and offers a more complex picture of the way such relations played out, and their 
consequent effects on conceptions of morality.          
After Mama Yaya offers Tituba her crucial advice, Tituba often considers th  
question of taking revenge or harming those who hurt her and those she loves, but always 
decides against it.  She refuses to use her powers for evil, and this rejection often seems 
motivated by the dichotomy first invoked by her mentor.  Yet, Condé explodes this 
assumption when Little Sarah—a miserable, oft-beaten slave woman—asks Tituba to 
help her get rid of Priscilla Henderson (her mistress). Tituba refuses, remembering Mama 
Yaya’s command, but Sarah retorts: “Knowledge must adapt itself to society.  You are no 
longer in Barbados among our unfortunate brothers and sisters.  You are among monsters 
who are set on destroying us” (68).  When Tituba, troubled but still steadfast, reiterates 
her refusal, “the contempt in [Sarah’s] eyes burn[s her] like acid” (68).  Here, Condé 
shows us a hint of the death, destruction and violence that Sarah would perpetrate against 
the white masters and mistresses if conditions allowed.  Tituba’s refusal signifie  that 
although she also lives a life of oppression and hardship, and feels a desire for revenge, 
she will not succumb to it.  Indeed, it is because she will not adapt her knowledge in such 
a way as to make it equal to the cruelty enacted upon her, John Indian, Little Sarah, and 
others, that we recognize her outsider status as the direct motivation for her moral 
behavior.         
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Although Sarah’s desire is for revenge (i.e. violence in response to violence 
committed against her), Condé orders the narrative in such a way as to draw a direct 
connection between the slave woman’s understandable desire and Rebecca Nurse’s 
absurd one.  As Tituba walks home from her conversation with Sarah, Nurse asks Tituba 
to “punish” her neighbors for allowing their hogs to ruin her vegetable garden.  
Emphatically, Tituba exclaims to herself: “Oh no, they won’t get me to be the sam  as 
they are!  I will not give in.  I will not do evil!” (68-9). Again, Tituba’s use of the
pronoun “they” is telling; it applies equally to Sarah and Goody Nurse and the groups—
slave and Puritan—to which they belong.  Thus, Condé groups them together on the basis 
of their violent desires, and disregards their racial and class differences.  Both characters 
want Tituba to use her skills to harm others.  Tituba ignores their entreaties, and in this 
way, Condé demonstrates how Tituba’s sense of morality, inspired by outsiderness, 
transcends that of both groups, even as it is clearly dependent upon relationships with 
members of those groups.5  Although she stands apart from these communities, their 
beliefs and values still affect her in multiple ways.  Thus, in Tituba, Condé illuminates a 
self that simultaneously merges the theoretical atomistic individual of liberal theory and 
the socially constituted self of communitarian theory, while effectively problematizing 
both.    
                                                          
5 In her interview with Ann Armstrong Scarboro, Condé explains that I, Tituba is somewhat a parody of 
black female writing, both in its incorporation of the invisible spirit world and in its representation f 
Tituba and Hester Prynne’s discussion of feminism “in modern terms.”  Condé entreats readers: “Do not 
take Tituba too seriously, please” (212).  Although she doesn’t say so in the interview, Condé may ver
well be parodying Tituba’s unrealistic code of ethics too; I will be the first to admit that Tituba is “too good 
to be true.” Nevertheless, within this parodic discur ive construction lie the seeds of possibility for the 
ways in which outsiderness can lead to an alternative theory of the link between morality and community.   
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Before moving on to explain how Condé problematizes these concepts, I should 
point out that I do not read I, Tituba as a literary text only.  In my view, the text 
discursively engages with theoretical notions of selfhood, community, identity, morality, 
feminism, and multiple manifestations of difference.  As Carol Boyce-Davies reminds us, 
“for Black women’s writing, it is premature and often useless to articulate the 
writer/theorist split so common in European discourses, for many of the writers do both 
simultaneously or sequentially” (35).  In I, Tituba, the “black witch” serves as the 
grounding for Condé’s theorization of a community of perpetual outsiders and collective 
resistance, and the implications of such a theory. Through Tituba, Condé explores notions 
of self, community, identity and history, and her work contributes to several ongoing 
debates in cultural studies, feminist theory, and communitarian theory.        
A key element in Condé’s engagement with theory lies in her conceptualization of 
the self.  In arguing that Tituba’s outsiderness inspires her morality, I do not mean to 
represent her as a simple model of the liberal, “individualist” self—a “self—atomistic, 
pre-social, empty of all metaphysical content except abstract reason and will—[who] is 
allegedly able to stand back from all of the contingent moral commitments and norms of 
[her] particular historical context and assess each of them in the light of impartial and 
universal criteria of reason” (Friedman 189).  Condé makes Tituba’s notions of right and 
wrong and self-reflexive evaluation of her moral commitments stem directly from the life 
experiences she creates for her protagonist.  That is, one’s sense of morality c mes from 
one’s social, economic, racial and historical positioning. Moreover, ideals of right and 
wrong are not grounded in “abstract reason,” but instead develop out of affective 
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relationships; Tituba tells readers that she cannot hate, she “only feel[s] tendern ss and 
compassion for the disinherited and a sense of revolt against injustice” (151).   Thus, 
even as I argue that she remains an outsider to the communities presented in the text, I do 
not read her isolation as an indication that she can ever be, “abstracted from [her] social 
contexts” (Weiss 163).  Instead, I read her relationships as a direct influence on her sense 
of self, her moral sensibilities, and her daily conduct.  Relationships, however, do not 
necessarily translate to inclusion within a community.  One can have relationships that 
transgress the boundaries of communities of identification.  In representing Tituba as one 
whose significant differences from others’ clearly set her apart, but who nevertheless 
manifests as a “socially constituted” being, Condé figuratively merges the elves that 
ground liberal individualism and communitarian theory.  In doing so, she points to new 
ways of thinking about the self and community.   
Consider, for example, the context in which Mama Yaya—in discussing Tituba’s 
desire for revenge against Susanna Endicott—initially taught Tituba to be different rom 
“them” (29).  The “them” clearly refers to white slave-owners.  Tituba, however, do s not 
read the differences between the slaves and slave-owners as unambiguously as does 
Mama Yaya, and this leads her to apply the same tenet in situations with various 
communities—for instance, the Puritans, the slaves, and the maroons.  As Condé asserts 
in an interview with Ann Scarboro, “Tituba was doing only good to her community,” but 
it is impossible to tell which community Condé views as hers, especially since Tituba 
usually “does good” to all.  In grounding her treatment of all others in Yaya’s initial 
command about the treatment of some others, Tituba demonstrates an aspect of choice 
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that, in conceptions of the self, liberal theorists take for granted (without recognizing its 
contingency), and communitarian theorists do not sufficiently address. Thus, Condé’s 
theory of community is more effective in addressing the forms of agency that individuals 
can and do exercise within the scope of their lived social relations.      
In “Feminism and Modern Friendship,” Marilyn Friedman provides an excellent 
critique of communitarian theory from a feminist perspective.  Communitarians assert the 
inherent sociality of the self—a self defined by the relationships they maintain and the 
conditions (family, culture, nation, neighborhood) in which they live.  Although many 
feminist theorists agree with this notion of the self, they critique communitaria ism for 
ignoring the subordination of women within said communities.  Perhaps more 
significantly for my own argument, feminists critique communitarians like Alasdair 
MacIntyre for privileging predetermined attachments in their conceptions of theself: 
 
We all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity.  
I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of 
this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, 
that tribe, this nation.  Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who 
inhabits these roles.  As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my 
tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and 
obligations.  These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.  (qtd 
in Friedman 190) 
 
 
Strikingly, although MacIntyre recognizes the multifarious nature of these id ntity 
“roles,” he still assumes that they can provide a single “moral starting point.”  His 
argument does not account for the ways in which the moral mandates of such roles might 
contradict one another.  This oversight brings to mind tales such as Liam O’Flaherty’s 
(somewhat perfunctory) “The Sniper,” wherein a Republican sniper in Dublin 
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unknowingly shoots and kills his “Free Stater” sniper brother.  Here, the sniper’ position 
as a soldier in a civil war obviously conflicts with his position as brother, son, etc. and 
therefore troubles the entire notion of a moral starting point. There are no clear-cut 
“rightful obligations;” there are only multiple possibilities that call to different people in 
different ways.  Condé shows that conflicts among these possibilities abound; for 
example, Tituba’s status as a slave conflicts with her status as a loving caretaker of the 
Parris women, her love for John Indian conflicts with her status as a free woman, and so 
on. Because of the conflicts attendant upon these varied social roles, Tituba cannot act 
without exercising choice in some form—a fact of selfhood which MacIntyre—and 
according to Friedman, most communitarians—tend to overlook.       
Condé bolsters Friedman’s feminist critique of communitarianism by portraying 
Tituba as a woman who, despite suffering various forms of oppression that limit her 
choices, still maintains a degree of independent agency in deciding with whom she will 
associate.  Of course, agency can never be enacted from a completely “fre” subject 
position; even the communities that Tituba stands outside of condition her choices and 
behaviors.  Yet, Friedman shows that this communitarian emphasis on pre-determined, 
involuntary associations is too limited, especially since these may be “fraught with 
ambiguities and ambivalences” (197).  Such an emphasis limits our vision of the 
possibilities that exist for any social agent, notwithstanding the degree to which that agent 
may be considered “free.”  Thus, Friedman proposes that this theory of community needs 
to be supplemented with a theory that stresses communities of choice because “some of 
us are constituted as deviants and resisters by our communities of origin, and our 
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defiance may well run to the foundational social norms that ground the most basic social 
roles and relationships upon which those communities rest” (197).  Plainly, Tituba falls 
into this category; assigning her a clear “community of origin” is not possible.  Instead, 
her voluntary associations come to the fore in determining her courses of action.  Condé’s 
depiction of Tituba highlights these linkages—the same connections that Friedman links 
generally with “communities of choice,” and more specifically, with the notion of 
friendship.  Yet, Condé demonstrates that friendship, as articulated by Friedman, is only a 
partially effective trope for re-imagining community because it supplements rather than 
supplants the sense of loyalty, obligation and embeddedness many feel for their 
“communities of origin.”        
Tituba does not stand within any community, yet she maintains friendships with 
several others.  These friendships often “counter oppressive and abusive relational 
structures in . . .  nonvoluntary communities by providing models of alternative social 
relationships and standpoints for critical reflection on self and community” (Friedman 
204 my emphasis).  The friendships Tituba develops with Elizabeth and Betsey Parris 
sometimes do effectively counter the Puritanical social structures that forbid these 
women the pleasure and warmth of unencumbered voluntary relation that Tituba affirms
as her right to enjoy. At times, friendship with these women also provides Tituba some 
comfort, but Condé does not shy away from exposing how, despite their friendship, the 
Parrises’ ties to their sociopolitical, economic and racialized community eventually lead 
them to join in Tituba’s scapegoating.  Thus, friendship or voluntary associations alone 
do not suffice as a model for positive community—the particular sense of morality th t 
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Tituba holds as an outsider, and the subsequent active resistance against patriarchal nd 
racial oppression, are also necessary.    
Condé carefully delineates how Tituba’s friendship with Elizabeth and Betsey 
works across difference.  Elizabeth and Tituba’s mutual sympathies are ignited o  he day 
they first meet. When Tituba refuses to confess at Samuel Parris’s command, he strikes 
her, and when Elizabeth attempts to intervene on Tituba’s behalf, he strikes her as well 
(41).  Tituba declares that the blood which results from their wounds seals their alliance, 
and in the subsequent years, not only does Tituba entertain the women daily with stories 
and games, but she also saves Elizabeth’s life (45), and heals Betsey in a ritual bath that 
concurrently purifies Tituba of the guilt from her self-induced abortion (63).  Once again, 
Condé shows how the affinity Tituba feels for these white characters leads to a friendship 
that directly supports the mutual healing and survival of all three of these women.  Yet, 
Condé also shows that this friendship in no way lessens the differences between them, 
nor the effects of these differences—especially those of race and class. 
Condé acknowledges and manifests this division through Tituba’s reflections on 
how all three women yearn for Barbados.  In comparing their desires, she points out that 
while Elizabeth and Betsey long for the “life of white women who were served and 
waited on by attentive slaves,” Tituba yearns for “the subtle joys of being a slave. The 
cakes made out of crumbs from the stale bread of life.”  These ruminations bring her to 
the significant conclusion: “We did not belong to the same universe, Goodwife Parris, 
Betsey, and I, and all the affection in the world could not change that” (63 my emphasis).  
In this brief passage, we see how the very luxury which Betsey and Elizabeth enjoy in 
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Barbados depends on their whiteness and their complicity with the subordination of 
slaves, how this fact locates them and Tituba poles apart, and how, nevertheless, it does 
not impede the love and affection they feel for each other. It also demonstrates Tituba’s 
critical reflection on her own socioeconomic position and theirs—a deed which, not 
surprisingly, the Parrises do not perform themselves.  Through Elizabeth and Betsey, 
Condé reveals how those embedded within the Puritan community and unthinkingly 
reliant on its social, racial and economic values, do not have the wherewithal to challenge 
those values when accusations of witchcraft start circulating in the village. Condé does 
not, however, imply that the Parris women’s sense of friendship, affection and love is any 
less real than Tituba’s.  Instead, it reiterates the temporary, partial and rbitrary nature of 
their voluntary associations, and the still-present, but also partial, influence of th ir 
“original” community.   
  Stuart Hall expertly articulates the nature of these somewhat contradicto y 
positions in his elaboration of the interconnection between identity and communities.  
Explaining identity and communal action as forms of discourse, he shows how 
communities arise from the impermanent closures of identity  
 
Is it possible for there to be action or identity in the world without arbitrary 
closure—what one might call the necessity to meaning of the end of the sentence?  
Potentially, discourse is endless: the infinite semiosis of meaning.  But to say 
anything at all in particular, you do have to stop talking.  Of course, every full 
stop is provisional.  The next sentence will take nearly all of it back.  So what is 
this ‘ending’?  It’s a kind of stake, a kind of wager. It says, ‘I need to say 
something, something . . . just now.’  It is not forever, not totally universally true. 
It is not underpinned by any infinite guarantees.  But just now, this is what I 
mean; this is who I am.  At a certain point, in a certain discourse, we call these 
unfinished closures, ‘the self,’ ‘society,’ ‘politics,’ etc. (117)   
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Hall’s argument explains not only the ways in which identities come to be formed, but 
also how communities result from these momentary “full stops.”  Such communities are 
fragile, open, and always in flux because of the endless possibilities of discourse.  Even 
those communities that appear to be permanent (for example, those based on kinship, 
geographical location, nationality, culture, language, etc.) are simply the results of a 
longer-lasting “full stop.”  This does not, however, make such momentary communities 
any less real.  In the moment when two or more subjects stop “talking,” a concrete 
community emerges, and it is no less concrete simply because it may not last.  Moreover, 
the temporary and unfinished closures that result in community are signified in and 
through relationships (such as kinship, friendship, solidarity, etc.), and these relationships 
are also always contingent.  This is the point of which Condé shows Tituba, as an 
outsider, remains continually aware, and which the Parris women—embedded within the 
Puritan community—tend to forget.     
 Holding an outsider’s perspective on the nature of community allows Tituba to 
refrain from un-reflective and uncritical submission to any community’s values.  
Elizabeth and Betsey thoroughly demonstrate the contingent nature of community, not 
only in their accusations against her but in the apparently thorough reversal of their
feelings for Tituba.  When Tituba tries to defend herself against Betsey’s accu ations by 
explaining that everything she did was for the child’s own good, Betsey cruelly responds, 
“You, do good?  You’re a Negress, Tituba!  You can only do evil.  You are evil itself” 
(77).  In that moment, unreflective association with a community clearly overpows the 
love and affection that Betsey had felt for Tituba. Condé’s point is that many subject  
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cannot comprehend the fragility of communal ties; in Betsey’s young mind, the 
momentary significance of every partial identification exists for all time.  Yet, when 
Tituba is in jail, a repentant Goody Parris visits her, exclaiming, “I was misled,” and 
explains that Betsey sends her love and asks Tituba’s forgiveness (107).  Betsey
represents a recurrent problem in discourses and theories about community; even though 
her experiences illustrate the fragility of community, her worldview does not fall in line 
with that understanding.  Tituba’s worldview, however, does incorporate this knowledge 
and thus, highlights a more productive method for dealing with it.   
In I, Tituba, Condé does not limit her theoretical engagement with feminist 
discourse to the issues—primarily represented by Tituba’s relationship wit the 
Parrises—surrounding communities of origin and communities of choice.  She also 
addresses the problems and possibilities of a feminist solidarity that can work acr ss 
racial, cultural, gendered and socioeconomic differences by directly including a novel, 
anachronistic, (self-proclaimed) feminist version of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s w ll-known 
heroine, Hester Prynne.  The theoretical conversation between the text and feminist 
discourse becomes apparent in the scene in which Hester and Tituba first meet. Hester 
sees Tituba standing chained to a wall in the passageway and tells the jailer to bring 
Tituba into her cell.  When Hester finds out that a man gave Tituba her name, she reacts 
as if horrified, to which Tituba replies, “Isn’t it the same for every woman? First her 
father’s name, then her husband’s?”  Hester tellingly responds: “‘I was hoping . . .that at 
least some societies were an exception to this law.  Yours, for example!’” (96). In this
moment, Condé blatantly critiques Hester—a figure of Eurocentric feminism—for both 
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her cultural naiveté and her “simplistic construction of patriarchy” (Manzor-Coats). This 
critique builds upon the work of feminist writers and scholars like Gloria Anzaldúa, bell 
hooks, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, and Donna Haraway, who point out that class and 
racial differences often disrupt the ostensible unity that can be established between and 
among Third World women or “women of color” and Western women.6  Hester directly 
applies her notion of “women” as a homogeneous category in her perceptions of Tituba, 
even as she simultaneously appears to acknowledge her cultural difference. The result is a 
parody, indeed.   
Of course, Condé carefully delineates all of the misreadings, temporary distrust 
and periodic irritation that permeate Hester and Tituba’s relationship.  Theseelem nts 
lead Lillian Manzor-Coats to read it somewhat negatively; when they tell each other their 
stories, she posits that Tituba occupies the role of the native informant—“a position most 
women of color have had to occupy in the U.S. in relation to their white sisters” (“Of 
Witches”). Moreover, she interprets their eventual separation in death as testament o the 
“untranslatability of the experiences of black women vis-à-vis white women [which] is 
beautifully captured in an untranslated—perhaps untranslatable—poetic image of Hester
and Tituba on either side of an ocean over which neither can stride” (“Of Witches”).  Yet, 
though I agree with her conclusion about the untranslatability of their experiences, I read 
the putative native informant scene, and the women’s friendship in general, much more 
                                                          
6 I use the term “Third World” women after Mohanty: “This term designates a political constituency, not a 
biological or even a sociological one.  It is a sociopolitical designation for people of African, Caribbean, 
Asian, and Latin American descent, and native peoples of the United States.  It also refers to ‘new 
immigrants’ to the United States: Arab, Korean, Thai, L otian and so on.  What seems to constitute 
‘women of color’ or ‘Third World women’ as a viable opposition is a common context of struggle rather 
than color or racial identifications” (49).   
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positively.  In fact, I read it as Condé’s theorization of the most productive form of 
political solidarity as existing between two perpetual outsiders. 
Condé destabilizes the power relations among women of different races and 
classes in such a way that, contrary to taking a “native informant” position, she has 
Tituba refuse to explain her life experiences to Hester.  When Tituba attempts to tell her 
story as if it is about “a young girl,” Hester presses her for her specific story, but the 
former explains to readers that “something kept me from telling her” (99).  Manzor-Coats 
overlooks this crucial line in the text, and it holds great significance for a reading of the 
specific ways in which Condé engages with feminist discourse. If Hester’s questions 
attempt to place Tituba in the position of native informant, Tituba’s refusal illustrate  her 
own exercise of power.  At the meta-textual level, Conde assigns a fiercely ind pendent 
agency to the presumed “native informant.”  Moreover, Condé shows that the 
establishment of political solidarity does not necessitate transparency or the c mplete 
understanding of one another.  The “untranslatability” of Hester Prynne and Tituba’s 
experiences does not signify the impossibility of their working together in a common 
context of struggle. 
While the relationship between Tituba and the Parris women effectively 
illuminates the problems that arise from unreflective collusion with a specific 
community, the relationship between Tituba and Hester Prynne shows just how healthy 
an actualized community of perpetual outsiders might be.  Hester is exiled because of her 
adultery; she does not subscribe to the Puritans’ patriarchal values, nor does she abide by 
them.  When Tituba describes the Puritan society as Hester’s, Hester exclaims, “It’s not 
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my society.  Aren’t I an outcast like yourself?” (96). Despite her parentag , her marriage, 
and her birthplace, Hester refuses identification or association with the Puritans. The 
conditions that dictate Hester and Tituba as outsiders, however, differ greatly; Hester is 
cast out because of her extramarital affair and subsequent pregnancy, whereas Tituba is 
accused of witchcraft—not least because of her race and gender.  Thus, outsiderness 
denotes their divisions from specific communities, but also simultaneously from each 
other.  Despite their economic and racial differences, Tituba and Hester clarify the 
positive results of two outcasts who work in solidarity to manipulate the Puritanical 
political system and ensure their mutual survival. 
At first, their relationship seems similar to that of Tituba and the Parrises; it is 
borne of a voluntary friendship that flowers even in the most adverse conditions.  Yet, I 
contend that the different locations and contexts of these friendships illuminate the 
important distinction between friendship as personal/private/insular and affinity/solidarity 
as political and public.  This is not to say that one field always necessarily precludes the 
other; these relations can exist in multiple sites simultaneously.  As Condé presents it in 
Tituba’s relationship with the Parris women, however, friendship cannot transcend the 
domestic space that Tituba inhabits with them.  Once Tituba is exposed to public scrutiny 
as a witch, their voluntary association with her comes to an end; they cannot effectiv ly 
translate their friendship into a political form of solidarity that might have kept Tituba 
safe from harm.  In contrast, Tituba’s friendship with Hester translates into the public 
arena of Tituba’s trial and indeed, winds up saving her life.  Hester teaches Tituba that if 
she confesses, the Puritans will not sentence her to death.  She also teaches Tituba how to 
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confess: “Tell them about the witches’ meetings, where they all arrive on broomsticks, 
their jaws dripping with anticipation at the thought of a feast of fetus and newly born 
babies served with many a mug of fresh blood” (100).  Hester’s familiarity with Puritan 
religious doctrine gives her the ability to manipulate their system, and she duly passes 
this ability on to Tituba.  Thus, their friendship transforms into the grounds for a 
successful struggle for survival against the oppressive Puritan political regime.            
 Although the literal representation of Tituba and Hester’s interactions does not 
appear to constitute a community in and of itself, I argue that their figurat ve 
representation illuminates the possibilities of a community of perpetual outsiders working 
together in solidarity.  At the textual level, then, Hester and Tituba represent the 
possibilities of solidarity and community that Chandra Talpade Mohanty attempts to 
envision across racial and class differences.  Citing Benedict Anderson’s well-known 
formulation of the imagined community, Mohanty argues that, for feminism 
 
The idea of imagined community is useful because it leads us away from 
essentialist notions of Third World feminist struggles, suggesting political rather 
than biological or cultural bases for alliances. It is not color or sex that constructs 
the ground for these struggles.  Rather it is . . . the political links we choose to 
make among and between struggles.  Thus, potentially, women of all colors 
(including white women) can align themselves with and participate in these 
imagined communities.  However, clearly our relation to and centrality in 
particular struggles depend on our different, often conflictual, locations and 
histories.  This, then, is what indelibly marks this discussion of . . . the politics of 
feminism . . . : imagined communities of women with divergent histories and 
social locations, woven together by the political threads of opposition to forms of 
domination that are not only pervasive but also systemic. (46-47 my emphasis)   
 
 
Condé’s theory partially coincides with Mohanty’s emphasis on voluntary political nks 
and a common context of struggle as the site for feminist community.  We see this, for 
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example, in Hester’s decision to struggle against the Puritans’ racist and patriarch l 
ideologies by helping Tituba.  Their friendship means more than comfort and affection 
for both of them; it means cooperative, defiant resistance of the status quo.  We also s e 
that in this momentary aspect of it, both writers reiterate Hall’s vision of community as 
always partial, impermanent, and fragile.  Yet, I stress again that Condé’s construction of 
Hester and Tituba as outsiders (notably, Hester also implores Tituba refrainfrom 
becoming the “same as they are with a heart full of filth!”) differentiates her theory of 
community as one that mandates a critical, reflective, and self-conscious worldview 
which successfully resists the insidious power of possibly harmful, illusorily permanent, 
and involuntary communal bonds (101 my emphasis).  In short, Condé recalls the notion 
of Freirean praxis as a recursive process of action, reflection, action (Lock Swarr & 
Nagar 6).     
         Contrary to popular belief represented in the criticism, the positive and political 
nature of Hester and Tituba’s relationship—as one that exists between two outsiders—
contrasts sharply with that of Tituba and Benjamin Cohen d’Azevedo.  After Tituba’s 
pardon, she remains in the prison trying to work off the costs of her ‘room and board’ that 
had accumulated during her stay.  When Cohen d’Azevedo comes to appraise her, she 
sees “grace in his eyes” and hopes that he will buy her (121).  He does come back to buy 
her and in the course of their relationship, they become friends, then lovers.  Here again, 
Condé represents the positive effects of friendship and love within the domestic sphere,
which eventually translates into a sense of political solidarity for Tituba, but not for 
Cohen d’Azevedo. Tragicomically, their pillow talk consists of comparisons between th  
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historical suffering of Jews and Africans (Tituba claims “He outdid [her] every time”), 
and Tituba becomes intensely interested in the question of naturalization and worshipping 
rights for the Jewish (127-8). When asked if she would like to convert, Tituba once again 
refuses incorporation into a community, despite her sympathy for the Jews (131).  In 
contrast, Cohen d’Azevedo remains thoroughly entrenched within the Jewish diasporic 
community and thus lacks the critical self-reflection of an outsider.  Condé once again 
demonstrates how inclusion in a community often disrupts one’s ability to actively work 
for the survival or to improve living conditions for outsiders in the public, political 
sphere.  Even though Condé paints him as a long-suffering, historically conscious, and 
somewhat compassionate Jewish male character, Cohen d’Azevedo still unquestioningly 
contributes to Tituba’s suffering.  
Because he is a wealthy Jewish merchant in Puritan Salem, most critics deem 
Cohen d’Azevedo an outsider like Tituba. He is “himself persecuted by his fellow 
townspeople for being a Jew . . . he too is a victim of oppression and is a kindred spirit” 
(Nyatetu-Waigwa 560).  Without doubt, Cohen d’Azevedo suffers religious persecution, 
but as someone who fervently identifies as Jewish, he lacks Tituba’s ability to remain 
critically aware of his own oppressive actions toward others.  Cohen d’Azevedo 
represents the paradoxical but common figure of one whose inclusion in one community 
explicitly results from his exclusion from another.  Moreover, his own sense of the 
Jewish community’s collective outsiderness (along with its attendant sufferings and 
struggles to survive) actually generates a moral ambivalence about anyne who does not 
belong to that community of outsiders. Indeed, Condé points out that he and his family’s 
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refusal to learn English “showed how indifferent [they were] to the misfortunes of others 
and to anything that did not concern the tribulations of Jews the world over” (123).  
Cohen d’Azevedo reinforces this point when, though he declares his desire to make 
Tituba happy, he coldly refuses her request for freedom: “Never, never, you hear me. . . 
.Don’t mention it again” (128).  He refuses because of Tituba’s role in allowing him to 
maintain contact with his beloved, dead wife, but this refusal indicates his complicity 
with the sexist and racist devaluation of Tituba as a slave. He never questions the 
overarching power structure that grants him mastery over her, and in this case, simply 
uses it to his own advantage.   
In this sense, Cohen d’Azevedo’s personal desire overrides his recognition of the 
injustice that Tituba suffers as a slave.  Nyatetu-Waigwa convincingly ar ues that Cohen 
d’Azevedo, Hester, and Tituba, “through their positions as victims of bigotry . . . have 
gained both compassion and a desire not to be reduced to the oppressor’s level” but this 
desire does not translate into positive action as effectively for Cohen d’Azevedo as it 
does for Hester and Tituba.  Until he sees the destruction by fire of his home and ships 
and the intentional murder of his nine children by bigoted Puritans, he remains blind to 
the material realities of Tituba’s miserable existence.  Once he endures that tragedy, 
though—which he views as God’s punishment for keeping her with him by force and 
“using the violence He condemns”—he finally grants her freedom (134). As in the 
moment in which Tituba remembers the collective suffering of the Barbadian slaves, 
Condé shows how Cohen d’Azevedo’s own trials finally bring him to recognize those of 
Tituba; that is to say, his personal suffering as an outsider inspires his affinity for and 
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subsequent liberation of Tituba.  When he frees her, she begins her journey to active 
participation in the maroon community and ultimately, in a slave rebellion that leads to 
her death.  Although freedom eventually brings Tituba to act in a role of defiant 
resistance against the white plantation owners in Barbados, Condé’s presentation of the 
possibility for building solidarity between men and women here is ambivalent at best.  
As questions surrounding the possibilities of solidarity between men and women 
in I, Tituba continue to vex, they cannot be severed from the question of agency in 
community.  I have heretofore argued that Tituba’s outsider position allows her to 
consciously choose her associations, but that these choices are contingent upon the 
limitations imposed on her as a black female slave in the seventeenth century.  Within 
such limitations, her sexual relationships with men often entail the most restrictive 
constraints on her freedom (John Indian leads her to slavery; Benjamin Cohen d’Azevedo 
contrives to keep her there) and on her capacity to actively fight against the whie 
plantation owners.  For example, when she tells Christopher, the leader of the maroons, 
that she wants to fight “the white folks” with him, he laughs at her: “Fight?  You’re going 
too fast.  A woman’s duty, Tituba, is not to fight or make war, but to make love” (151). 
Christopher epitomizes the patriarchal view (also evidenced in John Indian and partially 
in Iphigene) that defines women as sexual vessels and denies them historical agency.7 
Yet, Condé intentionally rejects this simplistic perception of agency and instead renders 
Tituba with varying degrees of agency in multiple locations at once. 
                                                          
7 The driving force behind Tituba’s narrative is to reclaim her historical presence, as she repeatedly laments 
the historical record that labels her “Tituba, a slave originating from the West Indies, and probably 
practicing ‘hoodoo’” (150). 
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In Tituba’s multiply located, but at times limited, agency in her relation to men, I 
argue that Condé again reiterates the fragility and inherent instability of community. 
Until Tituba takes up with Iphigene (a young, slave rebel in Barbados), none of her 
heterosexual relationships allow her to actively struggle against white male domination, 
despite her own feelings of solidarity with men like Christopher and Benjami Cohen 
d’Azevedo. Solidarity (as cooperative political resistance across gender differences) 
repeatedly seems to fail here, even though Tituba herself seems to view her sexual 
relationships as precursors to it.  Yet, even though Tituba’s “men” refuse or impede her 
role in the political context of struggle, Condé illustrates that Tituba’s sexuality is not 
apolitical. In fact, it opens up a discursive space wherein she rewrites the pre-d te mined 
“script” of subjective formation for black women: 
 
This script wherein subject positions seem to be fixed functioned on the basis of 
the assumption that the slave woman had no legal subjectivity and thus no 
recourse to legal or any other kind of action to counter the act of violence.  
Moreover, the grammar of violence which ruled and still rules this script dictaes 
that women, as objects of violence, function under fear, becoming subjects of 
fear. (Manzor-Coats)   
 
 
Manzor-Coats declares that Tituba understands her mother Abena’s death within this 
grammar of violence, but refuses the role of “subject of fear” for herself.  Instead, she 
reconstitutes herself as a desiring subject through her sexual relationships.  In Chandra 
Mohanty’s view, any analysis of Third World women’s agency requires attention to the 
“dynamic oppositional agency of individuals and collectives and their engagement in 
‘daily life’” (55).  In Tituba, Condé locates a form of resistance in “daily life” that is 
grounded in sexuality and physical pleasure.  Through these practices, Tituba resists her 
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lovers’ patriarchal relegation of her to a sexual object, and declares her own agency s a 
sexual subject.  This form of subjectivity in Condé’s novel ultimately initiates Tituba’s 
central role in an overtly political context of struggle when she teams up with Iph gene.  
Even in this political context, however, Tituba manages to maintain her sense of right and 
wrong and her desire to refrain from unnecessary killing and destruction.  This desire 
again places her in a position of irremediable outsiderness, even as she eventually ds 
up in her most efficacious political role.    
As I have already illustrated, Condé repeatedly demonstrates the failureof 
community grounded in solidarity across gender differences with John Indian, Benjamin 
Cohen d’Azevedo and Christopher.  Typically, this failure results from the male 
characters’ refusal to accept Tituba as a social agent with the power to enact political 
change.  John Indian begs her to comply with the Puritans’ request for confession 
because he does not believe she can otherwise survive, Benjamin Cohen d’Azevedo 
pigeon-holes her into a domestic servant/witch role and refuses her freedom, and 
Christopher proscribes her to the role of sexual object.  Yet, Condé partially and unevenly 
establishes a productive model of political solidarity in the maternal/sexual relationship 
she draws between Iphigene and Tituba.  At the end of the narrative, Condé introduces 
Iphigene—a young slave, a “hardened offender and nobody could tame his insolence” 
(159).  When he is beaten nearly to death, the slaves bring him to Tituba to nurse him 
back to health.  At first, their relationship is somewhat maternal; Iphigene sees Tituba as 
a mother figure.  In the course of her attentions, pregnant Tituba confides to Iphigene t at 
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she wants to bring her daughter (Christopher’s child) “into a different world” (161).  
Iphigene immediately rushes to her and kneels before her: 
 
‘Mother, I know by name and by plantation all those who would follow you.  We 
only have to say the word.’ 
‘We haven’t got any weapons.’ 
“We’ve got fire.  Magnificent fire that devours and burns!’ 
‘What will we do once we’ve kicked them into the sea? Who will govern?’ 
Mother, the white folks really went to work on you!  You think too much!  Let’s 
drive them out first!’ (161) 
 
 
Interestingly, this exchange begins with Tituba’s expressed desire as a soon-to-be-
mother, and Iphigene’s subsequent verbal linkage between her motherhood and her 
political agency.  Indeed, he locates her potential to lead within her role as mother, and 
this contrasts with her other lovers’ refusal to recognize her political powers.  Moreover, 
he requests her help as the mother of Christopher’s child in getting Christopher to 
passively support the rebellion.8 Yet, in the end, he paradoxically refuses her efforts to 
assert that power; when he plans to burn down all the plantations, she once again 
questions: “The children, too, will die?  Babies at their mothers’ breasts?  Children with 
milk teeth? And young marriageable girls? . . . Do we have to become like them?” (162). 
Iphigene brushes off her concerns and then ultimately relegates her, once agai , to the 
world of the private/personal, telling her: “The future belongs to those who know how to 
shape it and, believe me, you won’t get anywhere with incantations and animal sacrifices.  
Only through actions” (164).  Tituba’s maternal assignation performs two functions at 
                                                          
8 It is essential to note that Condé’s maroons are actually complicit with the white planters; they are 
allowed to maintain their freedom as long as they inform about other possible slave rebellions (163).  Thus, 
they do not really “resist” the colonizers, and in this rendering, Condé subverts the historical identity of 
maroons as heroic rebels, and further highlights Tituba’s admirable difference from them. 
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once: it motivates Iphigene’s ultimate disavowal of her political agency in the material 
world, and it positions her as an outsider to history—a position that Condé figuratively 
(and paradoxically) embraces.  
From Iphigene’s perspective, one moment renders Tituba’s motherly aspects as 
the foundation for her leadership of courageous and rebellious men, but in the next 
moment, he disregards them as useless in the struggle.  In Iphigene, Condé once again 
illuminates the problems that result from identity and community’s nature as temporary, 
incomplete and based on arbitrary closure; his conception of Tituba as “mother” changes, 
as does his recognition of her power (Hall 117).  Still true to her position of self-
reflective and critical outsider, Tituba shies away from the violence that armed resistance 
mandates, and when she does, Iphigene ultimately rejects the possibility of her political 
agency—as if such agency can only ever be violent.  Of course, Condé grounds this 
difference between them in gender, but perhaps even more importantly, she also grounds 
it in moral values.  Despite the fact that she has pointed us toward the possibility of 
solidarity between Iphigene and Tituba, this heterosexual relationship also ends in the 
failure of community due to Iphigene’s system of values.  In the end, Christopher informs 
the white planters of the slaves’ intent to rebel, and the planters, in turn, hang all of the 
potential rebels, including Tituba and Iphigene.  Within Condé’s depiction of the material 
world, Iphigene and Tituba’s relationship can never translate into political solidarity.   
Or can it?  Iphigene’s view of Tituba as mother recalls Anne McClintock’s 
incisive analysis of the family, and women—particularly how, in certain nationalisms, 
men locate women outside of history; they figure “women . . . as inherently atavistic—
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the conservative repository of the national archaic.  Women were not seen as inhabiting 
history proper but existing, like colonized peoples, in a permanently anterior time” (359).  
In I, Tituba, Condé transforms this location—outside of history—into a productive site 
for Tituba’s combined political and private action. Instead of allowing the position of 
“outside history” to stand as a site of powerlessness within the material domain, Condé 
depicts it as the ultimate place for transcending the private/public, male/female divides.  
Indeed, although the novel overall appears to be a work of historical recovery—a 
correction to the white, Western history that has erased Tituba’s presence—Condé claims 
that “Tituba is just the opposite of a historical novel . . . I really invented Tituba” (201).  
At the textual and the metatextual levels, then, Condé embraces the position of “outside 
of history,” and at the textual level, it allows Tituba to merge forms of “feminine” private 
activism (i.e. caring for others, storytelling, healing, and “witchcraft”) with typically 
masculinized violent revolt.  Paradoxically, Condé seems to argue that operating from 
outside of history enables one to create positive changes within history. 
Condé includes an epilogue in which Tituba explains to readers how she is still 
effecting change in the material world: 
 
For now that I have gone over to the invisible world I continue to heal and cure.  
But primarily I have dedicated myself to another task, helped by Iphigene, my son 
and lover, my companion for eternity.  I am hardening men’s hearts to fight.  I am 
nourishing them with dreams of liberty.  Of victory.  I have been behind every 
revolt.  Every insurrection.   Every act of disobedience.  (175)    
 
 
 Here, Tituba lies behind the fight for freedom; she is the driving force and ultimate agent 
in each battle—big and small.  These are not the words of a domesticized female who has 
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learned her militancy through male invitation or designation, as have Fanon’s Algerian 
women (McClintock 366).  Tituba does not help Iphigene; he helps her. Tituba acts in 
both worlds; as a spirit, she continues to “heal and cure,” but she also claims 
responsibility for “every insurrection” (175).  She finally is able to claim  dual agency 
that the white Puritan and black patriarchal social systems would not allow.  
Condé’s location of Tituba’s dual agency in the “other world” might be read as 
the author’s ironic commentary on the potential for community across gender difference.  
As in my reading of Hester and Tituba’s friendship, though, I reject this negative view.  
Instead, I see Condé’s depiction as one that pushes past the limitations of the material
world to textually imagine a different space in which women and men can act in 
solidarity—politically—in both the private and the political spheres. As  Mara Dukats so 
eloquently states, “I, Tituba . . .  suggests a renewed awareness of the complexity of 
cultural formations and the way that the discursive features of a text actively revise, 
transform, and establish interrelations that in turn lead to the revaluation of power and the 
renegotiation of social relations” (10). In Tituba’s successful transcendence of racial, 
class, and finally gender difference to actively perpetrate change in myr ad forms, Condé 
models a singular individual who teaches us a new form of potentially just community.      
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CHAPTER III  
FLEXIBLE COMMUNITY IN BEKA LAMB 
 
We creoles are so different, one from the other, that it’s hard for us 
to mix properly amongst ourselves, let alone among Carib people 
who have a lot more things in common. (Edgell 70) 
 
 
In his comprehensive analysis of Zee Edgell’s first two novels, Richard Patteson 
claims that Edgell “virtually founded her country’s national literature” (4, my emphasis).  
The statement seems appropriate based on Edgell’s renown as one of very few 
recognized Belizean writers, the fact that these novels address significantly influential 
periods in the history of Belize’s fight for sovereign nationhood and independence from 
Great Britain, and the particularly “Belizean” nature of the characte s, languages, and 
conflicts represented in the texts.  Published in 1982, Beka Lamb is set during the early 
1950s when Belizeans’ desire for self-rule began to build collective force through labor 
unions and political organizations like the People’s Independence Party (PIP).  The 1991 
novel In Times Like These centers on the period during the early 1980s, when Belize 
finally achieved national sovereignty.  The development of the Belizean nation grou ds 
both narratives, and this emphasis has resulted in primarily Jamesonian analyses of the 
texts as national allegories.  Beka Lamb especially has been variously deemed a woman’s 
rewriting of the national allegory (Gikandi 202), a text that “works on two levels” to 
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present “the story of a young girl’s foray into adulthood and the story of a developing 
nation’s foray into sovereignty” (Newson 199), and the narrative of a family that 
represents the nation in microcosm (Salick 108).  While the subject matter and temporal 
setting of this novel certainly justify an analytic focus on nation, these critical accounts 
often fall into the trap of valorizing the Western form of nation as the form of community 
to which Edgell’s characters aspire. Western nationhood, Partha Chatterjee tells us, holds 
“the same material and intellectual premises with the European Enlightenment, with 
industry and the idea of progress, and with modern democracy . . . [this form] goes hand-
in-hand with reason, liberty and progress” (NT 3). While Chatterjee and other subaltern 
studies historians explore the complex forms of acceptance and resistance this paradigm 
has met with in colonial/postcolonial countries, scholarly accounts of Beka Lamb tend to 
privilege this form of nationhood in their analysis.9  In doing so, they implicitly reinforce 
what Dipesh Chakrabarty identifies as a Westernized historicist view in which the colony 
is designated an underdeveloped, pre-modern country, and as such, also an unrealized 
national community.   
                                                          
9 I do not mean “privilege” as in “view positively;” rather, these critics simply presume the Western form 
of nation as Belize’s end goal.  Moreover, this presumption is implicit rather than explicit in their analyses.  
For example, Suzanne Scafe sees colonial Belize as a “fragmented society perpetually on the verge of 
destruction” and implies that nationhood could rectify this fragmentation (27).  Simon Gikandi analyzes 
Beka Lamb in a book that explores the paradox of postcolonia nations’ desire for modernity (which is, of 
course, linked with nationhood) and their distrust of modernity (as a construct created by European 
colonizers on the backs of colonial peoples).  In some ways, his work connects with that of the subaltern 
studies group—especially Chatterjee’s—yet, he does n t follow through on a concept of different nation 
formations so much as explore Caribbean writers’ vexed relationships to modernism and their textual 
methods in dealing with it (25).         
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My own reading of Beka Lamb invokes the work of Chatterjee and Chakrabarty in 
order to push against this Eurocentric prioritization of the nation which inherently 
devalues Belize as a national community that has not yet “arrived.”  Instead of reading 
with an eye toward Edgell’s representation of Belize’s failures and fragmentation, I focus 
on the productive relationships and manifestations of community that she depicts.  Edgell 
sets the narrative in a moment of anticolonial struggle when myriad possibilities exist for 
the Belizean nation.  Her rendering of community thoroughly illuminates these 
possibilities, which she indicates must be incorporated as the foundation for a viable 
nation-state.  What nationalists and critics need to realize, Edgell seemsto say, is that the 
Belizean national community—in all of its heterogeneity and its various ways of coming 
together—provides the most solid foundation for a Belizean nation-state that recognizes 
and addresses all of its citizens.   
Subaltern scholars have illustrated that critics generally conceive the national 
community as preexisting the nation-state but as also surviving in a “subterranean, 
potentially subversive” way when the nation-state takes over as the dominant paradigm 
(Chatterjee, Nation 236).  The nation-state is the political institution in which “all the 
instrumentalities of state power (e.g. military and police agencies, judiciaries, religious 
hierarchies, educational assemblies and political assemblies or organizations) re 
subsumed and legitimized as the ‘natural’ expressions of a unified national history and 
culture” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 150).  The dichotomy between the diversity of 
the actual group of individuals who comprise the national community (on the one hand), 
and the constructed unity of history and culture that justifies and undergirds the political 
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power of the nation-state (on the other),  presents a key theoretical problem in discussions 
of the nation and in Edgell’s text.  Inevitably, the nation-state does not (indeed, perhaps 
cannot), represent the interests of everyone in the national community, despite 
nationalism’s “all-too-easy identification . . . of the state with the nation and the nation 
with the people” (Chatterjee, NF 155).  Edgell’s Belize, like many incipient postcolonial 
nations, grapples with these issues of inclusivity and representation in the nation.10  In her 
focus on the national community and in her unique articulation of this community, she 
points toward the possibilities that might result from an alternative realization of 
nationhood for Belize.   
I argue that Edgell represents the Belizean national community as grounded in 
collective acts of mourning, struggle, and nation-building rather than shared identity and 
history.  This representation of community permits an openness and a permeability of 
boundaries that most nationalist accounts do not. The community represented by most 
nationalisms appears as exclusive, specific and homogeneous, while the communities that 
Edgell depicts allows people of differing race, class, culture, ethnicity, gender, and age to 
come together in various situational contexts without eliding their differences. Although 
such differences in Belize may seem insurmountable, as Lilla Lamb explains to her 
daughter in the epigraph above, Edgell’s portrayal of the characters’ abilities to r spond 
to each other and work together productively demonstrates that they are not. Furthermo e, 
in addition to creating the possibilities for the transcendence of identity differenc s, 
                                                          
10Throughout this essay, I use Timothy Brennan’s definition of nation as a term that “refers both to the 
modern nation-state and to something more ancient and nebulous—the ‘natio’—a local community, 
domicile, family, condition of belonging,” (45).  Thus, “nation” incorporates both concepts of the natio -
state and the national community.    
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Edgell’s praxis-based community (when it manifests) can variously (although only 
temporarily) overcome other familiar divisions between male/female, public/private, 
colonizer/colonized and history/memory that proliferate in modern forms of the nation.  
The task for Belizean nationalism, Edgell’s text indicates, is to somehow incrporate the 
notion of community-in-flux into their production of the nation.  As Chatterjee notes, 
“formal institutions of the state, based on an undifferentiated concept of citizenship, 
cannot allow for the separate representations of minorities.  Consequently, the question of 
who represents minorities . . . constantly threatens the tenuous identity of the nation and 
the state” (112).    Although Edgell does not provide a clear answer as to how this might 
be rectified (the narrative ends long before Belize gains independence), she points toward 
the positive effects of communities constructed through collective action, and more 
specifically, the healing and inclusion that results from them.  Finally, in illustrating that 
a productive, participatory form of community can only manifest situationally or 
momentarily, Edgell challenges both Benedict Anderson’s well-known formulation of the 
nation constructed through homogeneous, empty time and the Eurocentric historicism 
that relegates colonies to what Dipesh Chakrabarty labels “the waiting room of history.”  
She also constructs a nationalist text that somehow circumvents Homi Bhabha’s 
theorization of time in nationalist texts as performative and pedagogical (208-9).   
Beka Lamb tells the story of the young, middle-class, black Creole Beka, her 
family, and her best friend Toycie Qualo.  Toycie and Beka are constructed as near 
opposites: Toycie is abandoned by both parents and raised in poverty by her Aunt Eila, 
and as a result, she becomes determined to raise herself up through education and hard 
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work.  Aunt Eila and Toycie, who figure as two single, poor women, contrast sharply 
with Beka and her family; Beka is comfortably raised not only by her parents Bill and 
Lilla, but also by her political activist paternal grandmother, Granny Ivy.  Moreover, at 
the opening of the novel, Beka performs poorly in school and lies constantly.  As the plot 
progresses, these characters become much more ambiguous as Toycie becomes pregnant 
by her ‘pania boyfriend Emilio Villanueva and Beka stops lying and works hard to 
eventually win an essay contest at school.11  Indeed, Toycie’s pregnancy, and her 
consequent ostracization and expulsion from school eventually culminate in her partially 
self-inflicted death, whereas Beka’s supportive family, teachers and friends help guide 
her to reach her utmost potential.  Throughout the text, Edgell infuses this apparently 
localized and personal sequence of events with the concurrent political narrative of 
Belize’s anticolonial struggle and national development.  Both narrative progressions 
allow Edgell to incisively critique patriarchy, colonialism, classism and natio lism, even 
as she challenges these institutions by positing alternative communities, constru ted 
through praxis, at both the personal and the political level.     
Edgell activates her primary critique and re-imagining of the nation through 
gender by stressing Toycie and Beka’s familial lives.  To be sure, class and race also play 
their roles, but Toycie’s demise stems from the sociopolitical effects of her pregnancy 
while Beka’s survival results partially from the powerful matriarchal influences in her 
life.  For example, when Bill Lamb tries to argue for Toycie to be allowed to stay in 
school, Sister Virgil rejects his plea, claiming “we believe it is entirly up to the modesty 
                                                          
11 ‘pania is a Belizean colloquial term for a Spanish Creole person.   
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of the girl to prevent these happenings” (119).  Toycie’s expulsion results in her rapid 
psychological decline; she eventually winds up in an asylum.  Beka, on the other hand, 
has Granny Ivy as an example of a woman who has survived despite unwed pregnancy 
and single motherhood.  When the matron at the asylum tells Eila, Ivy, and Beka about 
how desperate young girls become to marry the boys who took their virginity—so 
desperate, in fact, that they are willing to forgive “bad treatment”—Ivy responds: “I wish 
some of them knew what I know. . . It’s sad if you lost your virginity unmarried and to 
the wrong man, but if you lose it, you lose it.  There’s no need to degrade yourself” (135).  
Ivy embodies the explicit rejection of those dominant patriarchal values that so 
effectively conspire to destroy Toycie.  Moreover, the differences between Toycie’s and 
Ivy’s worldviews hold great significance for how we read Edgell’s depiction of 
community, and the consequent possibilities that this form of community entails.   
In order to hone in on the positive effects of Edgell’s alternative form of 
community, an explicit distinction must be made between the dominant values to which 
Toycie subscribes and the unconventional values that Ivy holds. Indeed, I argue that this 
distinction allows us to better understand why Edgell makes Toycie self-destruct even 
though the elder Ivy has already survived the same predicament.  Suzanne Scafe 
distinguishes between the “colonialist discourses of religion and education that define 
women’s sexuality as the root of chaos and sin” (29), and the Belizean community’s view 
which remains “remarkably resistant to these dominant discourses” (31). As one wh  has 
internalized the colonialist values, Toycie consequently sees no way to rectify h r 
situation except through marriage to Emilio or the continuation of her education.  Ivy, on 
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the other hand, rejects these discourses, and her life and later actions provide an 
alternative “model of womanhood . . . defined by hard work and a commitment to 
collective and individual responsibility” (Scafe 31).  Although Toycie and Ivy’s outlooks 
appear as simple differences in principle between two characters, they metaphorically 
constitute the limitations inherent within Western paradigms of the nation, and the 
possibilities that might result from alternative models, respectively. 
Even though Scafe acknowledges the Creole community’s resistance to 
colonialist discourses, she still concludes that “the Creole community is vulnerable to the 
charge that fragmented family structures result in broken individuals and impede the 
material progress of the community as a whole” (31).  She implies that it’s because of 
Toycie’s fragmented family and the failure of the broader community to educate her 
about sex that she eventually winds up “broken.”  In this reading, Scafe exhibits an 
implicit privileging of Western nationalism’s emphasis on material progress, while at the 
same time she reinforces the trope of the patriarchal, nuclear family s the necessary 
basis and symbol of the modern nation.  As Anne McClintock explains, “nations are 
symbolically figured as domestic genealogies” and this family trope is important for 
nationalism because “it offers a ‘natural’ figure for sanctioning national hierarchy within 
a putative organic unity of interests” (358 original emphasis).  Inevitably, as McClintock, 
Carol Boyce-Davies, and others have noted, such a constructed hierarchy and unity 
disregards people like Toycie—young, black, female and poor. Allegorically, however, 
Edgell’s illumination of an alternative family structure that mobilizes to ave Toycie in 
her time of need indicates how collective action can be a more positively productive 
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framework for small communities and nations to successfully resist conformig to the 
Western nationalist paradigm, a paradigm which thereby excludes and harms many of its 
citizens.  As Chatterjee notes, “the cultural history of nationalism, shaped through its 
struggle with colonialism, contained many possibilities of authentic, creative, nd plural 
development of social identities that were violently disrupted by the political history of 
the postcolonial state seeking to replicate the modular forms of the modern nation-st e” 
(156). In Edgell’s text, Toycie signifies this desire to replicate the modern nation-state 
and the destruction it causes, while Granny Ivy, and perhaps the entire Lamb family, 
embody the possibilities of community that turns away from this form of nationhood 
(with its exclusivist ideologies) and toward an active and activist model that comes 
together to struggle for social justice.   
The Lamb family treats Toycie like “one of their own;” she goes on vacation with 
them every year, performs housework and cares for Beka’s brothers alongside Beka, Lilla 
and Granny Ivy, and she and Beka have the type of loving yet contentious relationship 
more common among sisters than friends.  While Gikandi and Scafe have already 
discussed Edgell’s emphasis on women in both this family and the community, no critics 
have delineated Bill Lamb’s role in these collectivities.12  This gap perhaps results from 
the fear of reinforcing a male-dominated family/nation construct through the critical 
recognition of the father figure’s patriarchal power—a construct that Edgell decidedly 
contests by showing how men and women come together to try to save Toycie. Instead of 
disregarding men in her alternative model, Edgell posits a male character that recognizes 
                                                          
12 See Gikandi (201), and Scafe (31-32).   
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the consequences of gender inequity and does what he can to alleviate them.  Bill tells
Sister Virgil that “[Toycie] alone is not to be blamed for this accident,” and emphasizes 
the injustice of the fact that “Mr Villanueva’s son will not be expelled from school” 
(119).  He then offers to “personally see to it that [Toycie’s pregnancy] does not become 
a scandal,” if Toycie is allowed to return after giving birth; and he explains that “families 
without resources [like Toycie’s] have no strings to pull when their children get i 
trouble” (119).  Edgell’s father figure recognizes and works on behalf of Toycie to 
struggle against the effects of gender and class injustice, rather than uses his position to 
perpetrate it for his own benefit (as Emilio does).  At the same time, Lilla, Beka, Ivy, and, 
of course, Eila, attempt to counter the effects of injustice through their loving support of 
Toycie. Although this may seem to reinforce the notion that men belong in the public 
sphere and women in the private, Edgell belies this assumption elsewhere by showing 
Ivy, Eila and Beka’s participation in the political sphere.  Unfortunately, Bill, Eila, Lilla 
and Beka’s efforts to save Toycie ultimately do not succeed within the confines o  the 
narrative; first, because it ends while Belize remains under colonial rule, and second, 
because Toycie herself surrenders to the colonial, patriarchal, ideologies that devalue her 
very self.  Yet, by showing how men and women can work together to struggle against 
destructive inequities in both the public and private spheres, Edgell elucidates how 
community-as-praxis might create a more productive framework for community than the 
solely male-dominated nationalist model.  
One might argue that Bill’s speaking on behalf of Toycie simply replicates the 
relationship of women to men in the typical nation construct, whereby women are 
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incorporated into the nation indirectly through their relationships to men (McClintock 
358). Again, though, the temporal setting of the novel becomes an important factor since 
the colonial system—represented by Sister Virgil and the Villanueva family—refuses to 
recognize Toycie in her own right.  Bill’s own sympathy for Toycie and his efforts to 
contest the dominant powers indicate how his vision might, upon independence, be 
incorporated into a more gender-equitable form of nationhood.  Indeed, his worldview is 
grounded in a philosophy of mutual interdependence; Beka tells Sister Gabriela that Bill 
“feels the whole world depends on the whole world” (116).  Actuating such a vision in 
the construction of the nation, Edgell indicates, would angle collective action toward the 
recognition and inclusion of excluded groups and individuals in communities, and 
roundly reject the nation paradigm in which “the promise of national emancipation [is] 
fulfilled . . . by the forcible marginalization of many who were supposed to share in th
fruits of liberation” (Chatterjee NF156).  By centralizing women’s roles in the nation, and 
also constructing an alternative “male” discourse of community, Edgell creates a model 
that does not exclude men or women simply on the basis of gender.    
Edgell’s rendering of community as collective social and political action does not 
only account for the transcendence of typically disruptive gender and class divisions, but 
also succeeds in overcoming racial and cultural divisions.  Moreover, this model of 
community does not only operate through the allegorization of the nation through the 
Lamb family.  Edgell’s Belize City, and the many characters she brings in to populate it, 
represents another diverse, yet smaller community.  Her constitution of this group and 
their interactions also plays a prominent role in how she re-figures community through 
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praxis.  Beka Lamb’s narrator describes Belizean society as incredibly diverse.  Belize 
City, we are told, “was a relatively tolerant town where at least six races with their roots 
in other districts of the country, in Africa, the West Indies, Central America, Europe, 
North America, Asia, and other places lived in a kind of harmony” (11 my emphasis).  At 
St. Cecilia’s, a priest looks at his students and sees “each face, almost every one a 
different shade of black, brown or white” (88).  This level of diversity in such a tight-knit 
community makes it difficult to distinguish peoples on the basis of cultural, racial, nd 
linguistic differences.  Like the real Belize, the heterogeneity of Edgell’s Belize makes it 
impossible to characterize the population without oversimplifying.  As the sociologist 
Nigel Bolland points out, in Belize “an examination of particular cultural characte istics, 
such as language and religion, shows that these attributes overlap and cut across ethnic 
and racial distinctions, thus uniting as well as distinguishing people in different ethnic 
groups throughout the country” (Bolland 45). Notably, both Edgell and Bolland’s 
representations show how people can unite as well as divide across such heterogenei y, 
and this point is central to recognizing the flexibility of Edgell’s community i  Beka 
Lamb.  
The primary scene in which Edgell brings together unlikely members of the 
community occurs when Toycie attempts to commit suicide.13  In addition to Beka and 
Ivy, the scene includes National Vellor—a prostitute of East Indian descent with no 
family and no education—and a British soldier who figures metonymically as the 
                                                          
13 Edgell leaves the cause of Toycie’s fall from the bridge unknown, therefore neither confirming nor 
denying that it was a suicide attempt.  I read it as such particularly because Edgell has Eila ask: “Toycie 
gone to that bridge over and over.  How you think she managed to fall down? I can’t think of a way she
could fall unless she was dizzy” (129). 
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colonial power.  Upon finding Toycie, National jumps in the water and drags her out, 
essentially saving her life.  She then runs to the Lamb home for help; Beka and Ivy 
follow, and the British soldier ties a tourniquet round Toycie’s head, and drives her along 
with Granny Ivy to the hospital (126-7). Prior to this moment, Edgell clearly position  
National and the British soldier as outsiders in this neighborhood; Lilla describ  
National as a “half-crazy coolie woman” (5) and warns Beka not to speak to her, and Bill 
Lamb tells his mother that “hatred of British colonialism unites us now” (96). The 
collective effort to save Toycie, however, temporarily unites these disparate individuals, 
which illustrates Edgell’s model of community as actional and unmitigated by the 
identity differences that disrupt other, more traditional concepts of community.    
Edgell’s rendering of the praxis that brings the British colonialist, the East Indian 
prostitute, and the black Creoles together to save Toycie illuminates the ways in which 
non-identitarian, spontaneous communities can work toward the survival of a single 
individual.  Indeed, it also shows that the lines between one individual and another, or an 
individual and her community, are tenuous at best.  Throughout the text, National Vellor 
and Toycie’s roles shift and change situationally, thus showing the shifting nature of both 
identity (at the literal level) and the community (at the figurative).  Indeed, when Beka 
takes a last look at National before she runs to find Eila, “Vellor’s face meltd into 
Toycie’s, Toycie’s face merged into Vellor’s and then Vellor became Toycie” (128).  
Beka’s vision reinforces Stuart Hall’s theorization of identity as a positioning rather than 
an essence; and Edgell implies that, in order to thrive, community must somehow, some 
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way, account for these changed and changing positionings (in all of their heterogen ity) 
(132). Theorizing community through praxis points us toward the way.   
If we read Toycie as one representative of the nation, then in coming together to 
save her, the characters are, in a sense, coming together in an attempt to revitalize the 
body of the nation devastated by the ravages of patriarchal colonialism.  Notably, Edgell 
grants primary agency in this restoration to National, the most marginalized of all these 
characters.  Moreover, Edgell provocatively christens her as the representative citizen of 
the nation.  Perhaps even more controversially, Edgell includes the British soldier in her 
momentary community—a soldier who appears to stand for the colonialist values that 
have so thoroughly contributed to Toycie’s demise.  Yet, in this particular scene, the 
soldier’s actions—his dressing of Toycie’s wound and driving her to the hospital—are 
curative; figuratively, they indicate that the new Belize will likely need to incorporate 
some of the characteristics of the modern modular nation, even if on a need-based, 
changing and changeable basis. As Partha Chatterjee has shown in the case of India, and 
Simon Gikandi has shown in the case of Caribbean writing, postcolonial countries and 
their subjects cannot completely break from the project of modernity embedded within 
colonialism and the Eurocentric model of the nation-state (26; 201).  Edgell’s inclu ion of 
the British soldier concedes this point, but turns toward the positive potential in this fac , 
rather than the negative.  Of course, readers might interpret the fact that Toycie
eventually dies as an indication of this diverse community’s failure to revive the nation, 
but I would counter that in this particular moment, Edgell elucidates success from their 
cooperative efforts, not failure.  Indeed, it is only when Eila removes Toycie to th  
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countryside, away from the community represented in the narrative (despite the plas of 
the Lamb family to keep her in the asylum so they “can personally see to her”), tat she 
dies (140).  Thus, Edgell highlights the healing aspects of community through praxis 
within this particular sequence of events.             
Edgell not only illuminates alternative forms of community within the text, she 
also constructs the text in a way that propagates community at the level of th  me a-text.  
Toycie’s death serves as the impetus of the entire narrative. Eila cannot afford an actual 
wake for her niece, so Beka decides that she will “keep wake” for Toycie hers lf by 
remembering everything that preceded and culminated in Toycie’s death.  These 
memories comprise the narrative content.  Beka learns how to “keep wake” in the first 
place by attending Greatgran Straker’s (her maternal great-grandmother—the woman 
who raised Lilla) own wake—a significant event that occurs midway through the 
narrative.  As Judith Misrahi-Barak points out, the text highlights “the wake not only as a 
ritual of death but also as a celebration of self-knowledge and community” (par. 1).  
Indeed, Edgell’s drawing of this scene illuminates a spontaneous hodge-podge of people 
from the community that come together specifically in the act of collective mourning.  I 
assert that this wake imparts Edgell’s most complex and significant depiction of a praxis-
based community which challenges and complicates nationalism’s homogenizing, 
essentializing and pedagogical tendencies.    
As an elderly woman, Greatgran Straker was known by many, yet Edgell marks 
her funeral as typical both in terms of participation and impact: 
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All along the route from Aunt Tama’s house on Manioc Road, down Water Lane, 
where many bars were situated, and over the swing bridge, people lined the street 
sides . . .Anyone could spare the time, stopped whatever they were doing to watch 
the funeral go by.  It was a custom.  It was important to know who had died, 
under what circumstances, to whom the person was related, and who the mourners 
were following the hearse, and why they felt the need to attend this particular 
funeral.  There were few events that commanded the total attention of the 
community as much as a passing funeral.  Its size was commented upon, and the 
life story of the deceased, whatever was known of it, whispered from person to 
person.  It was more than a funeral they watched.  In a way, it was a small lesson 
in community history, and everyone for those minutes was a diligent scholar.  By 
and large, most people preferred to forget the time that had gone before.  But on 
certain occasions, and especially at the funerals of the very aged, through the use 
of innuendos and euphemisms, a feeling was communicated, and this was 
understood.  (62-3 my emphases)   
 
 
In this scene, Edgell explicitly emphasizes the spontaneity of a community that comes 
together not on the basis of shared identities (she offers no indication of age, race, class, 
or gender of these mourners and onlookers), nor on the basis of a constructed, nationalist 
history (she posits “community history” expressed through equivocating language) but to 
perform the work of mourning together.  The scene illuminates a web of 
interconnection—expressed through conversation, shared presence, and reflection—that 
flows through and from Greatgran Straker, while it also presents an alternativ  paradigm 
of historical understanding to that of Western nationalisms.  While Edgell’s counter to 
nationalist historical discourse may appear similar to the division between the inner, 
private world and the outer, political world that Chatterjee traces in the case of Indian 
nationalism, I argue that it actually goes part of the way in contesting that simple division 
as well.  
  In his examination of anti- and post-colonial nationalism in India, Chatterjee has 
argued that in the case of India, nationalists resisted Western modernity by “constitut[ing] 
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a new sphere of the private in a domain marked by cultural difference: the domain of the 
‘national’ was defined as one that was different from the ‘Western’” (75).  Thus, cultural 
difference allowed Indian nationalists to claim sovereignty over their familial and 
spiritual lives, and to locate nationalist sentiment in the private sphere, long before 
nationalism became a public political ideology. Yet, while this conceptualization of the 
national community accounts for the agency of colonial Indian subjects, in the period of 
independence, it mandates exclusion of certain groups, values and worldviews: “The new 
subjectivity that was constructed here was premised not on a conception of universal 
humanity, but rather on particularity and difference: the identity of the ‘national’ 
community as against other communities” (75). Because of its inherent exclusions, th s 
nation form fails to successfully integrate all Indian subjects—especially women.  As R. 
Radhakrishnan points out,  
 
The nationalist subject in its protagonistic phase of history (as against its 
antagonistic phase when the primary aim was to overthrow the enemy) has to 
break away from the colonial past, achieve full and inclusive representational 
legitimacy with its own people—the sub-spaces and the many other forms and 
thresholds of collective identity (such as the ethnic, the religious, the 
communal)—and fashion its own indigenous modes of cultural, social and 
political production in response. (85-86)   
 
 
Chatterjee and Radhakrishnan both emphasize the exclusionary practices of identity-
based nationalism, and Radhakrishnan stresses the necessity of inclusive representation in 
an alternative, specifically feminist nationalism.  In the funeral scene, Edgell quite 
explicitly neglects to articulate the identities of those who participate; she alternately 
describes them as “anyone,” “the people,” and “the community.”  In a narrative otherwise 
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rather detailed in its delineation of ethnic particularities and the possible divisions that 
result from them (for example, in its depiction of National Vellor, or in its focus on the 
tensions between Spanish Creoles and black Creoles, etc.), Edgell here refuses to link 
collective mourning to some form of common identity.  Instead, she emphasizes the act
of mourning; the conversations, the remembering, the learning, and so on.  Though it may 
be argued that the narrative overall posits Beka—young, black, and female—as the model 
of the Belizean national subject, Edgell’s various depictions of how community comes 
together through praxis, primarily work toward inclusivity.  In this specific episode of 
collective action through mourning, Edgell resists nationalism’s attempts to specify some 
form of original, authentic,  identity, and instead shows a community-in-flux that resis s 
appropriation by the male-dominated nationalist paradigm. 
 Edgell not only resists nationalism’s appropriation of identity here, she also 
problematizes its potential appropriation of history.  History, Maryse Condé explains, “is 
something official.  Memory is in the mind of the people” (548-49).  While Beka Lamb—
and indeed all of the primary texts in this project—works to contest history through the 
recreation of memory (as Condé defines it), a danger arises in simply posingone form of 
historical knowledge against the other. As Radhakrishnan points out, the nationalist 
division of history and memory (in conjunction with the division between “inner” and 
“outer”) relegates non-modern, non-historicist forms of knowledge and ways of being in 
the world to a location “outside of history.”  He explains that “The locus of the true self, 
the inner/traditional/spiritual sense of place, is exiled from the processes of history while 
the locus of historical knowledge fails to speak for the true identity of the nationalist 
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subject” (85).   In other words, nationalism, thus far, has been unable to incorporate both 
history and memory, and consequently has failed to fully integrate its subjects.  While 
Edgell’s privileging of community history in the funeral scene seems to coincide with 
this problematic division, her other episodic accounts of political action (independence 
rallies, speeches, etc.—discussed in more detail below) demonstrate her attempts o 
integrate both forms of knowledge—history and memory—within the entire body of the 
text.  Indeed, by representing community as praxis in both the private and public realms 
of experience, Edgell not only blurs the line between them, but she also contests the 
dominant tropes of historical national time.  More specifically, she circumvents the 
limitations of what Dipesh Chakrabarty labels Eurocentric historical time, and poses an 
alternative to what Homi Bhabha has identified as the performative and pedagogical 
notions of time usually found in nationalist texts.    
Dipesh Chakrabarty attempts to challenge the hegemonic force of Eurocentric 
history by positing two histories, which he divides into History 1 (H1) and History 2 
(H2).  According to him, Western historical discourse posited a historical timeline that 
placed Europe at a spatial and temporal distance from the lands they colonized.  Imp rial 
powers like Britain, France and Spain stood furthest along the timeline—not least 
because they already held the status of sovereign, modern nations.  Colonized countries 
in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, on the other hand, were denied independence and 
national sovereignty on the grounds that they were, by Western standards, uncivilized and 
un- or under-developed economically (14).  To the colonial desire for independence and 
national sovereignty, European nations replied “not yet;” in Chakrabarty’s term , this 
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relegated them to an “imaginary waiting room of history” (8).  Chakrabarty’s work 
illustrates how the Eurocentric conception of modernity propagated colonialism, and it 
directly relates to Chatterjee’s analysis of why nationalism presum  the Western 
modular form of nation as its end goal.  Yet, Chakrabarty centralizes capital as the key 
aspect of modernity and nineteenth-century progressivist conceptions of history: “this . . . 
universal and necessary history we associate with capital . . . forms the backbone of the 
usual narratives of transition to the capitalist mode of production.  Let us call this 
history—a past posited by capital itself as its precondition—History 1” (63).  H1, he 
explains, is that past that “lends itself to the reproduction of capitalist relationships” (64).  
Clearly, Edgell’s representation of the community at Greatgran Straker’s funeral does not 
belong to this history.  Indeed, shortly before the procession begins, Beka overhears a 
woman telling her companion that, “‘Old Mother Straker was one of the last.  Not too 
many left now of the old people that remember things from the time before.  They young
ones aren’t interested.  All they think about is picture show, motor car, party and 
clothes’”—in other words, all the trappings of capitalist production (62).  The gathering 
and collective remembrance of the “time that had gone before” seems to oppose the 
values of the “young ones,” but this dialectical reading does not recognize Edgell’s 
efforts to show how they are each intertwined.   
The funeral embodies what Chakrabarty would call a manifestation of H2.   
Chakrabarty reads Marx’s notion of H2 as those relations in the past “that did not 
necessarily look forward to capital” (64).  Chakrabarty further elaborates his own theory 
of H2 as those pasts which 
77 
 
 
enable the human bearer of labor power to enact other ways of being in the world 
. . . They are partly embodied in [a] person’s bodily habits, in unselfconscious 
collective practices, in his or her reflexes about what it means to relate to objects 
in the world as a human being and together with other human beings in his given 
environment. (66)       
 
 
Edgell’s incorporation of both history (H1) and memory (H2) throughout Beka Lamb 
illustrates the inextricability of these “pasts.”  Indeed, Chakrabarty’s own argument 
claims that “History 2 does not spell out a program of writing histories that are 
alternatives to the narratives of capital . . . History 2 is better thought of as a category 
charged with the function of constantly interrupting the totalizing thrusts of History 1” 
(66).  In the broader trajectory of Edgell’s narrative, the funeral scene reads as an 
instance of H2 disrupting what many critics deem the narrative’s linear prog ession 
toward capitalist development, independence, and statehood.  The problem with this 
reading, however, is that it partially coincides with the Eurocentric valuation of 
progressive, linear time.   
 Edgell’s rendering of community as praxis, especially in the funeral scene, 
presents more of a challenge to H1 than Chakrabarty’s H2 does, specifically because it 
does not privilege community as the trope of one form of history or the other.  Since 
Edgell’s community arises through collective work, it is dispersed through time 
situationally; it does not solely inhabit H1 or signify H2.  Indeed, Edgell’s formulations 
of community in this text permeate both the public and private spheres at different tims. 
To imagine that the funeral only represents H2 disrupting the linear narrative of H1 is to 
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deny the people the very historical agency that Edgell underscores in this scene, and 
which they maintain in both realms of history.    
 Edgell further challenges common conceptions of agency and history in the 
funeral scene by rendering the community’s history as somewhat inarticulable yet 
understandable—a form of knowledge the communication of which must be mediated 
through euphemism.  I argue that this peculiar euphemistic discourse and expression of 
memory instantiates—in Homi Bhabha’s terms—yet another form of resistance o the 
nationalist paradigm of community.  In his influential essay, “DissemiNation: Time, 
Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” Bhabha contests the concept of 
homogeneous, empty time as the temporal form that helped construct the nation, and 
theorizes instead a “double time” that he discerns in nationalist texts—speeches, novels, 
histories, etc..  In such texts, “the people” are continually constituted as historical objects 
of a nationalist pedagogy and as the subjects of contemporary, performative nationhood. 
In simpler terms, nationalism teaches the “nation-people” in pedagogical time to 
“remember” their ostensible originary, shared past.  Pedagogical time consolidates the 
nation as a unified collectivity already constituted long ago.  In performative time, the 
people are repeatedly made to understand that they, in the present moment, constitute the 
“prodigious, living principles” of the contemporary nation.  Thus, the performative 
moment(s) consolidates the nation through repeated emphasis on the collective in the 
present (208-9).  
In exposing nationalist time in this way, Bhabha argues that scholars can better 
discern the gaps that allow for detection of the ways in which the people resist o  subvert 
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the nationalist paradigm.  Applying his theory to Beka Lamb, we can see how, in the 
Belizean people’s refusal to openly discuss or fully articulate the past (evidenced in the 
quoted passage above), and in their refusal to conceive their history in a pedagogical 
form, they embody this resistance to nationalist pedagogy.  By depicting a community 
that refuses to name/define/describe its histories, yet somehow communicates those 
“small lessons” among themselves, Edgell opposes nationalist pedagogy with an 
alternative pedagogy dispersed through the people’s praxis (the act of mourning) rather 
than nationalist discourse. 
Edgell’s representation of the community’s pedagogical methods here partially 
coincides with Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of community—particularly in its seeming 
verbal inexpressibility. On the subject of community, Nancy contends that “perhaps, in 
truth there is nothing to say.  Perhaps we should not seek a word or a concept for it, but 
rather recognize in the thought of community a theoretical excess (or more precisely, an 
excess in relation to the theoretical) that would oblige us to adopt n ther praxis of 
discourse and community” (25-6 original emphasis). Edgell’s elucidation of community 
as praxis, and that community’s inability to directly articulate itself as community (in 
both the text and the metatext) intersects with this particular element of Nancy’s 
philosophy.  Although Nancy’s overarching conception of community deals more with 
universal notions of humanity, subjectivity, and existence than with the local, historical 
and political problems that interest Edgell and the subaltern studies scholars, Edgell’s 
representation of death and its attendant rituals in Belize City demonstrate her “bot /and” 
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approach to imagining and discursively rendering a novel form of community that 
transcends current nationalist and theoretical limitations.   
Finally, on the subject of time and history in community, critics might presume 
Edgell’s alternative pedagogy as located in some apolitical, ahistorical space—irrelevant 
to the dominant paradigm of nationhood (i.e. history, H1, nationalist time, etc.)—because 
it primarily addresses “domestic work” or the “domestic space.”   As Anne McClintock 
explains, patriarchal nationalisms relegated such domestic efforts to a site out ide of 
history (39).  Yet, I assert that in their refusal to engage in direct discourse at the funeral, 
the mourners refuse to propagate nationalist time; thus, this refusal also constitutes a 
political act.  I stated earlier that Edgell’s community as praxis permeates both the private 
and personal spheres; in this instance, it does both simultaneously.  It would be difficult
to construct a more powerful argument against nationalisms that proliferate West rn 
historical theories of progress, and critics who read Edgell’s Belize in terms of its 
“unrealized dream” of nationhood.  The necessary elements are all here, Edgell seems to 
say; the nation must somehow appropriately channel them.   
 While the funeral constitutes an example of how Edgell interconnects the personal 
with the political by positing community through praxis, she also delineates the material, 
political work that brings the community together intermittently throughout the text.  
Almost all of Beka’s family, friends and teachers participate in the imaginative and 
material work of building the nation.  Granny Ivy and Miss Eila are active members of 
the PIP and often bring Beka to rallies and meetings.  Although Granny Ivy and Beka’s 
parents, Bill and Lilla, each take different positions on the debate about whether B liz  
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should gain independence from Britain and become its own nation or federate with other 
West Indian nations, they all spend time, energy and effort in discussing the problem of 
nationhood and teach Beka to do so as well.  Indeed, Beka and Toycie have an 
abbreviated debate about national rights among themselves (36); Beka aspires to become 
a politician (45); and she participates in an essay contest about the history of Belize that 
metaphorically writes the nation.  Each of these characters represents the different 
desires, values, and worldviews of the Belizean people, but these differences do not 
impede their collective fight for independence.  Thus, Edgell again shows how 
community through praxis actually comes together across and through very diff ent 
political points of view.      
  Edgell’s theory of community offers a lesson for that “political discourse of the 
‘modern’ kind which insists that these collectivities have a fixed, determinate form, and 
[that] if there are several to which an individual can belong, that there be a priority 
among them” (Chatterjee NF 223).  Since the Lamb family represents the country in 
microcosm, and their political differences do not require elision or prioritization in order 
for them to work together for independence, Edgell’s text contests the nationalis  
emphasis on homogeneous identities and unity as unnecessary (Salick 108).  
Notably, Beka Lamb incorporates this form of identity-based nationalist discourse 
as well, if only to demonstrate its forcible construction, and consequent severe 
limitations.  At a political rally where the people are protesting the devaluation of the 
dollar, possible federation with the West Indies, and the governor’s dissolution of the city 
council (among other things), a PIP leader implores his audience:  
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What have we got left?  National unity, my people, that is what we have left.  Let 
us present a united front to the world.  We must show, as was said in the 
memorial, that a poor, suffering, homeless, undernourished people can stand 
together until our not unjust demands are met.  National unity, shoulder to 
shoulder.  (108, my emphasis) 
 
 
By employing these particular verbs, the speaker implies that national unity ca  only ever 
be a presentation—a show meant for the rest of the world—not an actuality.  His speech 
exemplifies the performative moment in nationalist time. In the narration of the Belizean 
nation, with its incredible racial, ethnic, and class diversity, the very idea of unity needs 
continual discursive iteration not least because it so clearly belies the day-to-  realities 
of Belizean life.  Too many cultural, social, and economic factors impede the possibility 
of continuous shared interests or goals among all of its citizens.  Moreover, the exclusion 
that unity necessitates is possible only in the political imaginary; for example, in Belize’s 
coat of arms—an illustration of “two black men, bare to the waist” (8)—which elides the 
presence of women, Spanish Creoles, Caribs, East Indians, and all the other peoples that 
comprise the nation.  The national symbol necessarily overlooks these groups because 
representation of a flexible and inclusive community within the nationalist imagination 
seems virtually impossible.     
 Edgell’s text, as I have shown, insistently works toward  bridging  divides 
between forms of temporality, history and knowledge; the national community and 
nationalist thought; and the identity differences (class, gender, ethnicity, et.) of people in 
a diverse society.  It also works toward the full inclusion of marginalized figures (like 
Toycie and National) in the narrative representation of the nation. While the articulation 
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of such inclusion occurs on a figurative, allegorical level in Edgell’s drawing of the 
events surrounding Toycie’s life and death, she also illustrates it literally through Beka’s 
experiences at St. Cecilia’s Academy during the academic year in which s e suffers the 
loss of Toycie.  In fact, I argue that Edgell’s representation of community as praxis holds 
implications not only for the Belizean nation, but also for the relations among this nation
and others—including, and not insignificantly—Great Britain.       
Undoubtedly, Edgell paints a thorough picture of how this colonial power has 
oppressed and exploited the people of Belize.  At the aforementioned PIP rally, another
speaker explains to his listeners that they have been “the most subservient subjects in the 
entire British Empire” and that “over the centuries colonial exploitation took and is 
taking abroad the little wealth we possess, leaving us impoverished and destitute” (107).  
Thus, Edgell shows how the ideologies and the material actions of the colonial power 
converge to keep Belizeans from gaining political, social and psychological (in Toycie’s 
case) independence.  Yet, just as the national community cannot be conceived as 
homogeneous, static, or fixed, neither can the individuals who comprise the colonial 
power.   
In her drawing of Sister Gabriela as the dialectical other of Sister Virgil, Edgell 
shows that community through praxis can even transcend the political boundaries of the 
nation.  For example, Sister Gabriela, as an instructor at the academy (though she is 
American, not British, she still represents the colonizers’ institution), demonstrates the 
principles of Edgell’s community through the collective work of healing.  In order to 
circumvent the limited curriculum mandated by the London examinations, Sister Gabriela 
84 
 
organizes a school-wide essay contest seemingly about “The Sisters of Charity in 
Belize,” but which is actually meant to bring the contestants to “understand a little more 
about [their] country and about [them]selves” (94).  When, after Toycie’s death (and 
Beka’s consequent prolonged absence from school), Sister Gabriela goes to the Lamb 
home to collect the essay, she draws the entire family out of their grief and depression by 
requesting their help with a medley of folksongs to be sung for the Mother Provincial 
when she visits.  Sister Gabriela understands the Lambs’ sorrow and grief atToycie’s 
death, and she clearly assigns the folksong task to Beka in order to help draw her out of 
her depression.  This strategy succeeds overwhelmingly, as “all that afternoon . . . the 
little group sat there humming tunes, trying to decide which ones were best for the 
occasion.  Granny Ivy . . . forgot all about the smelly dishcloth over her shoulder as she 
reminisced about folksongs she used to sing, as a girl, before time” (162).  The Lambs’ 
spirits drastically improve after this visit; Beka decides to go back to sch ol, and Granny 
Ivy and Lilla become re-energized by it. The episode may at first appear to sustain an 
interpretation in which the colonial subjects perform a cultural rite for an ethnographic 
American nun in preparation for a larger community performance before an even more 
important imperial figure.  Yet, the community that we witness here illustrate  how Sister 
Gabriela’s chosen course of action improves the Lamb family’s psychological and 
emotional well-being.  This is not to be taken lightly; the nun definitively holds a position 
of power in the Belizean society—especially over Beka, the metaphorical representative 
of the nation.  Yet, like Bill Lamb in his petitioning for Toycie, Gabriela does not use this 
position to harmful effect.  Instead, her work, and the work that she inspires Lilla, Ivy, 
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and Beka to perform brings about the family’s healing, while at the same time it lends 
itself to the important work of building the nation that these women deem so important. 
The folksongs that the women sing read as nationalist texts created by the nation-
people rather than nationalist ideologues.  Moreover, the domestic space in which this 
scene occurs, coupled with its emphasis on women, illuminates how Edgell’s 
representation of community through praxis takes a specifically feminist form.  
Radhakrishnan has argued that in Indian nationalism’s splitting into an “outer vision” that 
remains “hostage to the Enlightenment identity of the West,” and its “inner vision” which 
“is effectively written out of history altogether. .  . Woman takes on the name of a vast 
inner silence not be broken into by the rough and external clamor of material history” 
(85).   Metatextually, this scene breaks that silence and demonstrates not only women’s 
central role in maintaining historical knowledge, but also in creating history through their 
collective work.   
Finally, Edgell’s most substantial rendering of community as praxis lies in her 
representation of writing, both in terms of Beka’s participation in the essay contest and in 
terms of the memories that Beka psychically writes which constitute the narrative itself.  
Jean-Luc Nancy explains the centrality of writing in the expression of community: “only 
a discourse of community, exhausting itself, can indicate to the community the 
sovereignty of its sharing . . . This is nothing other than the question of literary 
communism . . . something that would be the sharing of community in and by its writing, 
its literature” (26 original emphasis).  Nancy’s emphasis on the necessity of discourse, 
together with his explanation of community’s inexpressibility (because of its constant 
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flux, I would argue, though Nancy rationalizes it differently), demonstrate the necessity 
for both Edgell and Beka’s writings of the nation.       
Gikandi argues that Beka’s participation in the essay contest exemplifies her 
struggle to “establish her identity within the social order of colonialism (represented by 
the school) and the as yet unrealized ream of national culture (expressed by her 
grandmother and other nationalists), . . . [and] . . . draws our attention to the difficulties of 
forging new identities and expropriating colonial modernism and its discourse” (220, my 
emphasis).  The contest indeed represents Beka’s effort to come to terms with her place 
and course of action in the midst of personal and political turmoil, but it is surprisingly 
therapeutic work.  She finds “consolation, for the death of Great Grandmother Straker, 
and for Toycie’s absence, by working at something beyond her natural capacity” (151).  
Moreover, the thinking and writing work that Beka puts into writing this essay establishes 
a link between the lives of marginalized women, the “disjointed” oral narrative of Mr. 
Rabatu—who was present when the nuns first arrived in Belize City—and the academic 
history she gets from the nuns and the librarian.  Though we do not know what, of all this 
information, she incorporates in the essay, Edgell connects Beka’s writing process t  an 
oral history (which she recites to herself, and of course, to readers of this text) about the 
“illegitimate” women she knows, and their “illegitimate children”: “on this street, Miss 
Flo had a daughter named Miss Glory and Miss Glory had Miss Ruby. . . and now she 
has three daughters.  Then there’s old Miss Boysie in the alley and she has a daughter 
named Miss Prudence . . .” (145).   By demonstrating Beka’s consciousness of these 
women, Edgell indicates that her protagonist’s figurative writing of the nation w ll 
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contest their continued marginalization.  Beka’s work, rendered collectively as memory 
work performed by her various sources, re-members the community and all of its 
disparate parts.  Thus, Edgell depicts a writing of the nation that incorporates 
marginalized subjects, and illustrates to readers that such inclusion is absolutely central to 
a viable nation model.        
Strikingly, Beka wins the essay contest, despite Granny Ivy’s continued warnings.  
She tells Beka “You are wasting your precious time trying to win that fool-fo l contest.  
What I am telling you is important. . . and I am weary telling you over and over again  
‘pania, bakra or expatriate will win!  Who ever heard about any black girl winning so 
much as a pencil at that convent school?” (151).14    Ivy’s admonitions illustrate that 
though she does not subscribe to colonialist values, she may be resigned to the 
dominance of colonial power—at least until she reaps the rewards of independence.  With 
the fact that Beka wins the contest, however, Edgell implies that her writing of the 
nation’s history—the inclusionary practices that allowed it to happen, and the 
inclusionary practices she performed in writing it—will be the foundation upon which a 
successful nation-state might effectively come to fruition.   
On her walk home from school after winning the essay contest, Beka runs into her 
father’s brother, Uncle Curo. When he tells her that some of the nationalist leaders h  
been arrested, she asks, “is this the end of everything then, Uncle Curo?” and he replies, 
“The end, pet?  Belize people are only just beginning!”(167). His response indicates an 
openness toward the future that is full of possibility and hope, a temporal space in which 
                                                          
14 “bakra” is a colloquial term for a white person.   
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community might be conceived in all of its flexibility and different forms.  It also 
indicates Beka’s interconnection with the people; the essay contest and the completion of 
her grieving for Toycie mean that Beka is also “just beginning” and it is this image that 
leaves readers optimistic about Beka’s Belize.        
While Beka performs the work of writing the nation within the text, her memories 
also constitute work in the metatext.  Like the collective mourning at Greatgran Straker’s 
funeral, the narrative brings readers together with Beka in the effort to mourn T ycie. 
Although the narrator is not Beka, her memories and experiences focalize the entire text.  
Moreover, Beka’s conscious reconstruction of Toycie’s life through memory acts as her 
way of “saving” Toycie—rescuing her from patriarchal, classist, racist narratives of the 
nation in order to reincorporate her in Beka’s own writing of the community and the 
nation. Roydon Salick claims that the narrative of Toycie’s life serves as a met textual 
answer to the question Beka often asks Granny Ivy: “What woulda happen to me before 
time?” (114).    He further claims that Toycie is Beka’s alter ego who “diesso Beka can 
live, so that Beka can achieve self-motivated, hard-won success” (109).  I see no
evidence for such a directly causal link between the one girl’s life and the other’s death.  
Instead, I read the two as the simultaneous (not consequential) deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the national narrative. In Salick’s analysis, death imparts a division 
between the girls, when in fact, the narrative itself as a mourning ritual inst ntiates 
Nancy’s principle of death in community: “Community is always revealed in the death of 
others; hence it is always revealed to others” (Nancy 15, my emphasis).  Edgell’s 
narrative reveals Toycie’s death to us, as readers; it also reveals the mutual
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interconnection between Toycie Qualo (the unsuccessful nation form), Beka Lamb (the 
possibly successful form), and the other members (citizens) of the community.   
Chatterjee emphasizes the vital necessity of both deconstructing nationalisms 
complicit with Eurocentrism, and of carving out a different space for a nationalism that 
“could fashion its own epistemological, cognitive, and representational modalities” 
(Radhakrishnan 85).  In her representation of Toycie’s end, Edgell thoroughly tears down 
the Western modality of nationhood—exposing all of its dangers, hypocrisies and their 
destructive effects—but in Beka’s wake for Toycie, the narrative metatextu lly 
reconstructs the Belizean nation as an inclusive, flexible and productive nation form that 
includes women, prostitutes, children, and the poor, in the political, social, and familial 
spheres.  The way Edgell represents this community posits it as a comprehensive and 
effective alternative to the totalizing and repressive nationalist discour es of the West.  
Chatterjee argues that Indian nationalism or any non-Western nationalism that imics 
this liberal-elitist form typically fails to speak for its people.  Beka—a black Creole, 
female child—differs extremely from the imagined white adult, male sovereign subject of 
Western nations.  In Chatterjee’s explanation of anticolonial nationalisms, he shows how 
they construct an essential “inner” identity that severs itself from a national identity, 
which, for the sake of independence, conforms to Western ideologies. In Beka Lamb, 
Edgell creates her new form by rendering Beka—a clear example of a nation’s putative 
“inner identity”—as the national protagonist.  While in most nationalisms, the “inner self 
is not allowed to take on a positive hegemonic role as the protagonist or agent of its own 
history,” Beka’s nationalism situates her as the narrator of a nation that effectively 
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represents “its own reality and its own people” (Radhakrishan 88).   Edgell creates a 
nation that successfully merges the inner and outer identities of the nation-people.     
In Belize’s anticolonial period multiple possible answers exist for the questions 
“What is our nation?” or “What will our nation be?”  By conceiving community through 
praxis and thereby bridging divides between heterogeneous subjects, private/public 
realms, masculine/feminist discourses, nationalism/national community, and 
history/memory, Edgell provides a creative framework through which the nation-state 
might begin to effectively incorporate the national community (in all of its diversity) 
during the post-independence period.  To avoid the exclusions that result from nationalist 
creations that take on Western modular forms, Edgell’s text elucidates the productive 
framework of coming together through collective action.  Since the narrative ends long 
before Belize achieves independence, she does not illuminate how, exactly, this heory of 
community might be put into play in the consolidation of the nation, but the task she sets 
is for the nation to somehow comprehend the national community as in flux, flexible, 
grounded in praxis, and dependent upon situations and contexts.  This task is not 
imaginary; it is one that the text shows should be created in the realm of political, 
economic and social realities in Belize and other Caribbean nations.  Unfortunately, some 
sixty years after the anticolonial period, nations throughout the world have yet to heed 
this call.    
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CHAPTER IV  
THE BLUES MATRIX—CULTURAL DISCOURSES AND COMMUNITY IN ERNA 
BRODBER’S LOUISIANA 
 
 
Of all the texts I examine here, perhaps none presents as radical a representation 
of community as Erna Brodber’s Louisiana.  Like the other works discussed in this 
project, Louisiana revises or reimagines history (and other institutionalized knowledges, 
such as anthropology) and indicates this revision as a necessary precursor to recognizing 
productive communities.  Like Maryse Condé, Brodber prioritizes spiritualism and 
ancestral knowledge, and like Zee Edgell, she presents a community primarily grounded 
in women and women’s work.  Moreover, her central concern with unifying subjects of 
the African diaspora links with Caryl Phillips’ search for the possible connectio s that 
might exist between such subjects.  Perhaps most importantly, Brodber’s community in 
Louisiana, as in the other texts, is always in-flux; it circulates, transforms, re-circulates 
and extends itself in different forms and through different characters.  Yet, despite these 
similarities and others, Brodber’s representation of community renders subjectivity and 
agency quite differently than these other works.  While all of the other texts show 
individual subjects who come together through work, collective action, solidarity, 
affinity, or the processes of Relation, Brodber’s text makes community, formed through 
discourses and cultural practices, the precedent for both the subject’s self-knowledge and 
the consequent agency that stems from such knowledge.     
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Most critical accounts of Louisiana comment upon Brodber’s textual re-
membering of the diasporic community, though none take her rendering of community as 
their primary interpretive focus.  In her monograph on Brodber’s work, June Roberts 
reads Louisiana as the figurative marriage between the theories of Marcus Garvey and 
W.E.B. DuBois, and simultaneously the biographies of (conservative) Zora Neale 
Hurston and (radical) Brodber herself (215-18).  Though she stresses Brodber’s positive
revisioning of Hurston’s life, and the many examples that illuminate DuBoisian or 
Garveyist thought, she suggests that Brodber’s text (indeed, all of her work) strives
toward the unification of the African diaspora. She rightly asserts, “connection to the 
ancestral past, continuity in the present, and u ity in the future constitute Brodber’s 
ideological mission” (218 my emphasis).  Like Roberts, Angeletta Gourdine recognizes 
Brodber’s unification project as grounded in her combination of disparate ways of 
thinking, although Gourdine focuses on the fusion of “fiction, science, anthropology and 
religion . . . [as an] alternative discourse that challenges . . . historical and anthropological 
representations of black individual and community experiences” (139).  Gourdine’s 
argument centers on the linkage between anthropology and fiction in this text, and “the 
interdependence of student/studied” (141).  Her concentration on Brodber’s alternative 
discourses and ways of knowing bears similarity to Patricia J. Saunders’ focus on how 
Brodber constructs alternative ways of knowing and being that link with the collective 
consciousness (158). Lastly, Denise deCaires Narain focalizes “the woman’s body . . . as 
a vessel or vehicle for the powerful delivery of the word which can ‘reborn’ the black 
diasporic community” (114).  While these critical accounts stress different l ments of 
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the novel and the theoretical work it performs, they all find Brodber’s polyphonic 
narrative structure significant, and they seem to agree that conjure or African spiritism 
comprises Brodber’s “organizing aesthetic” (Roberts 216).   
In my analysis of Louisiana, I also read African conjure work, the multivocal 
narrative structure, and the fusion of different forms of knowledge as key strategies in 
Brodber’s theory of community. Yet, instead of reading the novel solely through the 
trope of spiritism or voodoo, I turn toward Houston Baker’s notion of “the blues matrix” 
as another important framework for understanding how Brodber’s community operates. 
Blues, folk and jazz music play a central role in the lives of the main characters nd in 
their return to roots; thus, a theoretical lens grounded in blues culture opens up elements 
of the text that the voodoo trope alone does not. Houston Baker asserts that “Afro-
American culture is a complex, reflexive enterprise which finds its proper figuration in 
blues conceived as a matrix . . . a point of ceaseless input and output, a web of 
intersecting, crisscrossing impulses always in productive transit” (3).   I assert that in 
Louisiana, Brodber portrays this blues matrix as the cultural repository of the collective’s 
historical, social, affective, and political knowledges, and that these knowledges form the 
necessary foundation for a positive and productive diasporic political unity.  I do not pose 
this metaphor over or against Brodber’s spiritualist emphases; instead, I see the psychic 
spirit work in the novel as one of those “impulses” at work within the matrix.   
I further argue that the tropes of translation, transcription, voicing and 
multivocality in the narrative stress discourse, rather than the individual subject, as the 
possible site of agency.  Brodber’s literary theory of subjectivity and community 
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exemplifies what Baker describes as “language (the code) ‘speaking’ the subject. . . . [A 
process whereby t]he subject is ‘decentered’” (1).  Through her depiction of Ella 
Townsend/Louisiana’s possession—which happens to be initiated through a folk song—
Brodber shows how the voices that possess her protagonist bring Ella/Louisiana to a new 
understanding of self as a communal being, which, in turn, brings her to a new 
comprehension of agency created through community. This agency manifests through
both Ella’s healing work and through her meticulous recordkeeping of the different 
histories she gathers as a medium and an anthropologist.  This knowledge then 
recirculates in the form of the narrative itself.  Finally, and perhaps more specifically 
relevant to Baker’s blues matrix, Brodber demonstrates that the music Ella’s husband 
Reuben performs and records proves to be yet another cultural discourse that, combined 
with Ella’s transcriptions, inspires his burgeoning political activism and eventual 
participation in the African independence struggles of the 1950s.  In short, Brodber’s 
community manifests through the praxis of cultural discourses that are always already in 
circulation, and the recognition of which make up the necessary basis for political unity, 
agency and freedom from oppression for African diasporic subjects throughout the globe. 
Brodber’s depiction of the African diaspora rejects the notion of it as a 
collectivity which “stands in a hierarchically subordinate relation to the nation or 
homeland, regarded as ‘the bastard child of the nation—disavowed, inauthentic, 
illegitimate, and impoverished imitation of the originary culture’” (Gopinath qtd Braziel 
and Mannur 8).  In Louisiana, the diasporic community, represented through its forms of 
knowledge and its cultural discourses, serves as the source of collective power and 
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agency for its individual members. Moreover, Brodber posits diaspora as the most 
productive site for the recognition of multiple histories and temporalities.  In Theorizing 
Diaspora, Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur describe a prevailing metaphor for 
diaspora as Janus-faced; the “gaze [that] is simultaneously directed both forward and 
backward, [which] suggests a certain temporality; the figure at once looks to the future 
and the past” (9). Brodber’s text shows how this double-vision illuminates not only the 
differing pictures of the past, but also how it embeds the possibility of multiple futures.     
The plot of the novel is deceptively simple. It begins in 1936 with the journey of 
Ella Townsend—Columbia graduate student in Anthropology—to St. Mary, Louisiana at 
the behest of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration (WPA).  She is 
provided a tape recorder (very new technology at the time) and engaged to interview a 
matriarchal community figure, named Mammy (Sue Ann) King, in order to record the 
story of “the blacks of South West Louisiana” for the national archives.15  Brodber 
depicts Ella as a complete outsider to the community not least because she is steeped in a 
“capitalistic individualism that is unmistakably American.  She prides herelf in her 
career, her financial independence and her ability to support herself . . . [and her] project, 
too, is rooted in western notions of knowledge based on secular and rational empiricism” 
(Khokher 39).   Mammy King—Brodber’s representative of the rural African American 
community—slyly resists this outsider’s attempt to appropriate the community’s history 
                                                          
15 The Federal Writers Project, which was only one comp nent of the WPA, “included studies on such 
topics as architecture, science for children, and American Indians.  Among the most important are oral
history archives created by FWP workers, including priceless archives like the Slave Narrative and 
collections of folklore. . . Among many other participants in the FWP were Ralph Ellison, Richard Wright, 
Studs Terkel, John Cheever, Saul Bellow, Margaret Walker, Arna Bontemps and Zora Neale Hurston” 
(Adams and Goldbard).    
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for governmental purposes.  Shortly after Ella’s arrival, Mammy dies and at her funeral, 
Ella has visions and goes into convulsions. The black community in this rural parish, 
including Ella’s soon-to-be-husband Reuben (also a student of Anthropology), recognizes 
this as a transfer of souls.    
At first, Ella’s scientific training leaves her skeptical, but when she unexpectedly 
hears Mammy’s and other unrecorded voices (including her own) on her tape recorder, 
she begins to believe.  Soon thereafter, she and Reuben move to New Orleans where, 
under the guidance of psychic Madame Marie, Ella regularly “converses” with the 
deceased Mammy King and her “spirit-sister,” the deceased Afro-Caribbe n, Lowly 
(Louise) Grant. The venerable sisters symbolize two seemingly distinct cultural traditions 
within the African diaspora that take root in Ella. They also signify the voices come to 
draw Ella into the cultural collectivity—the blues matrix—and through which she 
eventually becomes Louisiana.  Ella’s immersion here simultaneously bringsher to an 
understanding of her own personal past too, as her psychic activities allow her to 
remember the forgotten Jamaican grandmother—her “one sure link with love”—who 
raised her but died when Ella was just three years old (90).  Through her discussions with 
Mammy and Lowly, through her supplementary readings of the past for West Indian and 
African American men, and through her social scientific recordkeeping, Ella merges 
multiple forms of knowledge that signify the diasporic community as a nexus of cross-
cultural and metaphysical relations.    
The move to Louisiana figuratively represents Reuben’s and Ella’s return to the
cultural roots that form the foundation of Brodber’s viable community. I must stress that 
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she highlights these cultural roots not as those “terribly sterile clichés[:] . . . customs, 
traditions, and costumes” that Frantz Fanon claims result from the intellectua s’ “painful, 
forced search” for roots, but as a living tradition that influences and is influenced by 
those who enact them (158).  In Homi Bhabha’s terms, Brodber depicts culture as 
enunciative rather than epistemological.  The epistemology of culture “tends toward a 
reflection of its empirical referent or object” and “is locked into the hermeneutic circle, in 
the description of cultural elements as they tend toward a totality” (255 original 
emphasis).  That is to say, the epistemology of culture turns culture into an object—as do 
Fanon’s imagined intellectuals—and disavows the possibility of recognizing alternative 
sites of agency for historical subjects.  The enunciation of culture, on the other hand, 
“attempts repeatedly to reinscribe and relocate the political claim to cultural priority and 
hierarchy (high/low, ours/theirs) . . . [it] is a more dialogic process that attempts to track 
displacements and realignments that are the effects of cultural antagonisms a d 
articulations” (255 my emphasis).  Bhabha claims that focusing on how culture gets 
enacted rather than how it is reflected provides a “process by which objectified o hers 
may be turned into subjects of their history and experience” (255).  Like Baker, Bhabha 
focuses on discourse(s) as the site for such enunciative practices. This argument not only 
provides a theoretical framework for understanding Brodber’s representations of culture, 
but it also suggests a reading practice for the audience of this text.   
Although Brodber herself stresses the diasporic connections between Afro-
Caribbean and African American cultures, the narrative underscores that diasporic 
subjects conceive them as different.  Thus, the characters distinguish between Mammy’s 
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culture and Lowly’s.  For instance, shortly before Mammy’s death, the dying woman 
describes Lowly’s Jamaican culture to Ella: “They have brass bands but not as good as 
ours; they have mento, flat footed shuffle like ours; they have pukkumina, that’s what 
they call getting the power . . . ” (20).  Although the descriptive language here works to 
draw out the similarities (Brodber’s point), the pronoun usage (“They,” and “our”) 
demonstrates that the characters perceive these cultural practices in national terms, vis a 
vis Jamaica and the U.S.  In her depiction of how Ella begins to listen and transcribe the 
taped voices, Brodber demonstrates that the social scientist who previously perceived 
cultures as epistemological objects, begins to recognize them as enunciatory sites instead: 
 
“Let go”, I heard myself say to myself.  I let go and was all ears.  I li tened.  I 
heard the song of the first lady.  I back-tracked and back-tracked until the words
were clear. . . But whate’er the melody the tune and the lyrics were unmistakably 
familiar.  That last time I had heard them I had collapsed.  That was something 
else to think of—the collapse.  But let me leave me out of this and get the obvious 
down on paper, I commanded myself.  Upon the hill, the rising sun.  It is the voice 
that calls me home.  They had sung that at Mammy’s funeral.  And according to 
this lady it was sung at her funeral which had taken place somewhere else.  That 
was extraordinary.  I would have to meditate on that.   (50-51) 
 
 
Clearly, Brodber stresses listening here, confirming that the recognition of enunciatory 
practices requires an adjustment in one’s “reading” strategies.  Moreover, the ability to 
observe the “extraordinary” similarities between both the songs and the funeral rites 
demonstrates Bhabha’s dialogic process in the enunciatory framework; rather than 
prioritize one culture over the other, we instead see equitable similarities between the 
two.  Reading through Bhabha/Brodber’s suggested lens, we also see how the cultural 
discourses in circulation here resist objectification as well as hierarchiz tion.  Moreover, 
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by emphasizing the voices’ singing, storytelling, and mourning, Brodber portrays cultural 
practices as ongoing enunciatory processes.  In doing so, she decenters the subject—
Ella—and recenters the voices and practices that illuminate alternative forms of agency.    
Brodber stresses that these alternative forms of agency do not only manifest 
through discursive practices; they also appear in the body of Ella as a figurative 
repository of several cultures, and as a conduit for the renewal of those cultures.  This 
rendering of Ella’s experience, specifically, shows a somewhat more literal decentering 
of the subject.  Initially a firm representative of scientism, rationality nd individualism, 
the discourses Ella “hears” or becomes immersed in gradually transform her into 
Louisiana—a vehicle for the community’s voices.  Brodber carefully elucidates the pain 
and fear attendant upon this process for such a Westernized subject.  During the veryfirst 
‘conversation’ between Ella, Mammy, and Lowly, Ella does not quite understand what 
happens.  As she narrates, “There is no doubt at all in my mind that . . . I said those words 
that are foreign to me and I sensed that I was a party to conversation between o hers.  I 
was more than just frightened.  I was shaken to the roots” (33).  While this fear 
eventually dissipates, the processes of soul transference and prophesying represent such a 
violent break from Ella’s prior sense of self and world that Brodber portrays them as 
physically traumatic; Ella goes into convulsions, screams in pain, and over the fifteen
years of waiting for Mammy and Lowly’s stories, her health gradually declines.  Then, 
upon finally hearing those tales, she dies.  The violence of these experiences, I argue
allegorizes the movement of the subject from an individualist position to a collective one.  
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Recognizing one’s collective being proves a significantly difficult process, which may be 
the reason why so many diasporic subjects today cannot or will not do it.      
This decentering of the subject also points toward the possibilities for the ongoing 
processes of culture and for understanding its multiple histories.  Both Ella’s cultural 
work and the histories that her protagonist translates and transcribes manifest in a 
continual circular process that encompasses the attainment or employment of psychic 
abilities, a (sometimes concurrent, sometimes subsequent) new understanding of self, and 
a contribution to others’(individually and collectively) efforts to understand themselves 
and others.   The resulting sense of what Melvin Rahming labels “cosmic 
interrelatedness” is reinforced in the men for whom she “reads,” and they, in turn, 
strengthen her sense of interconnection as she psychically follows them across the sea.16  
Through these recurrent processes, Ella as a figurative cultural site herelf instantiates 
cultural openness and flux that recalls Wilson Harris’s theory of cross-cultural 
imagination. 
Because of her experimental and abstract narrative style, Brodber has been 
compared to Harris (Narain 97), and Harris himself, in a critique of Myal, has lauded her 
approach as one that “penetrates surfaces and raises unsuspecting edges of light and 
dark” (“LM” 92). As the editors of his famous critical book point out, however, “Wilson 
                                                          
16Interestingly, Brodber highlights women as the workers and men as the benefactors—in both the spiritual 
and material sense. Only women perform psychic readings, which Houston Baker describes as common in 
black women’s writing; “The spirit work that is imagistically projected by afro-American women’s 
expressiveness is, I think, like what is called by the religion of voodoo The Work” (qtd in Roberts 216, 
original emphasis). Brodber does not show Ella reading the pasts of any other women than her spirit-sisters; 
she only reads for the West Indian and African American men who board at the boarding house.  Moreover, 
the sisters played a more significant role in the Garveyist movement for which they worked than did Silas 
(Mammy’s husband).  Thus, the women perform both the spiritual healing work and the political 
organizational work, a representation through which Brodber illuminates the powerful and necessary roles 
women played throughout history.       
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Harris is . . . a writer whose primary concern would seem to be with the ‘reality’ of 
language itself, rather than reflecting directly material or political relationships . . . The 
splendors, limits, and ironies of consciousness are Wilson Harris’s great concerns” 
(Baker and Blassingame xi, original emphasis).  In his introduction to The Womb of 
Space, Harris claims that his “primary responsibility lay with the elaboration of gateways 
into the largely submerged territory of the imagination” (xix). Brodber’s construction of 
Louisiana partially coincides with Harris’s theoretical inquiries, but she does not allow 
herself the luxury of disregarding material relationships, since the material conditions of 
black diasporic people ground her entire body of work.  Indeed, most of the histories 
Brodber relates in this text recount slave rebellions, labor strikes, and other historical but 
unknown acts of resistance against the dominant white powers. Nevertheless, the cross-
cultural imagination that Ella represents initiates the historical knowledge that, as we will 
see, remains absolutely essential to an effective diasporic political community.   
Harris endorses the cross-cultural imagination as the most viable site for new 
forms of community 
 
The paradox of cultural heterogeneity, or cross-cultural capacity, lies in the
evolutionary thrust it restores to orders of the imagination, the ceaseless dialogue 
it inserts between hardened conventions and eclipsed or half-eclipsed otherness, 
within an intuitive self that moves endlessly into flexible patterns, arcs or bridges 
of community. (WS xviii) 
 
 
Ella becomes the “intuitive self,” Louisiana, through her conversations with the venerable 
sisters and her psychic readings; and the consequent understanding she gains from them 
serves as the force behind the expansion of her own imagination.  For example, she 
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defines herself as “the link between the shores washed by the Caribbean sea, a hol . . . I 
join the world of the living and the world of the spirits.  I join the past with the present.  
In me Louise and Sue Ann are joined.  I am Louisiana” (124).  As a figure of the cross-
cultural imagination, Louisiana represents a deeply interior experienc of collective 
agency at the psychical/spiritual/cultural level.  She also represents the ways in which this 
experience of collective agency depends primarily on the collective, rather than the self.  
As she listens to the voices from within, she tries to seek out their experiences, but the 
effectiveness of this ability depends upon the collective and not her own desire.  Her 
individual desire, agency, and acts, then, are subordinated to the power of the collective 
group.  
  The voices Ella hears symbolize both the collective consciousness and the 
spiritual discourses that partially relay this consciousness.  Brodber repeatedly stresses 
Ella’s lack of power and control here.  For instance, after one of Mammy’s stories, she 
attempts to “hear” more: “There was nothing after this.  I touched, I pushed, I stroked, 
focused and projected myself but there was nothing” (83).  Though Ella cannot fully 
exercise control over these processes, Brodber makes clear the dependent relatio ship 
between conjure work and the collectivity.  Without the sisters, Madame Marie, Reuben, 
Marie’s boarders and so on, Ella would not be able to perform her work—not only as a 
spirit worker, but as an anthropologist and historian.  Her readings plunge her into a new 
understanding of communal existence that departs from “the twin axes of scientific 
rationality and the politicized ideology of power and control . . . [and instead] revolves . . 
. around the exigencies of spirit . . . a consciousness inclining towards the full 
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manifestation of its cosmic interrelatedness” (Rahming n. pag.).  Interrela dness 
becomes the obvious condition of her existence and her explorations of this highly 
populated ground brings her to a novel understanding of self as dependent upon, and 
grounded within,  the community.   
    In Louisiana, Brodber underscores the fact that this interrelatedness always 
already exists among the diasporic community, whether one realizes it consciously or not.  
She incorporates the line “Ah who sey Sammy dead” from the Jamaican folk song 
“Sammy plant a piece of corn” as the initial force behind Ella’s possession.  The first 
time Ella hears it, it comes through as her own voice on the tape recorder (mix d with 
Mammy’s and Lowly’s voices), though she claims that “nowhere was that phrase in my 
consciousness at the time” (31).  The folk song works here just as the blues song does in 
Baker’s conceptualization: 
 
The blues song erupts, creating a veritable playful festival of meaning.  Rather 
than a rigidly personalized form, the blues offer a phylogenetic recapitulation—a 
nonlinear, freely associative, nonsequential meditation—of species experience.  
What emerges is not a filled subject, but an anonymous (nameless) voice issuing 
from the black (w)hole. (5)  
 
 
Though Ella hears her own voice say the words, the song itself comes from that collective 
consciousness somewhat unfamiliar to her; it does not spring directly from her 
individual(ist) consciousness.  Significantly, the song had been sung at the funeral of her 
grandmother (though she had forgotten this); thus, Brodber shows that collective 
consciousness resides within the individual whether the individual realizes it or not.  As 
the speaker of the song phrase, and as a spiritual medium, Ella signifies Baker’  “blu s 
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voice.”  She becomes not only the representative, but also the conduit of the collective’s 
experiences.  Brodber’s text shows how Ella becomes embedded within the constantly 
circulating cultural, social, historical, political and private knowledges of the Afro-
Caribbean/African-American community, and eventually how those knowledges lead to 
the extension and strengthening of that community.   
Histories become the mode of knowledge through which Ella most significantly 
extends this diasporic community.  Brodber’s depiction of the stories and histories that 
Ella translates and transmits forcefully challenges the notion that they can ever be 
conceived of as static or stable. All aspects of the diasporic community—its knowledges, 
forms, and processes—remain continually in-flux. Like Baker, Brodber stresses 
nonlinearity and nonsequentiality, and thus, her rendering of histories challenges the 
Western historical model of linear progression. Her narrative strategies also disrupt and 
revise traditional conceptions of black nationalism, Pan-Africanism and negritude, which, 
according to Carol Boyce-Davies, define themselves in a “static, essentializ d, nativized, 
flawed, historical context” that does not suffice to represent the dispersed peoples of the 
black Atlantic (50).17  In highlighting the mutability of various forms of knowledge,  
Brodber offers another response to Fanon’s argument that the return to African cultural
traditions runs the risk of constricting present and future possibilities because it looks to a 
                                                          
17 Boyce-Davies’ Black Women, Writing and Identity and Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic are two well-
known critiques of the emphasis on “roots.”  These texts counter attendant notions of immobility and static 
history with an emphasis on movement and the circulation of ideas, knowledge and culture through 
voluntary travel and of course, forced migration.  I  the former, Boyce-Davies posits migratory subjectivity 
as the appropriate designation for black women’s experiences throughout the diaspora; in the latter, Paul
Gilroy employs his famous roots/routes metaphor to account for both aspects of contemporary black 
subjectivity. Brodber herself offers a different metaphor for black subjectivity, but one that nonetheless 
counters the notion of roots as a simple return to an idealized past.    
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past that is “irrelevant to the present” (161).  In this statement, Fanon imagines the past as 
a time period that holds no bearing on the present, as if some sort of dividing line exists 
between the two temporalities.  Brodber turns this notion on its head by illustrating not 
only that the past continues to influence the present and the future, but also by showing 
how knowledge about the past, as it is conceived through the discipline of traditional 
history or historiography, remains severely limited.  In order to understand the past(s) and 
its continual relevance in the present and future, one must remain open to the various 
forms such understanding can possibly take. 
As I stated earlier, Louisiana’s prophesies strikingly do not foretell the fu ure; 
instead, they manifest as visions of the past: “I am a soothsayer, yes, but one who looks 
behind, sees and will see the past.  I see that clearly” (106).  Allegorically, her conjure 
work recovers and reconstructs the omitted personal and social histories of diasporic 
subjects which are either too painful for individuals to remember or too complex to be 
consciously and discursively rendered.  Dipesh Chakrabarty labels such histories 
“subaltern pasts,” which he defines as those narratives of the past that are “subordinated 
by the ‘major’ narratives of the dominant institutions” (101).  One such history is that of 
Mammy’s mother, who was killed as a result of her labor organizing in 1878.  The tale 
itself is multiply narrated; Mammy reports the story to Louisiana, not only through her 
own voice, but also through the voice of her grandmother, who, at times, incorporates the 
words of the white masters: 
 
Til now nobody seen the body, they tell me.  Nobody know if that be the woman 
lynched down in Louisiana that have this state with Mississippi flying off to 
Chicago city.  “Certain people”, my Grandma say, “too sure that ‘strange woman’ 
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throw she own self in the river.  ‘Ain’t she been acting strange ever since she been 
back here Vinnette’”—Grandma name Vinnette—“big Massa, Massa Findlay, 
Massa Findlay wife say, the works overseer say.”  My Grandmother say she say 
“Hmmmmmm” and hold her belly tight.  (113)     
 
 
In the way she structures this story, Brodber demonstrates the overwhelming power that 
the dominant white discourses exert over the black matriarch’s options and abilities for 
expressing herself, even within the confines of her own family. Straightforward 
accusation of those responsible appears impossible; it can only be implicitly expressed 
through the subtle phrase, “certain people.”  Moreover, the information that Mammy’s 
grandmother gleans from those words tells her all that she wants to know, and reading the 
dominant culture in this way becomes one type of knowledge that she imparts to 
Mammy, and which Mammy imparts to Louisiana through the telling of the story.   Thus, 
all at once, in this brief account, we learn the sanctioned history (a ‘strange woman’ 
drowned herself); the unsanctioned but obviously more accurate history (she was 
murdered); the approximated affective history that results from it; the ways in which 
these histories are constructed (through the discourses of the white men and women and 
Mammy’s grandmother); and the ways in which these histories can never be articulated 
in their entirety.  Yet, even though they cannot be articulated, Brodber clearly 
demonstrates that they can be understood as Louisiana and ostensibly, Brodber’s readers, 
can discern something akin to what actually occurred.   
Brodber repeatedly draws attention to the fact that such understanding is an 
absolutely essential aspect of forming a viable diasporic political community to s ruggle 
against oppression and abuse.  Yet, it stands as only one of many necessary elements.  By 
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making Louisiana a social scientist who, even after years of work as a psychic, insists on 
recording the historical data she receives and attempts to corroborate it with the dominant 
historical record, Brodber shows the need for historical knowledge in all of its myriad 
forms. When Louisiana goes in search of information at the library about the 
caneworkers’ strike, Mammy laughs at her, but she nevertheless finds information about 
an 1878 “Disturbance in the canefield” in which women took “leadership roles” (139).  
She tells Mammy, “What your granny felt, what your mother felt, what you felt cannot be 
told any better than you have told it” (139), and the conveyance of Mammy’s story 
resonates with Louisiana’s earlier realization that “Feeling is knowing” (116).  Yet, 
affective knowledge alone remains ever incomplete.  Houston Baker asserts that “in
practice, histories are always limited by ideology.  Catalogs [of historical elements] are 
not merely constituted.  They are instituted . . . on the basis of ideologies” (25).  
Brodber’s portrayal of Louisiana’s method points toward the way in which one might 
circumvent the limitations of these ideologies, by gathering information in Historical 
(yes) but also affective, rational, spiritual, and experiential forms.    
In her depiction of Louisiana’s library research to corroborate Mammy’s story, 
and in her own multiple authorial positions as fiction writer and historian, Brodber 
typifies what Edouard Glissant calls the necessary “creative approach” to history for a 
people with a “nonhistory” (61-62). For Glissant, nonhistory does not signify that African 
diasporic peoples lack a history in the Hegelian sense.  Instead, he defines it in his 
discussion of Caribbean historical consciousness, which “came together in the co text of 
shock, contraction, painful negation and explosive forces.  This dislocation of the 
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continuum, and the inability of the collective consciousness to absorb it all, characterize 
what I call a nonhistory” (61-2).  In this conceptualization, Glissant powerfully maintains 
the existence of those histories that had been said not to exist, but he also shows that the 
re-establishment of the continuum is vital “to the formation of community” (63).  As 
Louisiana works at reconstructing the history of the caneworkers’ strike (and the 
longshoreman’s strike organized by Mammy) through what she gains from history books 
and what Mammy tells her, she exemplifies this vital link.  Her psychic knowledge 
informs her academic historical work, making her research and discovery more 
representative of reality than one or the other would be alone. 
Brodber’s both/and approach to narrating histories not only increases the store of 
historical knowledge; it also rigidly contests those dominant historical discour es that 
suggest the powerlessness and passivity of black diasporic subjects descended from 
slaves. In addition to her mother, Mammy’s grandfather, and her grandmother’s second
husband, Ramrod, were both killed for challenging their white owner, and as I pointed 
out earlier, Mammy herself helped organize the New Orleans longshoreman’s strike. 
These forgotten events in American history (Houston Baker distinguishes the American 
historical situation from that of the Caribbean), result from what Baker terms the 
“economics of slavery”—a mode of production and system of thought which “promoted 
the dehumanizing plunder of African labor, [while] it also produced a corollary southern 
mythology of the ruling class” (27). Baker shows how this dominant ideology forced 
authors such as Gustavus Vassa (author of the The Life of Olaudah Equiano), Frederick 
Douglass, Harriet Jacobs and others to negotiate their existence, and eventually their 
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freedom from within this ideology. In Louisiana, Brodber shows not only how diasporic 
subjects negotiate within this social structure, but also how they work to contest it.        
 Baker’s identification of the economics of slavery as a limiting ideology in 
American history correlates to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s theory of the history of capital, or 
what he calls H1.  According to Chakrabarty, dominant historical discourses reflct “the 
universal and necessary history we associate with capital.  It forms the backbone of the 
usual narratives of transition to the capitalist mode of production” (63).  Such 
discourses—typically associated with academic disciplinary history—reinsc ibe capitalist 
modes of production as the ultimate end goal for the nation-state. They also tend to elide
the complex realities of a subject’s life practices, since they read historical subjects as 
simply “bearers of labor power” without taking into account the many “other ways of 
being in the world” (66).  In terms of slavery, H1 implicitly boosts the view of African 
diasporic subjects—such as those presented in Brodber’s text—as slaves and the 
descendants of slaves, without articulating the myriad ways in which they contested, 
resisted and forcefully struggled against the plantation system.     
 Notably, most of the histories Louisiana gains from her discussions with Mammy 
center on labor strikes and other forms of protest that never made it into the history 
books.  In these narratives, slaves and descendants of slaves indeed become the subjects 
of their own histories.  For example, Mammy describes her grandfather’s reaction to 
learning that he is a slave after he attempted to run away.  His master catches him and 
tells him, “‘You be bought and paid for.  You have no right to go off as you please.’ 
Bought and paid for by somebody else!  Dear Jesus, bought and paid for.  Have no self!” 
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(82). Brodber relays the narration here as if Mammy repeats the words her grandfather 
thought or said, though there’s no way she could have heard them because he died before 
she was born.  The discourse here reflects the historical experience of the collectivity 
rather than the individual; many slaves, even the descendants of slaves (as Mammy
shows) experienced the shock of recognition of the self as property.  Moreover, this story, 
which ends somewhat unsurprisingly with the lynching of “Grandpappy,” contains an 
astonishing twist: “Massa Sutton so shame, he do away with himself.  Do away with 
himself.  And that never happen before neither.  He and Grandpappy move together from 
they small” (83).  Returning to Chakrabarty’s thesis, one can see how this particular 
history would be subsumed by H1.  The historical discourses that reinforce capitalist 
modes of production cannot recognize or articulate the affective relationship between 
what it deems an owner and his property, but the spiritual discourses or unrecognized 
voices of histories can.   
 A danger exists, Vasant Kaiwar points out, in placing too much theoretical weight 
on the power of such alternative historical discourses to work toward the end of 
oppression and injustice.  He asserts that  
 
Chakrabarty strives mightily to argue that the real roots of oppression in . . . the 
Third World . . . lie in a rampant Eurocentrism and historicism, not in income 
inequalities, mass poverty, patriarchy, the exploitation of labour, or the manifold 
oppressions of the state.  The struggle is displaced onto the level of discourse.   
(191)  
 
 
In my own view, both oppressive and exploitative material practices, and the discourse 
that reinforce the “logic” behind those practices, need recognition and contestation in the 
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material and theoretical sphere.  As Brodber conveys the collective experiences of 
Mammy, Lowly and others, she also shows the necessity for a both/and approach to 
resistance; the histories that Louisiana collects narrate the actualmaterial struggles 
against oppression that occurred in the past; and, as narratives, they also contest the 
oppressive effects of dominant histories. 
 Textually, Brodber’s contestation of these multiple forms of oppression occurs 
not only through the revisioning of history, but also through a revisioning of the possible 
future(s).  Brodber makes Louisiana a soothsayer who only reads the past; she cannot 
foresee the future. In so doing, she creates a sense of openness and possibility for the 
future deemed vital to the viability of the diaspora as a political community.  The 
representation of Louisiana’s soothsaying rejects the notion of predetermined futurity, 
leaving an open space/time for people to “write” their own futures.  In Chakrabarty’s 
terms, Brodber’s picture of the future as an open space explicitly shows how readings of 
the past directly influence those possible futures.  As Chakrabarty points out, the 
teleology of H1 “has to subjugate or destroy the multiple possibilities that belong to H2 
[subaltern pasts]” (65).  In demonstrating a discursive openness toward the future, 
Brodber underscores the agency of diasporic subjects to create their own realities—based 
on the knowledge they attain through historical memory and cultural forms/processes.  In 
the structure of the text, it also resonates with the images of Louisiana as a “hole,” and 
Baker’s blues matrix as the “black (w)hole,” delineating a powerful linkage between 
open-ended histories and the open, inclusive nature of the community.   
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If opening up the relationship between the present and past leads to a 
consequential opening of the future, Brodber stresses that multiple knowledges are 
essential for the collectivity to create a future in which diasporic subjects will be 
politically empowered and free.  Knowledge in all its myriad forms serves as the single 
most crucial motivator for revolution in the text.  Brodber instantiates this in Mammy’s 
narration of her grandfather’s experience 
 
My Grandpappy was a thinking man but he ain’t know no word called ‘slave.’  He 
be thinking though and Massa Sutton he always be raising questions with him: 
“Moses,” Massa Sutton he like to say, “Wish I was you.  Nothing to worry you. . . 
I gotta be wracking my brain. . . where to get that better price. . . It is a hard life 
Moses.”  Come the day Grandpappy say, “Only difference Massa Sutton, you 
sleeps on the featherbed and I’s on the moss. . .With that one saying the learning 
start.” (81) 
 
 
Remarkably, this passage orders events in such a way as to posit experiential knowledge 
as the precursor to learning, and affirmation of that experiential knowledge as a precursor 
to conscious knowledge and protest, which actually replicates the broader trajectory of 
the plot as represented by Louisiana, whose psychic abilities manifest before she knows 
what to do with them, and whose experiences through these abilities bring she and her 
husband Reuben to a conscious understanding of the African diaspora’s political past, 
which, in turn, brings Reuben to political participation in the contemporaneous 
independence struggles in Africa.    
Light-skinned and biracial, born in the Congo but raised in Europe, Reuben longs 
for a sense of connection with other African diasporic subjects.  In New Orleans, he 
finally finds “that little capillary that was to take him right back to the tall oak he was 
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trying to find in his Congo, in the heart of Africa. . . Reuben had found black men” (52).  
Undoubtedly, these black men signify the community Reuben has been searching for, but 
Ella’s description is only partial, for when she elaborates, she explains that “the little 
capillary” also brought him to her, and to black music.  
 
He was strutting, strumming, learning to jazz and get acquainted with the blues.  
Not that he was a total stranger to these two latter, for he had met them in Europe 
and had ferreted [them] out in New York.  But these products there were 
processed.  In this Louisiana canefield sounds and styles were coming hot out of 
the oven.  He was feeling them in the making, was there at their conception.  The 
man was being made anew.  (53) 
 
 
Through Reuben, Brodber invokes Baker’s blues matrix even more forcefully than she 
does through Ella. First, because Reuben plunges specifically into this creol zed “music 
that celebrates organized discord, community, harmony in discord, and individuality all t 
once” and becomes a new self as a result (Roberts 263).  His collective agency manifests 
partially through his own eventual production of jazz and blues recordings.  Yet, even 
more importantly, Reuben also plays the role of the blues singer in Baker’s metaphor.  
Blues singers, Baker asserts, serve as translators.  They “offer interpretations of the 
experiencing of experience . . . [and] produce polyvalent interpretations encoded as blues.  
The singer’s product . . .constitutes . . . a robust matrix, where endless antinomies are 
mediated and understanding and explanation find conditions of possibility” (7).  In the 
narrative structure of the text (which I discuss further below), Reuben serves as the 
penultimate translator of Ella’s life work; although she is the most prominent translator of 
the narratives in the text, it is his voice we hear last in the narrative overall.  Thus, he not 
only participates in the recirculation of cultural bodies of knowledge through music, but 
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he also discursively propagates the historical and spiritual knowledges found through 
Ella’s work.  More importantly, however, his final translation occurs through the 
translation of the self as a politicized subject, symbolizing what I deem Brodber’s 
ultimate argument—that the comprehension of the preexistent community’s cultural 
forms and historical experiences directly initiates the sense of political unity that might 
result in effective resistance against social, racial, economic and political ppression for 
diasporic subjects.     
The key aspect of the blues singer’s translational work, in Baker’s theory, lies in 
that subject’s ability to find conditions of possibility in the matrix through which he 
operates. Reuben’s condition of possibility becomes organized resistance but only afer 
he “translates” Ella’s ultimate text.  Indeed, the literal act of translation links with 
Brodber’s drawing of Lowly’s translation from life to death; “you can see from every 
angle.  And I tell you.  What a sight!” (10). Armed with the knowledge gleaned from his 
and Ella’s experiences, Reuben exclaims, “Protest is all about and our people are making 
their discontent known.  Is this my community?  Have I any business in this?  I am 
hearing of Kasavubu and Lumumba. . . I am beginning to think that I must put down my 
spade in the Congo. . . That would be an extension of the community” (166).  Once again 
here, Brodber suggests the image of the rhizome—the rootless root—spreading 
throughout the black Atlantic.  As Brodber depicts it, Reuben’s attainment of cultural and 
historical knowledges initiates his sense of belonging in the community, which in turn 
brings him to actively protest oppression and injustice and to work toward the extension 
of the community by fighting against these forces.   
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Through Reuben’s end, Brodber elucidates the absolutely crucial possibility of 
political resistance which she deems essential for the diaspora, but she also introduces a 
gendered division between the political and the ostensibly personal. Cynthia James 
claims that “Louisiana. . . can be considered a work that fulfills . . .  [the] call for 
visibility and recognition for the black West Indian immigrant woman in America, 
particularly between the World Wars” (154).  While I agree that the political actions of 
Mammy, Mammy’s mother, and Lowly take center stage in this text, the portrayal of 
Louisiana and Reuben—in comparison to that of Mammy, Silas and Lowly—appears 
problematic. Between the threesome, Silas recognizes the women as the hardest worker : 
“‘The work’, they say, ‘Gotta do the work’ . . . And I just a mere man could not resist 
them” (148).  Indeed, Lowly and Mammy perform both the psychic/spiritual work 
correlative with Ella’s and the political organizational work correlative with Reuben’s, 
but a clear division of labor exists between Ella and Reuben.  They represent respectiv ly 
what Partha Chatterjee calls ghar and bāhir or the home and the world, in which “the 
world is external, the domain of the material; the home represents one’s spiritual self, 
one’s true identity” (120).  Chatterjee points out that Indian nationalists during the 
colonial period, “gave this division special significance. . . [they] asserted that [the 
European power] had failed to colonize the inner, essential identity of the East, which lay 
in its distinctive, superior, spiritual culture” (121).   As Louisiana rules over the home and 
nourishes her ties with the spiritual world while Reuben handles all worldly matters, the 
difference between their marriage and Silas and Mammy’s hints at a historical 
explanation. Marcus Garvey’s movement represented an imagined black nation, and Silas 
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and Mammy felt they belonged to it; thus, the home/world dichotomy became 
unnecessary. No colonial or neocolonial power threatened their nationalist identities i  
this specific nation-space.  With the end of the movement, and the lack of protection from 
that nationalist structure, however, black men and women may have perceived the need 
to once again divide the spiritual from the material, reinforcing the separation of these 
two realities.  This division, Brodber shows, damages both the psyche and the politics of 
diasporic subjects.  
 Within the structure of the text, Brodber contests this division by making 
Reuben’s activism an extension of Ella’s work and by delineating Ella’s insiste t plea to 
hear not only Mammy and Lowly’s histories, but also Silas’s.  When the venerable sisters
are making their preparations for Louisiana’s arrival “home,” she proclaims: “Let it be 
told. . . I shall not go until I have made a closer acquaintance with one or more of the 
fathers” (141).  Their response is that Silas “helped to make things happen” (141).  
Louisiana deems this response unacceptable, thereby demonstrating Brodber’s refusal to 
allow the displacement of one exclusion (women’s historical work) with another (men’s 
historical work). At first glance, this gives the appearance of reinforci g the masculinist 
emphasis in Pan-Africanist discourses as Carol Boyce-Davies describes it: “what is asked 
of women in some of these nationalist discourses is that they accept their own oppressi n 
as given . . . to allow race-based discourses, i.e. Black/male discourses, to exist” (51). 
Yet, as in the aforementioned quote by Silas, his voice tends to confirm and support the 
powerful roles the women played rather than draw attention to himself.  Thus, through 
the depiction of these multiple relationships, Brodber again displays a both/and approach 
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to gender in the political viability of the community—ensuring that her feminist 
revisioning of community does not become exclusivist in that way.   
Finally, the narrative structure of Louisiana also exemplifies the text itself as a 
type of blues matrix through which discourses and practices circulate, transform, and 
extend the diasporic community.  Originally commissioned as a scientific historical 
contribution to the U.S. government’s state-sanctioned archives, the text instead becomes 
a communal work of creative nonfiction—merging science, “high science” (i.e. spiritual 
work), ethnography, and personal narrative.  Its multi-genre structure resonats with that 
of The Atlantic Sound, as both Phillips and Brodber work toward the reconnection of the 
diaspora through the incorporation of multiple voices, experiences and styles of narrative.  
As the main body of the text incorporates the narrative of Louisiana’s life and the lives of 
those who “possess” her, it depicts the communal and historical knowledge gained from 
the experiences represented in the book.  Yet, Brodber inserts several mediating texts 
which include an ‘editor’s note’ to Louisiana’s manuscript and a letter from Reuben for 
those editors.  These mediating texts demonstrate the diffusion of the community’s 
cultural, spiritual, and historical knowledges and ways of knowing throughout the 
diaspora and beyond (to those intellectual audiences of black history and literature).  It 
also projects outward toward an open future in which these forms of knowledge might 
serve as the ground for a unified, politically empowered diaspora to come into being. 
The novel opens with an editor’s note, dated March 1978, which explains the 
arrival of an anonymous manuscript (titled Louisiana) at a small black women’s press.  
After verifying the existence of its primary narrator Ella Townsend, whom they discover 
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was a Columbia graduate student of Anthropology, they publish it with very little editing 
(4). They also write that the inclusion of Reuben’s letter as an epilogue signifies their 
entrance into the “community of the production” of the text, and that with the money 
earned through sales of the book, they will establish a fund for the study of 
“commonalities in African America and the African Caribbean in the period between th  
World Wars” (4-5).  All at once, this note signals the academic circulation of Louisiana’s 
and the others’ personal narratives and collective histories, the black communal 
construction of the text, and an offer of financial support for the continuation of part of 
Louisiana’s project (i.e. the unification of members of the African diaspora). As the 
manuscript circulates among an audience of interested readers, the knowledges exposed 
therein also travel, thus reiterating the expansion and extension of these discourses.  
Notably, the editor’s letter ends with an indefinite call to action: “Our press extends the 
chain of hands.  Join us” (5).  This “end” directly illustrates the extension of the 
community through black textual production.  As readers learn about voodoo, the strikes 
that have been relegated to footnotes in history books (and the individuals who organized 
them), the New Orleans of the early-middle twentieth-century, and of course, Garvey’s 
astounding influence, the cultural and historical knowledge embedded in the text projects 
outward to reinvigorate the present and the future of African diasporic peoples. 
Brodber’s organization of the text, like the content, definitively shows that 
cultural knowledge, and the understanding of self that accompanies it, must precede the 
comprehension of lived/living histories. This explains why Louisiana waits nearly twenty 
years to finally gain access to the history of Mammy that the WPA had expected her to 
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acquire.  Louisiana’s plunge into the cross-cultural world of spirits, her self-di covery, 
and her learned openness place her in the most appropriate mind frame for proper 
reception of Mammy’s history. Brodber’s portrayal exemplifies the process of literary 
reading as Gayatri Spivak articulates it 
 
A training in literary reading is a training to learn from the singular and the 
unverifiable.  Although literature cannot speak, this species of patient reading, 
miming an effort to make the text respond, as it were, is a training not only in 
poiesis, accessing the other so well that probably action can be prefigured, but 
teleo-poiesis, striving for a response from the distant other, without guarantees.  
(532) 
 
 
Within the text, Louisiana’s patience as a conjuror and transcriber replicat this process 
of Spivak’s literary reading. Yet, even more importantly, Brodber requires her own 
audience to mimic this sequential process of immersion into cross-cultural and communal 
knowledge, followed by patient waiting and “listening” to the other stories the ven rable 
sisters tell.  As Spivak makes clear, this type of literary reading teaches educators and 
students how to learn “from below,” which represents a significant aspect of her vision of 
global social justice.  As Brodber activates the narrative organization to inspire her own 
readers to learn from below, she employs the text to promote the vision of social justice 
that undergirds her activist and historical work as well. Moreover, as a written text which 
might still be read, thirty, forty, fifty years from now, this promotion of social justice 
becomes a continual progression that somewhat answers Spivak’s call for the continued 
renewal of this type of work: “The pedagogic effort that may bring about lasting 
epistemic change in the oppressed is never accurate, and must be forever renewed” (529). 
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In Louisiana, Reuben articulates the primary lesson readers learn when they 
finally do “learn from below.”  As Louisiana dies, he hears her sing 
 
Different chords, different tunes, different octaves.  Sheer jazz.  One sound.  From 
one body.  A community song: It is the voice I hear, I hear them say, come unto 
me . . . Louisiana, my wife, Ella Kohl, the former Ella Townsend, was smiling 
and singing.  She was going over the rainbow’s mist with her knowing smile.  I 
know now what she knows: Mammy would not tell the president nor his men her 
tale for it was not hers; she was no hero.  It was a tale of cooperative action; it was 
a community tale.  We made it happen. (161) 
 
 
In the cooperative efforts of Mammy, Lowly, Silas and the other political workers in their 
day, and in the combined works of Louisiana and Reuben’s translation and transcription, 
the text enacts the construction of the community through alternative and multiple 
discourses and histories.  The multiple voices with different chords, tunes and octaves 
emanating from a single body allegorizes the form of community that Brodber promotes 
throughout—internally diverse but singing (!) together.  Those voices as text call out to 
present and future generations to fulfill the political unity that must precede the effective 
resistance against injustices that I read as the ultimate end of Brodber’s theory of 
community. 
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CHAPTER V 
“WALKING INTO THE FACE OF HISTORY”: HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE AND 
DIASPORIC COMMUNITY IN THE ATLANTIC SOUND 
 
 
In an oft-cited interview with Maya Jaggi, Caryl Phillips explains his literary 
engagement with history: “you subvert people’s view of history by engaging them with 
characters. I don’t think you subvert it by arguing schematically about ideas” (115).  
Phillips’s oeuvre reflects his continual engagement with notions of identity, belonging, 
loss, and home in diasporic populations, and his desire to subvert history stems from the 
understanding that history—as a discipline and as a form of cultural knowledge—plays a 
significant role in the exclusion and marginalization of diasporic peoples throughout the 
world.  While the concept of a diasporic community grounded in the shared experience of 
dispersal attempts to unite the descendants of peoples scattered by the Atlantic slave 
trade, Phillips shows the impossibility of constructing such a community without a more 
thorough and complex understanding of identity and historical difference.  In The 
Atlantic Sound, he demonstrates how differences in class, nationality, geographical 
location, culture and experience cannot be wholly supplanted, and thus end up reinforcing 
the exclusion and marginalization of certain peoples that the African diaspora i meant to 
counteract.  At the same time, he illustrates how theories of diaspora—despite their 
specific attempts at transcending the limitations of nationalism and establishing a global 
collectivity—still mostly rely on the problematic trope of community as a static and 
closed entity.  In his exploration of this notion, Phillips points out the necessity for a more 
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inclusive and open form of community that fosters acceptance of the myriad differences 
that exist among Africans, African-Americans, Afro-Caribbeans and others.  In short, he 
attempts to move toward a community that does not subsume individual beings within a 
generalizable whole, but instead incorporates difference as a foundational element in its 
actualization.             
While many critics read the text as Phillips’ refutation of the possibility of 
establishing a global diasporic community, working toward the creation of such a 
community seems one of his major motivations for writing.  In an interview with Stephen 
Clingman, he explains that he writes because he no longer wants anyone to suffer sham  
because of their complex historical, religious, racial and cultural identities (135).  His 
work as a writer attempts to obliterate this shame, for himself and others, through the 
creation of a global community to which all black diasporic peoples might feel a snse of 
belonging.  Although Phillips’ critique is overtly political, the form of community that he 
struggles toward appears to be profoundly personal—a form that will aid in the fullest 
development of the self in all of its plurality, and through relation with others.  As The 
Atlantic Sound illustrates so well, however, establishing such a community will prove 
impossible without some understanding of the contradictions, ironies and complexities of 
historical intercultural contact and how these affect contemporary individuals and 
experiences.   
Because identity and belonging are deeply embedded within a particular view of 
history and a rudimentary emphasis on origins, Phillips’s project requires sev ral 
strategies at once: the revision and rewriting of histories and a contestation of historical 
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knowledge itself, a continual focus on the shifting, unstable nature of identities, and a 
discursive grappling with both the limits and possibilities of community.  In The Atlantic 
Sound, Phillips employs all three strategies simultaneously by utilizing a multi-generic 
form—poetry, fictionalized history, historiography and travel narrative—to establi h 
novel connections between past contexts, situations and individuals and the present.  
Notably, although the Vintage International paperback cover categorizes the book simply 
as “history,” most of the critical work about it either wholly ignores or briefly glosses its 
historical aspects.  David Ellis, Maria Lourdes Lopez Romero and Elena Machado Sáez 
discuss Phillips’s discursive engagement with history, but only as support and/or 
contextualization for their larger arguments about black British writing, travel writing and 
neocolonial subjectivity, respectively.18   Other scholars have thoroughly addressed 
Phillips’s revision and re-membering of seemingly disparate and disconnected histories in 
fictional works like Higher Ground and The Nature of Blood, but not in The Atlantic 
Sound.19  Yet, Phillips’s self-proclaimed desire to subvert history permeates this text and 
serves as the fulcrum on which rests his literary theorization of diaspora.   
Although the book seems to stress the limits to establishing a viable diasporic 
community—as many reviewers and critics have noted—I argue that this emphasis 
paradoxically suggests some possibilities for transcending those limits.20  Phillips 
                                                          
18 See Ellis’s “‘Transatlantic Passages’: Lamming, Phillips and the Course of Black Writing in Britain,” 
Lopez Romero’s “Travel Writing and Postcoloniality: Caryl Phillips’s The Atlantic Sound,” and Machado 
Sáez’s “Postcoloniality, Atlantic Orders, and the Migrant Male in the Writings of Caryl Phillips.”  
19 See, for example, Andrew Armstrong, “Bloody History! Exploring a Capacity for Revision. Exploring 
History in Wilson Harris’ Jonestown and Caryl Phillips’s The Nature of Blood” and Stephen Clingman, 
“Forms of History and Identity in The Nature of Blood.”    
20 See David Ho, Vivian Nun-Halloran, Darryl Pinckney and Elena Machado Sáez.      
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painstakingly delineates many of the problems that arise from inter- and eve intra-
cultural contacts in an attempt to discover a productive way to transcend these problems.  
Though he never clearly outlines an alternative model, he does show how a better 
understanding of difference can facilitate a community formation like that w ich Jean 
Bethke Elshtain and Christopher Beem describe as a “‘we’ [that] also enables thes  ame 
persons to separate themselves and to recognize one another in and through their 
differences as well as what they share in common” (37).   Moreover, I argue that critics 
who read Phillips as completely cynical about the development of diasporic community 
conflate Phillips the narrator and Phillips the (implied) author.  Sáez argues that Phillips’s 
historical hyperconsciousness produces a “pessimism about humanity and the future of 
equality within a new world order” (19).  While Phillips the narrator indeed seems 
cynical about diasporic subjects’ shallow and often contentious relations, the author 
Phillips structures the book in a way that highlights spontaneous moments of affective or 
cognitive connection between the narrator, the people he meets, and the readers of Th  
Atlantic Sound.  Distinguishing between the author and narrator and scrutinizing the 
authorial construction of the text renders a less cynical reading of the diaspora than most 
critics, and Phillips the narrator, seem to allow.  It also allows for the recognition of 
Phillips’ development of community through the praxis of writing.      
 The Atlantic Sound’s form, narrative structure, and historicity render productive 
moments of Relation—as Édouard Glissant theorizes this concept—in which individuals 
and their historical experiences establish connection to each other through difference 
rather than commonality.  Relation, Glissant explains, cannot correspond with the English 
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term relationship; it is the way individuals, cultures, and temporalities connet with each 
other and the totality-world (totalité-monde), without obliterating differences through 
generalization (27).  In this context, Relation serves as the possible mode or meth d—the 
stepping-stone—for creating a viable collectivity that incorporates differenc  as well as 
similarity among its members.  Phillips’s text manifests several elements of Glissant’s 
theory: a narrator engaged in errantry (voluntary uprooting in search of the ther), a 
rejection of filiation (the desire for legitimate and legitimating ori ins); an acceptance of 
the opacity of other individuals and cultures; and finally, a conception of understanding 
as “giving-on-and-with” (donner-avec) or yielding to others’ cultural and subjective 
knowledge rather than trying to “grasp” or “take” that knowledge for one’s own benefit 
(the connotations of the French omprendre).  Each of these elements works together 
with the others to contest the boundaries inherent within closed, static communities.  
While Phillips’s text does not serve as a complete correlative representation of Glissant’s 
Relation, it does illuminate the many failures and only fleeting successes of Relation that 
even sometimes occur between individuals in vastly different temporal locations.  
Attention to historical discontinuity, or what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls historical 
difference, allows Phillips to construct these moments, which may eventually proliferate 
among contemporary diasporic subjects and aid in the formation of a collective social 
group positively grounded in and through difference.      
The Atlantic Sound follows Phillips (the narrator) as he journeys to several cities 
throughout the geographical triangle of the slave trade—from Guadeloupe to Liverpool, 
England; Accra, Ghana; Charleston, South Carolina; and finally to the Negev desert in 
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Israel.  Each destination inspires Phillips’s ruminations on the familiar but still vexing 
questions of diaspora identity, belonging, and home.  In the first chapter, “Atlantic 
Crossing,” the narrator travels by banana boat to Dover with the ship’s German capt in, 
Burmese crew, four German passengers, an American named Kevin and an English 
couple, Charles and Mavis.  The trip is long, lonely and excruciatingly boring, yet 
Phillips intentionally isolates himself from everyone else on the ship.  At dinner, he 
refuses to allow Kevin (who would like to escape from the arrogant and overbearing 
Charles and Mavis) to sit at his table because for Phillips, having his own table enabls 
him to cling to his sanity (14).  Later in the voyage, he begins to stay in his room all day
and emerge only at night to wander the decks and smuggle food from the kitchen—“a 
small price to pay for the peace of mind that solitude bestows upon [him]” (19).  
Although his fellow passengers cannot be classified as subjects of diaspora—they travel 
of their own free will, and have not been forcefully or otherwise dispersed from their 
homelands—his interactions with them set the tone for each of the remaining travel 
narratives in the book.  Phillips is cynical, distant, and judgmental of everyone around 
him; he adopts a detached and critical rhetorical stance that, for the most part, lacks any 
semblance of emotive identification with others (Machado Sáez 19).  Yet, metatextually, 
these travels represent Phillips’s efforts to better learn and understand his own and 
others’ experiences of dislocation and ongoing negotiation of the slave trade legcy.  
Thematically, the triangular trip, painstaking historical research and interv ews with 
Ghanaian, British and Guadaloupean men and women manifest Phillips’s attempts to go 
toward others, to connect with them in some way; thus, to see him solely as the critical 
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bystander is to ignore the sociopolitical and cultural work of the text and its author.  
Instead, Phillips enacts what Kobena Mercer has labeled, “critical dialogism,” a critical 
representational process which “has the potential to overturn the binaristic relations of 
hegemonic boundary maintenance by multiplying critical dialogues within particular 
communities and between the various constituencies that make up the ‘imagined 
community’ of the nation.  At once articulating the personal and the political, such 
dialogism shows that . . . black identities are plural and heterogeneous” (257 original 
emphasis).  Phillips’ text, despite its apparent skepticism, works to overturn the 
“binaristic relations” that Mercer references here.   
    The Atlantic Sound epicts Phillips as a world traveler in search of 
understanding in this ostensibly postcolonial world.   His desire to learn and understa 
through travel links with Glissant’s notion of errantry—a foundational element of 
Relation.  Errantry is a sacred type of wandering, not for conquest, discovery or invasion, 
but in order to plunge the depths and chaos of totality.  Because Glissant’s theories deal 
primarily with poetics, errantry does not equate with actual travel; rather, he defines 
errantry as a way of thought which “silently emerges from the destructuring of compact 
national entities that yesterday were still triumphant and, at the same time, fro  difficult, 
uncertain births of new forms of identity that call to us” (18 my emphasis).  While The 
Atlantic Sound textually represents Phillips’s actual travels, the book illustrates errantry 
primarily through its narrative structure and chapter titles.  As Zara Bennett argues, the 
dissonance between the chapter titles and their content aptly illustrate the difficulty and 
uncertainty of new identity forms which Phillips continually strives toward (11).   For 
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instance, in “Homeward Bound,” on a flight to Elmina, a Ghanaian businessman, Ben, 
asks Phillips, “Where are you from?”  Although Phillips half-heartedly attempts to 
explain his situation to the man (who perfunctorily concludes that Phillips is going
“home” to Ghana), he repeats the phrase “No, I am not going home,” twice with italicized 
emphasis to his readers (125).  The chapter titled “Home” is ironically set in Charleston, 
South Carolina—a city Phillips has never actually lived in, and “Exodus,” describes the 
permanent settlement of the Hebrew Israelites—voluntary African-American exiles—in 
the Negev desert.   In designating the unknown, “Home,” and the settled, “Exodus,” 
Phillips intentionally disturbs national identities and pushes them toward the creation of 
something new.  Moreover, in his exploration of situations so foreign to his own—Ben’s 
“rootedness,” and the Hebrew Israelites’ confidence in their endeavor, among others—
Phillips demonstrates his desire to take up the problems of the other—another essential 
component in the thought of errantry (Glissant 18).  
 The scene in which Phillips repeats, “No, I am not going home” also illuminates 
his personal rejection of Africa as putative homeland—a rejection more thoroughly 
theorized in “Homeward Bound,” his account of Panafest at Elmina.  Phillips 
intentionally highlights every phrase or incident that contests the myth of Africa as home 
for dispersed African-American, black British and Caribbean subjects.  As Bénédicte 
Ledent points out, Phillips recognizes how easily this myth might lead to intolerance, and 
he is particularly wary of the cultural tourism that “fails to make tourists aware of the 
very system of oppression it is supposed to denounce or at least oppose” (203).  At one 
point, Phillips overhears an African-American woman at Panafest expressing her concern 
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that she does not have the right currency with which to buy a Coke.  In Phillips’s words, 
“then she remembers herself, and in the spirit of family unity she states that, ‘in New 
York we don’t take cedis so we gotta make the effort.  You know, one blood, one 
family’” (171). The homeland, the sacred root(s), and the familial unity idealized by Pan-
Africanist thinkers appear in this moment as the woman’s resigned acceptance of her 
inability to purchase an American consumer product.  This brief episode incisively 
illustrates the return to roots as a fallacy grounded in simplistic notions of identity and 
history, while it also demonstrates that such a fallacy obstructs the necessary foundation 
for real collective unity.    
Despite his criticism, Phillips clearly recognizes and understands the desir for 
roots.  When he reflects about Ben, the stranger he met on the plane to Ghana, he admits: 
“I envy his rootedness” (126).  Yet the very desires (for rootedness and a homeland) that 
ostensibly unite diasporic peoples more often wind up dividing them, because all of their 
differences cannot be subsumed by this single shared desire.  Furthermore (and p rhaps 
paradoxically), though this desire ends up being one of the primary elements in the 
legitimization of the community, it actually points up the lack of substance in this 
foundation for the community. Glissant elucidates this problem in his discussion of how 
Western communities—through the process of “filiation”—endeavored to legitimate their 
existence through genealogies that trace back to a mythic or epic individual (Alexander, 
Ulysses, etc.).  Filiation is a circular process, whereby the “retelling (certifying) of a 
‘creation of the world’ in a filiation guarantees that this same filiation . . . rigorously 
ensues simply by describing in reverse the trajectory of the community from its present to 
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this act of creation” (47 my emphasis).  There are no actual grounds for viable 
community in this process; the origin story is essentially an effect that becomes a cause 
through narrative.21   
While Glissant focuses on Western myth, Phillips’s narration of Panafest shows 
that the desire for legitimacy and rootedness also proliferates in diasporic ubjects 
(including himself).  Though the point of origin for the diaspora is a homeland—rather 
than an individual and the bloodline that follows—it still practices the same type of 
exclusion and “hidden violence” as nationalism, religious myth and other community 
origin stories.  Phillips hints at this hidden violence, which results from the fact that “no 
myth ever provides for the legitimacy of the other,” when he describes Ben’s staunch 
refusal to accept that Ghana/Africa is not the author’s home (Glissant 49).  Reading 
Phillips only as a member of the dispersed African family, which he admittedly is, Ben 
refuses to recognize any other aspects of Phillips’s complex and irreducible identity(-
ies)—an act that metaphorically destroys parts of Phillips’s self.    
Identity tends to play a major role in the construction or destruction of diasporic 
community, and in many ways Phillips struggles against this.  Stuart Hall makes the 
                                                          
21 In his study of modern literary criticism, Edward Said posits affiliation—i.e. association among peopl  
that “takes validated nonbiological social and cultural forms”—as a partial but insufficient counter to 
filiation, “the closed and tightly knit family structure that secures generational hierarchical relationships.”  
He warns that affiliation sometimes reproduces the old filiative structures, and it can “easily become a 
system of thought no less orthodox and dominant than culture itself. . .[a] process of representation [that] . . 
. reinforce[s] the known at the expense of the knowable.”  An important task for the critic, then, is “to
recognize the difference between instinctual filiation and social affiliation, and to show how affiliation 
sometimes reproduces filiation, sometimes makes its own forms. . . . [because] critical systems—even of 
the most sophisticated kind—can succumb to the inherently representative and reproductive relationship 
between a dominant culture and the domains it rules” (20-4).  Caryl Phillips’ body of work clearly refl cts 
this struggle to break from the filiative order and create new systems, and I would argue that readers of hi  
work who only recognize his cynicism fall into the trap of reading him through the filiative lens.  Thus, it is 
not just Phillips as critics of society, but also readers as critics of his text who might reinforce this closed 
structure.  
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important argument that diasporic cultural identities are always unstable, grounded in 
place, time, history, narrative, and culture.   Moreover,  
 
Like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation.  Far 
from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the 
continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power.  Far from being grounded in mere 
‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which when found, will 
secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the 
different ways that we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the 
narratives of the past.   (131) 
 
 
Hall’s assertion clarifies the instability not only of identities, but of histor es, and thus the 
instability of communities created around these constructs. This observation continually 
bears out in The Atlantic Sound.   Consider for example, Phillips’s interview with Dr. 
Mohammed Ben Abdallah.  Ben Abdallah, a playwright, intellectual and proponent of 
Pan-Africanism, “insists [that Pan-Africanism] is a simple concept which involves the 
solidarity and cohesion of all Africans and people of African descent” (144).  And 
although he blames the destruction of the African “family” on European imperialism, the 
simplicity of the Pan-African concept becomes rather more complicated wh n he 
explains, just a short time later, that Ghanaian schoolchildren are taught about sl very 
“with the understanding that those sold into slavery were not always that good, and that 
in some respects they got what they deserved” (148). Without any sense of irony, the 
scholar articulates his faith in the “simple concept” of African diasporic unity, and then 
just as plainly accounts for one major reason why such unity is realistically impossible.  
Pan-Africanism’s one-dimensional theoretical foundation makes the philosophy 
inherently contradictory.  These contradictions impede the possibilities of actually 
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establishing a community that can incorporate difference and similarity simultaneously 
without forcing its members to subsume the former to the latter.   
Phillips further debunks the myth of past African unity by including a passage by 
Frederick Douglass about “the savage chiefs on the western coast of Africa, who for ages 
have been accustomed to selling their captives into bondage, and pocketing the ready 
cash for them” (143).  Contesting supposed racial solidarity, Phillips repeatedly shows 
how other aspects of identity disturb this imagined unity. The African businessman John 
Ocansey stands as one case in point.  In 1881 Liverpool, he develops a solid friendship 
with Mrs. Lyle, his white British landlady, based on mutual respect and identification 
along class and religious lines: “What concerned Mrs. Lyle was one’s station in life” 
(53).  Yet, he is disgusted by a poverty-stricken African-American man “whose dirty 
clothes and pungent breath announced that he was clearly existing at the lowest levels of 
society” (79). Ocansey reflects this fundamental axiom of Phillips’s work: diasporic 
community can never be effectively established on the basis of common identification 
markers like phenotype, nation, geography, religion, class, or gender because, as Stuart 
Hall reminds us, these are only “unstable points of identification or suture, which are 
made, within the discourses of history and culture” (131).  Since these markers 
continually change, identification can serve as a disruptive or a unifying force, and 
sometimes both simultaneously, for no matter how many ways subjects might identify 
with each other, the facts of human existence show that there will always be countl ss 
ways in which they do not. To achieve some semblance of community, diaspora theorists 
like Phillips must somehow, some way, take all of these issues into account.  
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In The Atlantic Sound, Phillips primarily problematizes identity by providing 
meticulously detailed historical accounts that complicate and often forthrightly contradict 
a generalized, universalist notion of capital “H”-istory—and particularly the histories of 
diasporic subjects.  He insists on highlighting those specific historical facts that explicitly 
show the impossibility of establishing one single historical truth (for, as Hall points out, 
the narratives of the past continually change).  As Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Ma nur 
point out, theorizations of diaspora  
 
should not be divorced from historical and cultural specificity.  Diasporic 
traversals question the rigidities of identity itself—religious, ethnic, gendered, 
national; yet this diasporic movement marks not a postmodern turn from history, 
but a nomadic turn in which the very parameters of specific historical moments 
are embodied and—as diaspora itself suggests—are scattered and regrouped int 
new points of becoming. (3)  
 
 
In many ways, Phillips’ text heeds this call.  His historical work converges with the 
project that the subaltern studies group has set for themselves: narrating history from 
below.   One motivating force behind incorporating histories from below is to make the 
discipline of history as democratic and inclusive as possible.  Dipesh Chakrabarty 
explains that an “explicit aim of Subaltern Studies was to write the subaltern classes into 
the history of nationalism and the nation, and to combat all elitist biases in the wriing of 
history” (102).  Put another way, subaltern studies methodologies aspired to make 
subaltern peoples the subjects, rather than the objects, of their own histories.   
Though decidedly non-nationalist in his own work, Phillips partially participates 
in the subaltern studies project.  The Atlantic Sound’s inclusionary form relates the 
anecdotal histories of several relatively unknown figures and imaginatively exp ores their 
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myriad (and sometimes perplexing) expressions of agency.   He includes the stories of the 
aforementioned John Emmanuel Ocansey, an African merchant’s son who in 1880 sailed 
from the Gold Coast in order to reclaim a debt owed to his father by a Liverpudlian 
commissioning agent; Phillip Quaque, who, for nearly 50 years, was simultaneously 
employed as an educator of “the Negroes on the Gold Coast” and as the chaplain to the 
British slavers who lived at Cape Coast Castle; and Judge Julius Waties Waring—  
Charleston judge who became a social outcast both for his scandalous divorce and 
remarriage to a woman from the North, and for his famous court decision in favor of 
black voting rights.  The way Phillips narrates these little-known histories, which often 
simultaneously encourage and rebuff what Machado Sáez has termed “emotive 
identification,” provides readers with a much more nuanced and complex understanding 
of the figures who lived during these times.  It also highlights the limits of traditional 
historicization.   
Although Phillips employs the same inclusive practices and disruption of the 
grand narratives of (H)istory, he differs from the subaltern studies group in two ways.   
First, his work is concerned with transnationalism and experiences of diaspora rather than 
nationalism, and second, his imaginative narrative methods diverge somewhat from the 
historical materialist methods of the subaltern studies approach (despite these historians’ 
explicit contentions with certain elements of Marxist thought).  These specific differences 
yield insights into the problems that arise in narrating what Chakrabarty calls “subaltern 
pasts,” while at the same time, they indicate how Phillips’s praxis of  creative literary 
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historiography might be a necessary and important supplement to the discipline of history 
in creating a viable diasporic community in the present. 
In Chakrabarty’s critique of history as an academic discipline, he explains that 
history’s privileging of the secular and the rational limits its abilities o narrate ways of 
being in the world that do not conform to these worldviews. He illustrates the problem 
well in his analysis of Ranajit Guha’s history of the 1855 Santal rebellion.  When asked 
why they rebelled against British colonists and non-local Indians, the Santal leaders told 
their interrogators that their god Thakur told them to (Chakrabarty102-3).  Their
perspective, Chakrabarty explains, grants agency not to themselves but to Thakur, a 
position that a secular, academic historian cannot simply accept at face value. The 
Santals’ view implicitly confounds Guha, who must strive for a “rationally defensible” 
narrative strategy and thus ends up “assuming a critical distance from that which he is 
trying to understand” (103). The rationally defensible strategy for reading these subjects, 
therefore, is inherently limited.  It does not provide historians the ability to “stay with 
heterogeneities without seeking to reduce them to any overarching principle that speaks 
for an already given whole” (107).  Chakrabarty argues that in order to struggle against 
this tendency, historians must simultaneously historicize and refuse to historicize.  They 
must be able to examine the irrational in all of its multiple forms, and somehow not allow 
it to be subsumed by the rational “whole.”  I assert that Phillips’s multi-genre narrative 
form embodies the most effective strategy for doing so.   
In Provincializing Europe, Chakrabarty’s own strategy for performing this work 
lies in his analysis of Bengali social life, oral and written literary texts, and the crucial 
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distinction between the public and private.  While this strategy effectively intgrates the 
heterogeneous life-worlds so vital to his historical project, his voice—the voic of the 
historian—still remains at the forefront and thus cannot transcend the critical distance he 
sees in Guha’s account. Caryl Phillips, on the other hand, in his melding of the fictional 
with the historical, the past with the present, and the irrational with the rational, manages 
to bring readers closer to his historical subjects by partially erasing the narrator’s 
presence. His text often plunges the reader into his historical figures’ experi nces without 
any clear narrative mediation.  For instance, when he visits Sullivan’s Island, which had 
been a holding site for many African slaves, the narrator’s voice suddenly but smoothly 
almost becomes that of the slaves:  
 
I watch a fishing boat, its nets hoisted high above its head, kicking up a playful 
surf as it slowly purrs its way home.  Sullivan’s Island is an eerie and troubled 
place.  Flat, marsh, grassland.  An arrival in America.  Having crossed the 
Atlantic in the belly of a ship.  An arrival.  Here, in America.  Step ashore, out of 
sight of Charleston.  To be fed, watered, scrubbed, prepared.  To be sold.  Back 
home, a similar climate.  Different vegetation.  Different birds.  Family.  (257-8 
my emphasis) 
 
 
Though this excerpt obviously begins with Phillips’s investigative “I,” that voice first 
gives way to a disembodied observer, and then finally to the (still yet) disembodied 
voice(s) of African(s), who can only relate to the site of disembarkation throug their 
previous experiences of home and family—experiences to which Phillips himself ha 
difficulty relating.  This method places readers more directly in touch with his subjects’ 
experiences.  In short, Chakrabarty narrates nd analyzes and explains the heterogeneous 
life-worlds elided by History; his views mediate the connection between readers nd his 
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historical subjects.  Phillips the narrator, though, sometimes disappears and allows the 
confusing, fractal, and contradictory actualities of his subjects’ existence to come to the 
fore, inspiring a deeper form of experiential understanding in his readers.    
This extensive explanation of Phillips’ con- and di-vergences with the subaltern 
studies approach brings us back to the overarching question of what role these might play 
in establishing diasporic community.  First, Phillips articulates the day-to-day 
experiences of people like John Ocansey, Phillip Quaque, and even his Ghanaian guide 
Mansour (discussed further below) in order to make the diasporic community more 
inclusive in its representation. This inclusion, by no means radical, fits in with 
historiography’s commitment to democratic practices and thereby attempts to make the 
diasporic collectivity more democratic as well.  Second, by highlighting these figures’ 
conflicting loyalties and affiliations, along with their underlying identity politics, Phillips 
exposes many of the barriers that keep the diasporic community from becoming a viable 
collectivity that can work together to fight those forces of economic, social, and political 
oppression that still abound today.  Yet, democratic praxis and meticulous, informed 
critique are not enough to actually make diaspora a more feasible paradigm for 
community. And if readers try to find any clear delineation of a productive model in The 
Atlantic Sound, they will surely be disappointed, because the philosophy that permeates 
this text persistently resists teleological definition.  I argue, however, that despite these 
limitations in the content of the book, Phillips’s form and structure offer incomplete and 
imperfect (but still vital) hints about what is needed to effect a diasporic community that 
simultaneously enriches the individual self, and the community as a whole.         
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Phillips maintains that for “outsider” writers, form always presents the ultimate 
challenge (NWO 293).  In The Atlantic Sound, he employs the disruption, multiplicity and 
inexplicability most commonly associated with postmodern fictional texts.  This
postmodern form effectively portrays not only the fluidity of the community through 
differing voices, but also the fluidity and instability of the narrator’s position within or 
outside of the community.  The first section consists of abrupt transitions from the firs -
person travel narrative to an almost poetic introduction to the historical African figure of 
William Narh Ocansey, John’s adoptive father.  The remainder of the book follows suit, 
and the juxtaposition of postmodern narrative with poetic language and historical cntent 
disorients readers, most significantly because postmodern narratives are almost 
antithetical to traditional historical discourses.  Although Eric Hobsbawm illuminates the 
ways in which the historical past is not continuous with the present, and exposes the 
constructed nature of historical “facts” embedded within certain traditions, he also 
recognizes (like Chakrabarty) that the disciplinary practices of history necessitate, at least 
in part, some faith in the reality of historical “facts.”  He points out that “postm dernism 
has fortunately not gained as much ground among historians as among literary and 
cultural theorists and social anthropologists. . . [it] throws doubt on the distinction 
between fact and fiction, objective reality and conceptual discourse.  It is profoundly 
relativist” (271).  Although, as we have already noted, such relativism creates many 
problems for historians attempting to narrate the past in a comprehensible way, Glissant 
expounds on the crucial necessity of honing in on these relatives instead of submitting to 
history’s generalizing tendencies.  For Glissant, this necessity far exceeds the simple 
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inclusion of minority histories which does not, by itself, contest the “totalitarin 
intolerance” of generalization, whereby “the other is assimilated, or else it is annihilated.  
That is the whole principle of generalization and its entire process” (49).  In order t  
oppose the totalizing forces of generalization, imaginative (figurative) conta t must 
occur—a process of Relation in which “the totality of relatives [is] put in touch and told” 
(28 my emphasis).  Here, not just in the telling but more specifically in the type of 
contact he formulates between figures, stories, and time periods, is where Phillips makes 
his most significant contribution in the imaginative and discursive creation of diasporic 
community.   
The most salient aspect of The Atlantic Sound is the diversity that characterizes 
Phillips’s subjects.  More often than not, these subjects are loosely, rather than closely, 
related, and the text is unique as “history” precisely because of this looseness.  To wit, 
few professional historians would include their Ghanaian tour guide’s life story in a work 
that also conveys the experiences of an African merchant in 19th-century Liverpool.  The 
linkage between contemporary and historical figures formally signifies the disruption of 
linear time so essential to history’s valuation of causality (and consequently, filiation), 
and establishes contact between radically different individuals, even in very diff rent 
temporalities.  While Phillips’s incorporation of numerous past and present relatives may 
not seem particularly revolutionary from a textual perspective, when read through Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s theorization of subaltern pasts, it becomes an essential and unique element
in Phillips’s presentation of Relation through form.  Subaltern pasts “remind us [ofthe] 
relation of contemporaneity between the nonmodern and the modern, a shared and 
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constant ‘now,’ which expresses itself on the historical plane but the character of which is 
ontological” (Chakrabarty 112).  In simpler terms, they are those elements of the past that 
remain “present” in any moment of historical time because contemporary subjects can 
intuit them from their own experiences.   They are embodied by a person’s “reflexes 
about what it means to relate to objects in the world as a human being and together with 
other human beings in his given environment” (66).  If individuals in the present can 
recognize them but not wholly co-opt them, then they serve as very specific and real 
exemplars for the processes of Relation.  Phillip Quaque’s story is a case in point.  
 Phillips develops Quaque’s history by including Quaque’s actual letters alongside 
his own analysis of the African-born and English-educated missionary.  At first glance, 
Quaque’s narrative might be read as yet another instance of the difficulties of achieving 
Relation or establishing a sense of community.  Phillips the narrator seems ambivalent, if 
not downright critical of this African man who “went so far as to call [the Africans’] 
language a ‘vile jargon,’” and who “never once expressed moral outrage at the indignit es 
that were being visited upon fellow Africans” (180).  He cannot understand how Quaque 
could “nowhere . . . make reference to his feelings about his ‘brothers and sisters’ in the 
dungeons beneath his feet” (179).   Just as in his representations of Panafest and the 
banana boat voyage, Phillips seems cold, distant and cynical here.  Yet, as a human being 
able to comprehend the psychoaffective difficulties Quaque must have faced on a daily 
basis, Phillips the author reaches out—across historical time—in search of this par icular 
subaltern past, which he knows must exist but which cannot be represented or discovered 
through typical historiographical methodology. The reality of these feelings cannot be 
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verified through historical research, data or documentation, but because he recognizes 
their vital importance to understanding the diasporic world, he tries to push past these 
discursive limitations.  In the attempt, he experiences the frustrating but productive, from 
Glissant’s perspective, realization of Quaque’s opacity.   
Glissant presents opacity as the conception of human behaviors as irreducible, 
non-transparent and fractal.   Opacity, as an element of Relation, contains a significant 
ethical tenet: “I thus am able to conceive of the opacity of the other for me, without 
reproach for my opacity for him.  To feel in solidarity with him or to build with him or to 
like what he does, it is not necessary for me to grasp him” (193). Phillips the narrator 
seems unaware of opacity’s integral significance; he tries to get past iby analyzing one 
of Quaque’s final letters, which he believes signifies “the ambivalence, pain and pathos . . 
. of loss.  Loss of home, loss of language, loss of self, but never loss of dignity.  However 
. . . his tone still betrayed a glimmer of optimism and the courage of restraint” (180).  On 
the whole, this analysis, following as it does Phillips’s critique of Quaque, and addressing 
Quaque’s final cryptic missive, seems arbitrary at best and erroneous at worst. Readers 
cannot assume Quaque’s feelings of loss or optimism as definitively as Phillips does from 
the letter: 
 
The state of this unsuccessful mission, I had formerly had some hopes of its 
growth, but at present on the face of things bears but an indifferent aspect.  I have 
my doubt of its increase unless a new change should take place for the better.  I 
could wish to say more on this topic, but I write much in pain and time fails me. . 
. excuse the scrawl as I have no time to lose.  But beg leave to inform the Society
that within these few years, I have buried two and fifty persons and baptized 
eleven children.  Prayer regularly every day in my room and on Sundays some of 
the gentlemen do attend.  I hope to be more explicit in my next, should God 
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permit me my health.  Accept of my sincere and hearty wishes prayer for your 
health and continuance.   (180) 
 
 
Phrases like “I could wish to say more” and “I hope to be more explicit in my next” 
highlight that which Quaque has not said.  Although Phillips the narrator concludes a 
great deal about what Quaque’s words represent, the inclusion of the letter demonstrates 
the impossibility of rendering Quaque or his feelings transparent and thus helpfully 
articulates the realities of opacity.  Glissant characterizes this as an inevitable aspect of 
any written text: in writing, “the text passes from a dreamed-of transparency to the 
opacity produced in words” (115).  Neither Phillips nor his readers can transcend the 
limits of Quaque’s chosen words.  Moreover, Phillips as author orders this section in such 
a way as to refute any teleological understanding of Quaque’s motives, emotions or 
behaviors.  His judgmental preconceptions are followed by his ambivalent reading of 
Quaque and at the end Quaque’s own voice, essentially forcing readers to accept and 
perhaps even learn to value his opacity and thus, the opacity of others.  Metatextually, he 
puts readers “in touch” with Quaque’s opacity, and textually, he does the same for 
Mansour, Judge Waring, Dr. Ben Abdallah and all the rest. As Phillips ends with 
Quaque’s own perplexing words, and no further explanation, in this way, he makes 
Quaque the narrator of his own history, and shows how Relation—perhaps only briefly 
and incompletely—emanates through the structure of The Atlantic Sound.     
 According to Glissant, with the recognition of opacities comes the realization that 
understanding, rather than representing a type of closure or securing of subjective 
information, paradoxically manifests through an openness toward others.  Through the 
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knowledge of opacities, people may learn to “give up the old obsession with discovering 
what lies at the bottom of natures” and instead realize that “what is here is open, as much 
as this there . . . This-here is the weave, and it weaves no boundaries” (190).  The lived 
openness of Relation transpires through individual recognition of others by “yielding” or 
“giving-on-and with” them (as Betsey Wing translates it from French).  The process 
through which Phillips’s chronicle of Quaque eventually makes way for Quaque’s lett r 
manifests this type of “giving-on-and-with” solely through structure—the text itself 
yields to Quaque’s discourse.   A more salient instance occurs in the text’s—not 
necessarily Phillips’s—changed relationship (partial Relation) to Mansour, the Ghanaian 
man who drives Phillips around during Panafest.   
Early during his stay in Ghana, Mansour asks Phillips to write a letter vouching 
for him as a traveler to the U.S, inciting Phillips’s anger: “Here before me was a man 
who had served time in a British prison for being an illegal immigrant, asking me to help 
him to become an illegal immigrant in the United States.”   Phillips ends the exc ange by 
telling Mansour, rather noncommittally, that they could discuss his situation at another 
time (139).   Several days later, and quite inexplicably, Phillips decides to hear Mansour 
out and see if he can help him (154).  There is no causal explanation for this turn, and 
thus it discursively refutes the teleology that typifies Glissant’s boundaries.  Furthermore, 
while the narrative content never discloses how Phillips goes about helping Mansour, the 
text itself yields to Mansour’s narrative, set off in a later, separate sec ion of the book 
titled with his name.  This section relates Mansour’s trials and tribulations as a Ghanaian 
immigrant in Britain.  Notwithstanding the narrator’s now familiar criti ism and 
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incredulity—he ends the section with “Is he really asking me for money?  Mansour, who 
has not even bothered to apply for a job since returning to Ghana. . .Able-bodied, smart 
Mansour, presenting himself as ‘third world’ victim”—the text itself opens up to 
Mansour’s story as yet another “relative” that deserves to be told (198-9).  The rather 
significant difference between the text’s “giving-on-and-with” Mansour’s story, as 
opposed to Quaque’s, lies in the fact that the instance of Relation with Quaque occurs 
textually across historical time, while Mansour’s occurs contemporaneously with the 
narrator’s account of his own lived experiences.  While concluding that the contemporary 
instance of Relation occurs a  a result of the historical instance would go against the anti-
teleological, anti-linear and anti-generalizing reading I offer here, these ostensibly 
historical and contemporary instances do link up in some way.  In fact, Chakrabarty’s 
notion of the ontological, shared and constant “now” of non-modern and modern subjects 
helps to articulate just how they relate—through the recognition of affective histories 
which cannot be known, appropriated or taken hold of, and the translation of that 
knowledge into Relation’s necessary openness toward others.    
Phillips has explained that his engagement with the past stems from his desire for 
people “to accept the fact that moving across these old lines in a personal way is the way 
forward, is the only thing that we have” (Clingman 136, original emphasis). For Phillips, 
recognizing the complicated existence of the past within the present is just a  e sential to 
changing society (the role of the writer as he sees it) as the ability to understand his 
contemporaries.  In the articulation of his own historical project, Chakrabarty advances 
one way of moving forward as  
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To see the modern as inevitably contested, to write over the given and privileged 
narratives of citizenship other narratives of human connections that draw 
sustenance from dreamed-up pasts and futures where collectivities are defined
neither by the rituals of citizenship nor by the nightmare of “tradition” that 
“modernity” created.  There are of course no (infra) structural sites where such 
dreams could lodge themselves.  Yet they will recur . . . (46) 
 
 
In The Atlantic Sound, Phillips provides a structural textual site in which these dreamed 
collectivities can and do take hold through emotive identification, and/or feelings of 
solidarity and the simultaneous acceptance of opacity between vastly different subjects, 
and across time and space. Skeptics might deem the narrative form a poor alternative to 
more concrete worldly institutions, but Glissant illuminates how the textual recurrence of 
these dreams can space themselves out into the world, informing “the imaginary of 
peoples, their varied poetics, which it then transforms” (1).  A transformed imaginary 
infused by opacity and the processes of Relation, will eventually lead to the consolidation 
of a diasporic community that allows individual selves—with all their private, complex 
and irreducible characteristics—to flourish and thus, to enhance the community’s ability 
to nurture and protect them.  
At the very end of The Atlantic Sound, Phillips visits the settlement of the Hebrew 
Israelites, African-American transplants to the Negev desert who claim to have created a 
society completely free of social ills like drug addiction, crime, homosexuality and cancer 
(!).  As in the other travel accounts he conveys in this text, he appears critical of this 
group of about two thousand transplanted African Americans.  For example, his imagery 
resonates with the idea that this ostensibly closed society suffocates him: “T s is not air.  
I left behind air in another place.  I begin to drip, to accept my fate.  I am among them.  I 
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want to know why they are here” (268).  Of course, the Israelites live in the desert, but 
his brief stay begins to feel not only physically, but also psychically stifling.  
Interestingly, he represents the views of these people as simultaneously different and 
similar to his own.  The Hebrew Israelites, like Phillips, remain cynical about the 
possibilities for diasporic unity throughout the globe, which is why they enact a literal
return to Africa in order to establish an actual unified community.  Yet, unlike Phillips, 
this cynicism initiated their intentional break from the rest of the world, a turning away 
and closing off—in other words, an explicit rejection of the possibilities embedded in 
Relation.  His own attempts to reach out and understand them (and others), however, 
once again embody the hopeful process of errantry, whereby he “plunges into the 
opacities of that part of the world to which he has access” (Glissant 20). The results not 
only yield a reading of Phillips as enacting Relation through errantry, but also 
demonstrate the impossibility of the closed society; for this society, he shows, remains 
open to the influence of other cultures despite its stated mission.   
 Phillips repeatedly highlights this ostensibly African society’s “failure” to 
actually represent African culture, in their dress, “This is not African dress; this is not 
local dress; this is the costume of a culture I do not understand” (268), in their behavior, 
“They are American girls.  Except they have never visited the United States” (270), and 
in their music, “Soul.  Light jazz.  African-American music” (269).  In doing so, he 
articulates the ways in which the return home inevitably manifests as yet another process 
of Relation among the different cultures of the diaspora. Although his representation of 
the closed society the Hebrew Israelites attempt to create represents what Glissant labels 
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a totality “in danger of immobility,” he actually hints at the positive interactions of 
African-American, African, and Afro-Caribbean cultures in this space (171).  For 
instance, at the New World Passover celebration, where the Hebrew Israelite  c lebrate 
their escape from “the great captivity,” a young woman sings Bob Marley’s “Redemption 
Song,” “The international anthem of the African diaspora.  High in the hills of Jamaic .  
On the coast of Brazil.  In Brooklyn.  In every major city in Europe.  And now here in 
Israel” (272). Of course, it seems logical that the work of Bob Marley—a descendant of 
African people—would be treasured in the Israelite community; yet, the identif cation of 
this song as a culturally international text definitively highlights culture as an ongoing, 
creolizing process.  “Relation is movement,” Glissant argues, and this fact belies the 
social closure and putative stability of the culture imagined by the Hebrew Is aelites 
(171). 
Finally, Phillips’ own reading of this closed society in relation to the rest of the 
world thoughtfully renders his sympathy with their desires to create such a society, while 
simultaneously addressing their ideological folly 
 
You were transported in a wooden vessel across a broad expanse of water to a 
place which rendered your tongue silent.  Look.  Listen.  Learn.  And as you 
began to speak, you remembered fragments of a former life.  Shards of memory.  
Careful.  Some will draw blood.  You dressed your memory in the new words of 
this new country.  Remember.  There were no round-trip tickets in your part of the 
ship.  Exodus.  It is futile to walk into the face of history.  As futile as trying to 
keep the dust from one’s eyes in the desert.  (275) 
 
 
The Hebrew Israelites’ folly lies not only in their miscomprehension of cultural realities, 
it also results from their misunderstanding of historical realities.  The historical facts of 
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African dispersal instituted by the slave trade cannot be refuted.  Yet, this historical 
knowledge is always inherently limited and therefore can never be sufficient to ground 
the creation of a contemporary unified diasporic community—across historical and 
subjective differences.  Metaphorically, walking into the face of history signifies the 
refusal to recognize history’s multiplicity, instability, and continual presence in the 
present—all of which are necessary to instantiate Relation in, with, and through others in 
the contemporary world.  The Atlantic Sound’s poignancy in rendering these truths 
explicit testifies to Phillips’s efforts to create an open global diasporic c mmunity, and 
thus also belies the skepticism and emotive distance readers so often take for granted in 
his work.  Instead of embodying the cynical outlook of its narrator, The Atlantic Sound 
represents the difficult, painful, but undeniably hopeful work of striving toward Relation 
with others to create an open, flexible and viable diasporic community. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: THE PRAXIS OF READING COMMUNITY 
 
 Many scholars and writers have contested the use of “post” in “postcolonial 
studies” as a prematurely celebratory view of the sociopolitical and economic realities of 
the contemporary world.  In Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique, Benita Parry 
provides an excellent overview of the critique of this prefix found in the works of Anne 
McClintock, Laura Chrisman, Ella Shohat, and Arif Dirlik (among others).22  In brief, 
these critics contest the singular European view of time and history embedded within the 
term “postcolonial” and its conception of colonialism—its processes and remnants—as a 
matter of the past, and therefore, a justification for “ignoring the contemporary actuality 
of global politics within a capitalist world-system” (57).  In my own view of postcolonial 
theory, such incisive critique is absolutely essential to the critical evaluation of 
contemporary processes of globalization and neo-colonialism that continue to reinforce 
economic, gendered, racial, nationalist, and other forms of oppression throughout the 
world.  Nevertheless, critique as a mode of contestation only brings us part of the way in 
successfully contesting the persistent dominance of patriarchal, capitalist and racist value 
systems that permeate relations between developed and developing countries.  We also
need to create (or consciously recognize others’ creations of) value system that become 
viable alternatives to our current modes of thinking and ways of being in the world.  The 
                                                          
22 See Chapter 4, “Signs of the Times.”    
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term “postcolonial,” as I see it, then, not only embeds all of the limitations so thoroughly 
explored by the abovementioned critics and many others, but it also represents the ed 
goal—the dream that drives (or should drive) the work of postcolonial writers and 
scholars.  This end goal certainly drives both my analyses of the literary txts I have 
examined in this dissertation and the development of my theorization of community as 
collective action, praxis, and discourse.   
As I stated in my introduction, postcolonial and Caribbean theorists tend to take 
the terms of community for granted in their more specific theorizations of identity, 
writing, nationalism, diaspora, history, and cross-cultural relationships.  By honing in o  
the nature of the communities represented in Caribbean literary texts, I uncover the ways 
in which such texts have answered the call for the creation of alternative paradigms to 
national and diasporic communities, and I show how the literature complicates curr nt 
theories of identity and history.  Carol Boyce-Davies has argued that “for Black women’s 
writing . . . it is premature and often useless to articulate the writer/theorist split so 
common in European discourses for many of the writers do both simultaneously or 
sequentially” (35).  I concur, and further argue that the literary texts I eamine here (even 
Phillips’) go further in theorizing new potential models of community than do the 
theoretical texts themselves. Perhaps this is so because literature plays out in the realm of 
the imaginary; its possibilities are not limited by the rationalist and empiricist emphases 
embedded in theory.  Such a conclusion certainly appears valid in the face of works like 
Louisiana and I, Tituba.  Literature also offers multiple levels of interpretation and 
signification at once, which better allows for the simultaneous deconstruction of old ways 
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of thinking and the creation of new modes of thought.  Consider, for example, Beka 
Lamb, in which Zee Edgell challenges Eurocentric historicism and complicates 
Chakrabarty’s theory of historical time and  multiple theories of nationalist time, all while 
creating an alternative model for a national community.  Such an undertaking would 
prove perhaps more difficult in a theoretical text, but here, as in the other primary works, 
the literary form becomes the more fruitful site for writers to theoriz and scholars to 
recognize original ways of experiencing and imagining community.  Thus, I believe that 
Caribbean and postcolonial scholars should read literature not only as a poetic form, but 
as a form of theory in and of itself.    
Because of their articulation of complex theoretical ideas in imaginary contexts, I 
further argue that Caribbean literary texts demand a praxis of reading which focuses on 
their creation and production rather than critique and deconstruction.  I take up this 
reading praxis in the spirit of theorists like Wilson Harris, who continually attempts to 
focalize the positive connections and cross-cultural relationships embedded in literary
forms, and Homi Bhabha, who strives to recognize the ways in which colonial and neo-
colonial subjects assert agency within an overwhelming structure of hegemonic power 
that denies them agency at every turn.  Thus, my reading practices may not be 
particularly new, but they contribute new insights into the nature of forms of community, 
and advance the current critical discussion about national and diasporic forms of 
community in postcolonial and Caribbean theory.  
In this dissertation, this method of reading has led me to my argument that 
communities depicted in Caribbean literature can and should be conceived differently 
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from the understanding of community as grounded in some form of identity—whether 
that be nationalist, Afro-diasporic, classist, racial, gendered, etc.—or shared history.  
Critics have already articulated the brilliant challenges that Caribbean writers raise 
against Eurocentric historicism; sovereign subjectivity; notions of coherent, stable 
identity; emphases on reason as the only valid way of knowing; and of course, on 
capitalist production as the only means of progress.  Collectively, however, we have yet 
to articulate the ways in which these challenges lead writers to unique representations of 
collective existence and survival.  Our critical focus, then, should explore the ways in 
which Caribbean, and indeed, postcolonial literature illuminates the coming together of 
groups through solidarity, cooperation, relationships, and communal discourses, and how 
these modes in some ways allow for the transcendence of harmful limitations (vilence, 
injustice, exclusion, obliteration, etc.) enforced by more traditional models of 
community.  I do not contend that such alternative communities are totally void of these 
dangers; instead, I argue that praxis-based communities are less susceptible to them.  I 
also emphasize that the theorization of community as cooperative action, participation, 
and collective struggle inherently stresses the agency of Caribbean liter ry subjects, 
which in turn, drives our imagination toward the recognition of actual Caribbean 
subjects’ agency in the world.    
By theorizing community as a praxis or discourse rather than what Sue Im-Le 
calls “a body of individuals,” the scholarly conversation moves beyond the necessary, but 
somewhat repetitive discussions of Caribbean or creole identities and into an exploration 
of how these play out in original forms of national and diasporic community.  Thus, we 
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are able to see how Condé’s community of perpetual outsiders decreases the significance 
of identity in community, which serves as a formative basis of both nation and diaspora 
forms.  Similarly, Phillips’ structural emphasis on Relation rejects the national and 
cultural divisions that the narrator obsesses over in his musings about diasporic 
community.       
As I have shown throughout my study, conceiving community as action 
simultaneously participates in the critique of “capital H” History that is the central focus 
of subaltern studies scholars and Caribbean theorists like Glissant, redirects our focus in 
the literature toward the little-known, minority histories that get overlooked in dominant 
historical discourses, and posits modes of community that reject “shared history” as their 
foundation. It also allows for further critique of certain postcolonial paradigms of 
historical thought; for example, as in Edgell’s problematization of nationalist pedagogical 
time.  Thus, although my exploration of community pushes toward new ways of 
imagining community itself, such an exploration inadvertently discovers Caribben 
writers’ innovations in postcolonial historiographical thinking as well.  This, I must note, 
is the authors’ innovation and not mine, but my theory of community helps to expose it.  
In short, theorizing community as praxis has implications for discussions of nation and 
diaspora, Caribbean identity, and postcolonial historical thought.  It also exertsa 
powerful influence on what we can decipher and learn from Caribbean literature, even 
beyond the texts I discuss throughout this project.   
 Finally, my exploration of community here has inevitably led me to further 
questions about the nature of how communities are gendered, the differences between the 
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projects of male and female authors, and the ways in which their representations of 
community differ or seem similar.  In my exploration of these literary texts, I discovered 
that Edgell, Condé and Brodber, to varying degrees, work toward a heterogeneously 
gendered, inclusive model of collective praxis, but I cannot say the same for Phillips’ The 
Atlantic Sound.   The women authors here include male subjects who inhabit non-
traditional roles in their alternative imagined communities, whereas Phillips barely 
acknowledges the voices of female subjects.  This is not to say that Phillips does not 
include female subjects in his other work, but simply that he does not do so in this text—
a text that I am reading as an attempt to re-connect the diasporic community.  This 
problematic gendered exclusion raises questions about the viability of his constru tion of 
an alternative diasporic community.  Indeed, from the work of these authors, the onus 
seems to be on women writers to imagine a space for community in which men and 
women work together to overcome social injustices.  This is a problem that raises urgent 
questions for me, such as what is the nature of collective action among men and 
collective action among women?  Do these forms differ or are they similar?  What is the 
significance of these differences or similarities in the forms that productive, alternative 
communities can take? And in whose view or according to whom?  These are questions 
the answers to which would contribute a more thorough methodological approach to the 
theory of community as praxis, and further advance discussions of community in 
Caribbean and postcolonial theory on the whole.   
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